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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to utilize the insights
provided by the decisions of the Virginia Court of Appeals
during the years 1776-1830 to gain a fuller tinderstanding
of the concept of "republicanism" through an analysis of
its application in courts of law.
It is clear that in the years after the Revolution,
the Virginia Court of Appeals made a striking statement
about the nature of that Revolution in Virginia. It
defined a new constitutional order by elevating the
Virginia constitution to the plane of higher law, and by
articulating and implementing the doctrine of popular
sovereignty. The court made workable such previously
theoretical constructs as the separation of powers, and
adapted the English legal heritage to republican dictates
and the demands of a new society. It was also instrumental
in applying new republican conceptions to specific areas of
the law. In so doing, the court displayed a clear
deference to the policy initiatives of the legislative
branch.
While applying republican principles, the Virginia
court added a decidedly conservative gloss, favoring stable
rules of law and the protection of existing property rights
at every opportunity, in the process supporting the
existing political order. At the same time, the Virginia
Court of Appeals was in the forefront of a localistic
response to the challenges posed by the establishment of a
new federal government.
Taken together, these conclusions suggest that
Virginia retained in large part a conservative, localistic
strain of republicanism well into the nineteenth century,
while its judiciary remained essentially incrementalist in
its policy-making approach.

vi
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION:

REPUBLICANISM, THE COURTS, AND

THE REVOLUTIONARY SETTLEMENT

The doctrine of "republicanism" has long been central
to American life.

It served as a theoretical justification

for the Revolution, imbued the institutions of the new
nation, and has functioned as the basis for American
political thought from that day to this.

Considering the

fundamentality of republicanism to the American experience,
it is remarkable how little the doctrine is actually
tinderstood.

Despite continual efforts to explicate the

nuances of republican theory, the end result has been more
to muddle than to enlighten.
Scholars have long been interested in the intellectual
aspects of early American republicanism; in particular,
analyzing {and arguing about) what the term encompassed,
the wellsprings of the doctrine, and its implications for
the American experience.1

This, too, is a study of

republicanism in the early American republic.

It is not,

however, a study of republican "ideology” in the usual
sense of the term.

The students of intellectual history

who have focused their attention upon republicanism have
performed inestimable service in the effort to better
2
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3
understand the conceptual framework that motivated the
citizens of the new American republic-

But for all their

perceptiveness, they have left unanswered— indeed, unasked—
the kinds of questions that are immensely useful to a true
understanding of the early Republic; the kinds of questions
that reveal the actual workings of republicanism among the
participants in the republican experiment.

While the

broader, more theoretical studies form an indispensable
precursor, it is time for the next step:

a study of the

application of the lofty principles of republicanism to the
mundane affairs of everyday life.

For it is only through

an understanding of the day-to-day reality of applied
republicanism that we can hope to resolve the larger
theoretical issues posed by the historians of ideology.
This analysis, then, is an effort at illuminating the
application of republican principles.

It will seek to do

so within a manageably narrow focus, both geographically
{the state of Virginia}, as well as in terms of the source
materials utilized (appellate court decisions).
Discerning the precise nature of those "republican
principles" is part of the task at hand.

Indeed, defining

"republicanism" is no easy matter, and has been a central
problem since the inception of the republic.

In 1803, St.

George Tucker commented that "the revolution which
separated the present United States from Great Britain . . .
produced a corresponding revolution . . .
of our government . . .."2

in the principles

Most of Tucker's contemporaries
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4
would have agreed that the break with England had been
accompanied by a revolution in principles, and most would
have been content to ascribe the label "republican" to the
new order.

But there was considerable disagreement over

the precise meaning of republicanism.

Certainly it implied

an absence of monarchy and aristocracy.3
agreement vanished.

Beyond that,

Some viewed it essentially as only the

removal of the British monarchy from the constitutional
structure, while others viewed it as a blueprint for a
reordering of society.4

Different conceptualizations of

republicanism were to continue into the nineteenth century.
The perceptions of this construct may also have varied by
region, and even by class.3

All of this goes to suggest

the difficulty in making any valid generalizations with
respect to republicanism.

Indeed, part of the strength of

republicanism and the reason for its almost universal
acceptance was due to the fact that it was such a vague
concept that it could be, in effect, all things to all
people.6
The articulation of republican principles could be
found, in the first instance, in the constitutions and
statutes of the various colonies which were adopted in the
years immediately after the break with Great Britain.

Such

statements of republican policy, while important, are still
an incomplete guide to an understanding of "applied
republicanism.”

While the constitutions and statutes were

key efforts to apply republican concepts to the pragmatic
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task of actual governance, these documents were themselves
essentially statements of policy which, in turn, had to be
applied at the level of individual action.

Thus, to truly

reach the essence of republicanism— that is, to perceive
republicanism in the swirl of day-to-day existence— our
attention must be directed to the forum where republican
principles were reduced to the level of pragmatic deci
sions— that is, to the courts.
In the courts (here, in particular, the Court of
Appeals of Virginia) could be found the application of
republican principles at all levels of sophistication, from
the high theory of constitutional interpretation to such
pragmatic questions as who would receive the assets of a
deceased's estate.

Judicial decisions, indeed, are

particularly suited to our task, since they provide such
clear examples of theoretical principles in practical
application.

As James Willard Hurst once put it, "because

compared with other modes of social adjustment law yields
an uncommon amount of formally defined choices and
decisions, legal sources present to a knowledgeable reader
a specially reliable means to identify continuities and
discontinuities or changes of direction in social
relations."7

Indeed, "a society reveals itself in its law.

Its points of growth and the interests it values may be
disclosed even in the decision of a seemingly technical and
insignificant legal question."8

The nature of

republicanism in its every-day form, then, is best
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articulated in the decisions of its courts.

Leonard Levy

has noted that through judicial decisions, ”we may discern
what [society] thought about the relation of the individual
to the state and of the states to the nation; about rights,
duties, and liabilities, about the roles of government; and
about the character of law itself.

We may also learn how

liberty and order were comparatively valued; which
interests were deemed important enough to secure in legal
form; and where the points of social tension, growth, and
power were.”9

It is in the answers to such questions that

our insights into the nature of the new order in Virginia
can be found.
More specifically, the essential issues in this study
can be simply stated.

Four questions arise which are of

central importance, and each relates in one way or another
to the nature of the "Revolutionary settlement" in
Virginia; that is, how Virginia came to grips with the new
order which was forged in the fires of a republican
revolution and tempered by several decades of experience in
implementing the new reality.
The first area of investigation is the substantive
application of republican ideology at the state level.

The

constitution, statutes, and— especially— the decisions of
the Court of Appeals provide an opportunity to gain an
understanding of the substance of the republican revolution
in Virginia.

In the years after the Revolution, the court

was instrumental in the implementation of theoretical
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concepts such as constitutionalism and popular sovereignty.
At a more prosaic level the court's application of
republican theory took the guise of adapting the English
common law to Virginia's republican environment and
implementing legislative enactments of republican prin
ciples.

After 1787, the Court of Appeals also helped to

articulate Virginia's response to an important shift in
the republican universe:

the creation of a new federal

government of undetermined scope and powers.

In all of

these areas the court played a principal role in Virginia's
response to a new republican reality.
A second question involves whether the legislature or
the court took the leading role in implementing the new
republican principles (the executive was relatively weak in
early Virginia).

The significance of this stems from its

implications for such republican notions as representation
and popular sovereignty.

It also serves as a measure of

the change that occurred between the Revolution and 1830 in
the approach to the making of policy in a republican state.
A third area of analysis is related to this conception
of change over time; that is, it looks to the dynamism
exhibited by the Court of Appeals in its treatment of
republican issues.

The generally-accepted interpretation

holds that between the Revolution and 1830 there was a
considerable transformation in both the substance of
republicanism and in its application.

Scholars such as

Gordon Wood, John M. Murrin, and Rowland Berthoff have
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suggested that republican values shifted from a focus

on

communalism and hierarchy to the celebration of
individualism and equality.10

"By 1820," said Wood,

"Americans had moved into another century, not only in time
but in thought, in the way they perceived themselves and
their world.

They had experienced a social and cultural

transformation as great as any in American history. . . .
This vast transformation, this move from classical
republicanism to romantic democracy in a matter ofdecades,
was the real American revolution . . .."lx

On the

institutional side, legal historians such as James Willard
Hurst and Morton Horwitz have argued that courts grew ever
more activist ("instrumentalist") in the decades after the
Revolution, and by 1830 the judiciary was pursuing a policy
agenda in a manner not unlike previous legislative
activity.12

The objective is to see if Virginia's

experience fits this pattern.
A fourth, related, aspect of the analysis incorporates
all of the above issues and seeks to integrate the Virginia
experience into generally accepted versions of the
transformation of American politics and society at the turn
of the nineteenth century.

In particular, the focus is

upon the extent to which Virginia (and the South in
general) depart from the accepted interpretation.

Several

of the scholars analyzing this period suggest that the
conclusions regarding the transformation of republicanism
may not be valid for the South.

Harry Scheiber indicates
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that the South may have been "fundamentally different,"
while Gordon Wood, in his conclusion that the triumph of
liberalism was overwhelming, adds a disclaimer that this
was true "at least outside the South."13

Perhaps no one

has posed the issue more clearly, or more strongly, than
Scheiber:

"Was the South so dominated by the 1slaveocracy'

interests, supported by the region's 'deference-politics'
tradition and structure, that the ante-bellum South was
fundamentally different . . . from the rest of the country?
...

We may need a new typology of the ante-bellum

southern states . . .,"14

One of the tasks before us is

to test this hypothesis and, if necessary, to begin to
develop that "new typology” of Southern republicanism.
The resolution of all of these issues provides a key
to our understanding of the practical application of
republicanism in Virginia.

It is clear that Virginia did

adopt, through its constitution and supporting statutes, a
republican solution to the issues facing the Commonwealth
at the inception of the Revolution.

The Court of Appeals

was intimately involved in this process as well, not only
in the mere application of the republican principles set
out in constitution and statute, but also in actively
defining the substance of republicanism in Virginia.

In

doing so, the Virginia Court of Appeals made a striking
statement about the nature of the Revolution in Virginia.
In the years after the Revolution, the court defined a new
constitutional order through the practical implementation
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of such conceptual matters as constitutional supremacy,
popular sovereignty, and the separation of powers.

It

adapted the English legal heritage to republican dictates,
and implemented legislative assertions of republican
principles.

In the process, the court added a conservative

gloss to those republican principles, favoring stable rules
of law and the protection of existing property, and by
implication, at least, supporting the existing social
order.

At the same time, the Virginia court was in the

forefront of a localistic response to the challenges posed
by the establishment of the new federal government.
The Virginia Court of Appeals also carved out a unique
niche for itself in the policy-making process.

The court

adopted a deferential attitude toward the legislative will
where that will was discernible.

In areas where no

legislative mandate existed, the court followed what might
be termed an "implementalist" policy that stressed the
achievement of a reasonable result within the context of
existing policy approaches.

The only real exception to the

court's reticent approach was in the field of judicial
review, where the court placed the will of the "people," as
expressed in the constitution, above all other priorities.
Interestingly, these judicial attitudes and approaches
remained remarkably consistent throughout the period
studied.

Taken together, these conclusions represent a

departure from the generally-accepted interpretation of the
early national period, and mark Virginia as a potentially
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critical piece of the puzzle that was early America.

The

experience of Virginia, for example, may be a key to our
understanding of the divergence of Northern and Southern
interests, attitudes, and approach in the nineteenth
century.

The bulk of the following analysis will be centered on
the interpretation of decisions of the Virginia Court of
Appeals.

To place the Court of Appeals in its proper

institutional context, a brief summary of the genesis and
structure of the Virginia court system may be helpful.15
The longstanding system of local ("inferior") county courts
and corporation courts had been left undisturbed by the
Revolution.

The colonial General Court, however, made up

of the governor and his councillors, had ceased to exist
following the collapse of royal government.

That court had

exercised both original and appellate jurisdiction, and
united the functions of law and equity.

The void was

quickly filled by the Virginia patriots in 1776.

The

Virginia constitution of 1776 had laid the foundation of
the first state court system by providing for the appoint
ment of "judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals, and
General Court, Judges in Chancery,
Admiralty . . ..1,16

[and] Judges of

The details of organization were left

to the General Assembly, which by a series of enactments
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between 1776 and 1779 established a Court of Admiralty, a
High Court of Chancery, a General Court, and a Court of
Appeals.17
The Court of Admiralty exercised admiralty jurisdic
tion, and had a bench consisting of three judges.

This

court ceased to exist after 1789 when admiralty jurisdic
tion was transferred to the federal courts.

The new

General Court succeeded to the common-law jurisdiction of
the colonial General Court.

Its jurisdiction was "general

over all persons, and in all matters, or things at common
law" where the debt or claim was ten pounds or more.
also possessed jurisdiction in criminal cases.

It

The

General Court also had appellate jurisdiction over
judgments at law of the county and corporation courts.
bench was composed of five judges.

The

The High Court of

Chancery took over the equity jurisdiction of the old
General Court.

Like its common-law counterpart (the new

General Court), it had general jurisdiction "over all
persons and in all causes in chancery" where the value was
ten pounds or above, both in original cases and appeals
from the chancery side of the county courts.

The bench

consisted of three judges, or chancellors.
The first Court of Appeals, the body that most
concerns us, did not have a separate bench, but was
composed of all the superior court judges:

the three

chancellors, the five judges of the General Court, and the
three admiralty judges.

This appeals court reviewed
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decrees of the High Court of Chancery, judgments of the
General Court, and sentences of the Court of Admiralty,
where the amount was fifty pounds and above or the matter
involved a freehold or franchise.18
This initial court system lasted only about a decade;
by 1788 the inefficiencies in the system caused the General
Assembly to undertake a radical restructuring.

In that

year, the jurisdiction of the General Court'was, for all
practical purposes, parcelled out to eighteen district
courts, to be attended by judges of an enlarged General
Court (which retained only an extremely limited jurisdic
tion in its own right).

The High Court of Chancery was

reduced to one judge.19
Importantly, the Court of Appeals was now constituted
as a separate court, with its own bench of five judges.
Its jurisdiction remained essentially the same as before.
Although there was some further tinkering with the other
courts,20 for the remainder of the period under study (that
is, from 1789-1830), the Court of Appeals retained the same
essential characteristics.21

Its judges represented the

court of last resort in virtually all cases (except in
criminal matters).

The Virginia Court of Appeals, then,

represented the final judicial statement on the vast
majority of substantive and procedural issues that found
their way to the Virginia court system.

As such, its

decisions are deserving of close study for the light they
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may shed on the practical application of republican
principles in early Virginia.22
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Quarterly 29 (1972): 49-80.
2. St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries: With
Notes of Reference to the Constitution and Laws, of the
Federal Government of the United States: and of the
Commonwealth of Virginia. 5 vols. (Philadelphia, 1803),
1: iv.
3. Shalhope, "Toward a Republican Synthesis," 72; John R.
Howe, Jr., "Republican Thought and the Political Violence
of the 1790s," American Quarterly 19 (1967): 153.
4. William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law:
The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 17601830 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 68.
5. Edward Countryman, "Of Republicanism, Capitalism, and
the 'American Mind'," William and Mary Quarterly 44 (1987):
561-62; Shalhope, "Republicanism and Early American
Historiography," 335, 339-42; Robert Kelley, "Ideology and
Political Culture from Jefferson to Nixon," American
Historical Review 82 (1977): 536; Howe, "Republican
Thought," 164; Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible: Social
Change. Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the
American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1979). J. R. Pole suggests that disagreements over the
nature of republicanism existed at least through the
debates over the Fourteenth Amendment. J. R. Pole,
"Equality in the Founding of the American Republic: A
Complex Heritage," in Gordon S. Wood and J. R. Pole, eds..
Social Radicalism and the Idea of Equality in the American
Revolution (Houston, 1976), 30.
6. Shalhope, "Toward a Republican Synthesis," 72.
7. James Willard Hurst, "Legal Elements in United States
History," in Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, eds.,
Perspectives in American History, vol. 5 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1971), 12.
8. Leonard W. Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief
Justice Shaw (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957),
303.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

16
9. Ibid., 4.
10. Gordon S. Wood, ed., The Rising Glory of America. 17601820 (New York, 1971); Rowland Berthoff and John Murrin,
"Feudalism, Communalism, and the Yeoman Freeholder: The
American Revolution Considered as a Social Accident," in
Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hudson, Essays on the
American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1973); John M. Murrin, "Gordon S. Wood and
the Search for Liberal America," William and Mary Quarterly
44 (1987): 597-601.
11. Wood, ed.. The Rising Glory of America, 1, 2, 8-9, 22.
12. James Williard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom
in the Nineteenth-Century United States (1956; reprint,
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967); Morton J.
Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).
13. Harry N. Scheiber, "Government and the Economy:
Studies of the 'Commonwealth' Policy in Nineteenth-Century
America," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 3 (1972):
150, n. 43; Gordon S. Wood, "Ideology and the Origins of
Liberal America," William and Mary Quarterly 44 (1987):
640. See also Kelley, "Ideology and Political Culture,"
537; Shalhope, "Republicanism and Early American
Historiography," 354.
14. Scheiber, "Government and the Economy," 150, n. 43.
15. The following summary is taken from Charles F. Hobson,
ed., The Papers of John Marshall, vol. 5, Selected Law
Cases, 1784-1800 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1987), xxviii-xxxiii.
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22. This study does not emphasize the individual per
sonalities of the judges on the Court of Appeals during
the period studied. It is possible that these personal
qualities may have had some— perhaps indeterminable— impact
upon the court's policy decisions. It is unlikely,
however, that they had a major effect. Fortunately for the
student of the court, the membership of the tribunal was
remarkably stable in the early national period. In the
forty-two years under study, the five-member panel had only
fifteen different justices on its bench (see Appendix B).
Of these, only a handful appeared to take a leading role in
shaping the court's decisions. Edmund Pendleton (17881303), St. George Tucker (1804-1811), and Spencer Roane
(1794-1822), in particular, loom large (in the final decade
judicial participation was more dispersed). There were, of
course, occasional personality clashes among members of the
judiciary, as elsewhere. The most famous of these existed
between Edmund Pendleton and George Wythe of the High Court
of Chancery, and between St. George Tucker and Spencer
Roane. There is, however, no substantial evidence that the
substance of the court's decisions was materially affected
by any of this.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER II
ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

The Revolution which began in 1775 marked a watershed
in the relationship between the American colonies and the
mother country.

The actual fighting which erupted in April

of that year made irreversible the drift toward disunion,
and within fifteen months the independence of the American
colonies was formally proclaimed.

But those developments,

momentous as they were, were not the most revolutionary
events of 1775-1776.

That sobriquet must be reserved for

the establishment of the several state governments in the
vacuum left by the collapse of the royal colonial rule.
The mere construction of new governments in the midst of an
unprecedented revolt against the Crown was bold enough, but
what made the move truly revolutionary was the nature of
the governments created.

For in responding to the

practical necessity of establishing some form of government
over their society, the revolutionaries seized the
opportunity "to reconsider the nature of their government
and to formulate explicitly the assumptions on which they
wished state power . . .

to rest."1

18
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The first step, of course, in Virginia as elsewhere,
was the formation of the new state government itself.

The

momentous nature of this undertaking was not lost upon the
Virginians.

Like their fellow revolutionaries in the

other colonies, Virginia patriots recognized that they were
"the first people whom heaven has favoured with an
opportunity of deliberating upon and choosing the forms of
government under which they should live."2

In Virginia,

the process began in earnest in May of 1776 when the
Virginia Convention appointed "a committee to prepare a
declaration of its rights, and such a plan of government as
will be most likely to maintain peace and order in this
colony, and secure substantial and equal liberty to the
people.”3

By June 29, 1776, the Virginia Convention had

completed its deliberations and produced the calied-for
"plan of government" in the form of a "Declaration of
Rights," followed by a "Constitution or Form of Govern
ment."

These documents were at once a fulfillment of

revolutionary ideals and a blueprint for the practical
governance of the new Commonwealth.4
While the framers were responsible for constructing
the new plan of government, the Virginia Court of Appeals,
in turn, took a leading role in implementing this rather
amorphous document, and thereby helped to make the
constitutional frame of government a viable one.

Indeed,

the court made key contributions to Virginia's new
constitutional order at all levels— institutional,
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theoretical, and practical.

Perhaps the court's most

momentous contribution came at the institutional level,
where it construed the constitution to be a law superior to
mere statutory enactments, thereby establishing the
constitution as the fundamental framework around which a
republican society would be erected.
The court also helped to define and implement the
theoretical underpinnings of Virginia's new constitution,
particularly with respect to the key doctrine of popular
sovereignty.

In the process, the Court of Appeals

contributed to a fascinating irony in Virginia's approach
to the new constitutional order.

In the midst of adopting

seemingly radical solutions (such as popular sovereignty)
to the issues facing Virginians after the break with
England, the Commonwealth applied those radical solutions
in a remarkably conservative manner.

For example, the

court, by supporting the constitution's radical approach to
"sovereignty,” also gave its implicit blessing to that
document's conservative definition of "popular" (that is,
who was entitled to participate politically in the new
order).

This was a limited definition, designed to

maintain the authority of the existing power structure.
The court also played an essential role at another
level.

The constitution represented, by its very nature, a

generalized statement of the desired structure of govern
ment, a mere skeletal form which had to be fleshed out to
become a smoothly functioning system.

Here, too, the Court
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of Appeals was instrumental in adding definition to the new
constitutional order.

By defining and implementing such

novel constitutional doctrines as the separation of powers,
for example, the court removed republicanism from the realm
of the abstract and placed it squarely within the reality
of everyday existence.
Finally, in the process of establishing this new
constitutional order in Virginia, the Court of Appeals
carved out a unique and important role for itself in
Virginia's republican universe as the primary "interpreter"
of the republican principles and doctrines contained in the
constitution and declaration of rights.

Virginia’s constitution and declaration of rights
contained language approaching rhetorical beauty in its
articulation of such overarching republican principles as
popular sovereignty, respect for individual rights, and
support for communal ideals.3

The constitution and

declaration of rights, however, as august as their language
was, had no irrefutable claim to any other status than a
mere legislative statement of the desired nature of a new
republican commonwealth, subject to legislative amendment
or rescission at any time.

This was due to the fact that

the Virginia constitution and declaration of rights had
been enacted as ordinances of the Virginia convention
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(i.e., interim legislature) in the same manner as all other
enactments of that session.

Despite the lack of overt

differentiation between statute and constitution, however,
the Court of Appeals almost immediately began to make
unequivocal statements about the superiority of that
constitution to mere legislative enactments.

This notion

of constitution as higher law was a conception that became
central to emerging perceptions of the proper nature of a
republican state.
This issue first arose in a judicial context in the
case of Commonwealth v. Caton in 1782.

The Court of

Appeals had been established in 1779, but before this time,
all that had come before the Court were some petitions
concerning land titles, which had been continued from term
to term.

Thus it was that when Commonwealth v. Caton came

on to be heard as its first reel adjudication, public
interest and attention were high.6

Commonly called "The

Case of the Prisoners," Commonwealth v. Caton was a highprofile prosecution of three leading Tories for treason.
The matter at issue arose in the context of an apparent
disagreement between the constitution and the statute as to
the power to pardon.

Under the constitution, the governor

had the power to pardon in most cases, except when "the law
shall otherwise direct," in which case it was the privilege
of the House of Delegates to grant the pardon.7

But a

statute had passed which provided that, in cases of
treason, the power to pardon passed not to the House, but
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to the House and Senate jointly.

In this case the accused

traitors had been convicted, then pardoned by the House,
but the Senate had refused to concur in the pardon.

The

prisoners attempted to evade execution by asserting that
the pardon by the House was sufficient under the constitu
tion.

The General Court adjoined the issue to the Court of

Appeals due to the "novelty and difficulty" of the case.8
The majority of the Court avoided the constitutional
issue by finding non-compliance with the statute, but Judge
George Wythe, in dicta (that is, judicial language not
binding upon later adjudications), made a ringing statement
about the role of the constitution, court, and legislature
in the Virginia scheme.

"If the whole legislature . . .

should attempt to overleap the bounds prescribed to them by
the people [in the constitution]," proclaimed Wythe, "I, in
administering the public justice of the country, will meet
the united powers, at my seat in this tribunal; and
pointing to the constitution, will say, to them, here is
the limit of your authority; and hither, shall you go, but
no further” (emphasis supplied).9

Justice James Mercer

also had no qualms about the issue, flatly maintaining that
the act was unconstitutional.10

Although such language did

not constitute an official holding of the court, the Caton
case was an early assertion that the document labelled a
"constitution" was somehow superior to mere legislation.
The Court of Appeals was much more decisive in 1788
when it next faced a statute of doubtful constitutionality.
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In that year the General Assembly had attempted to resolve
longstanding problems in Virginia's judicial system b$
restructuring it.

A law was passed creating new district

courts throughout the state.11

The justices of the Court

of Appeals were charged with the duty of sitting on these
new courts as circuit judges.

These judges took this law

to be an unconstitutional affront to their independence
through the imposition of burdensome new duties.

When the

court met for its Spring Term, in May, 1788, the judges
determined to resist this legislative encroachment.
Instead of flatly declaring it unconstitutional, however,
the court adopted a more conciliatory stance.

It addressed

a Remonstrance to the legislature, stating the grounds of
their objections.12

In so doing, the Court explicitly

recognized that "the constitution and the act are in
opposition and cannot exist together . . .."

This

presented no insuperable difficulties, however, since "the
former must control the operation of the latter."13

Here,

then, was an unequivocal assertion of the idea of the
constitution as superior to statute.
By the nineteenth century, the supremacy of the
c o n s titu tio n

was substantially unquestioned.

In 1828, in

the case of Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., the court treated
as axiomatic the conception that principles of the
constitution "limit the powers of the Legislature, and
prohibit the passing [of] any Law violating those prin
ciples ."

The generally accepted theory of constitutional
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superiority that evolved was probably best summed up by
Judge John Green in Crenshaw:

"The Legislature of the

State is declared by our Constitution to be a complete
Legislature, and consequently has all the powers of
Sovereignty, except so far as they are limited by the
Constitutions of Virginia and the United States” (emphasis
supplied).l4
In siim, then, it was the Court of Appeals which first
articulated this theory of constitutional supremacy in
Virginia, and best defined its limits.

Importantly, the

conceptualization behind this elevation of constitution
over statute goes to the heart of notions of republicanism.
It reflected developing notions of popular sovereignty,
for, by conceiving of a charter granted by the people that
governed all branches of government, no single branch could
become the oppressor of the people.13

In addition, placing

the wellspring of fundamental individual rights in an
organic document such as a constitution made them distinct
and somehow superior to— and protected from— governmental
intervention.16

This was, then, a radical new conception

of government, applied in a pragmatic fashion by the Court
of Appeals.
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The enshrinement of the constitution as higher law was
a key development, as it opened the way for the implementa
tion of Virginia's new constitutional order.

This

"constitutional order," however, involved more than the
mere words of the document itself; it represented also a
new conceptualization about the essence of a republican
government which was revolutionary in nature.

Here, too,

the Court of Appeals was instrumental in establishing the
viability of this new conception in Virginia.
Unquestionably the most important theoretical concept
underlying the Virginia constitution was the notion of
popular sovereignty.

The assumption that the new repub

lican government derived its power, in one form or another,
from the people, has been called the "one truly revolution
ary concept to stem from the American revolution."17
Indeed, the whole conception of sovereignty, and Virginia’s
solution to the dilemma it presented, colored every aspect
of the Revolutionary settlement in the Commonwealth.
The issue of sovereignty, which can be defined as "the
supreme power over the whole,”18 was one of immense
importance to Revolutionary Virginians.

Indeed, it has

been deemed "the most important doctrine of eighteenthcentury political science," and, in the decade after
independence, "the most important theoretical question of
politics . . . the ultimate abstract principle to which
nearly all arguments were sooner or later reduced."19

The

signing of the Declaration of Independence did not resolve
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this issue; indeed, it was the declaring of independence
that created it.

The problem of sovereignty arose out of

the universal assumption that sovereignty had to reside
somewhere in the state.

Prior to the Revolution, this

assumption produced no difficulties, since the locus of
power was presumed to reside in the crown, or in the crownin-Parliament.

This theoretical issue became pressing,

however, the moment that the colonies threw off their
allegiance to George III.

If sovereignty had to reside

somehwere, where did it now reside?
all obvious.

The answer was not at

It might reside in the Continental Congress,

the individual states, the county or town governments— or
the people.20

This last possibility was the most radical,

but Virginia opted for just this solution to the conundrum,
and it did so at the earliest possible moment, in the most
explicit terms.

In framing their constitution in May and

June of 1776, Virginians erected their new frame of
government upon an expressly popular foundation.

The

Virginia declaration of rights unequivocally stated that
"all power is vested in, and consequently derived from,
the people," and that "government is . . . instituted
for the common benefit, protection, and security of the
people . . .."21
This bold assertion that "power is vested in . . .
the people" was much more radical than it might first
appear.

By granting such authority and legitimacy to the

people, Virginians were, in the words of Richard Buel,
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"revers[ins] the dominant presumptions of eighteenthcentury English thought."22

Prior to this time, once

authority had been vested in the magistrate (via "contract"
or otherwise) it remained there indefinitely.

The

interests of the populace were subsumed to those of the
sovereign, and to countenance any other conception was
virtually unthinkable.

"To someone steeped in British

legal thought," observed Gordon Wood, "this explicit
retention of legal sovereignty in the people was preposter
ous .

It could only signify a repudiation of the concept

[of sovereignty] and an eventual breakdown of all govern
mental order."23

To the traditional British way of

thinking, then, power in the people meant anarchy.

To

sustain their novel theory of sovereignty, Virginians (and
Americans in general) thus had to move beyond familiar
conceptions and to formulate equally revolutionary precepts
for a new constitutional and political order.24
Virginians, in other words, were forced by the new
conception of sovereignty to rethink their whole system of
government.23

As Thomas Jefferson perceived, "the new

principle of representative democracy has rendered useless
almost everything written before on the structure of
government."26

Nonetheless, the solution did not prove to

be all that difficult.

Indeed, Virginia resolved its

theoretical problem with a stroke of the pen.

In a sense,

the Commonwealth solved the dilemma of popular sovereignty
in the very stating of the doctrine.

By establishing the
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locus of power in the people by means of a written
constitution, the framers of the Virginia declaration of
rights both announced the doctrine of popular sovereignty
and opened up whole new theoretical vistas.
The provisions of the new declaration of rights
revealed the framers' allegiance to the notion that
authority must remain in the people.

Indeed, as St. George

Tucker noted, the very "establishment of this constitution
was an immediate act of sovereignty" by the citizens of the
Commonwealth.27
more clear.

The provisions themselves could hardly be

In addition to flatly declaring "that all

power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the
people,” the framers went on to assert that "the magis
trates are their trustees and servants, and at all times
amenable to them."

Moreover, continued the framers,

"government is . . . instituted for the common benefit,
protection, and security of the people."

If the government

should fail in that objective, "a majority of the community
hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right,
to reform, alter, or abolish it."28

This, concluded

Tucker, represented "the principle of democracy.1,29
This bold statement of popular power was revolutionary
enough, but the framers went one step further in placing
this language in a document they considered part of the
constitution of Virginia.

In doing so, the Virginians

went beyond a mere statement about authority residing in
the people and made a commitment to a radical variation of
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popular sovereignty.

They thereby implicitly refuted a

common theory of the locus of such power.

The doctrine

that the Virginians rejected in the framing of their
constitution had its roots in traditional English govern
mental theory.

British constitutional theory, best

articulated by Sir William Blackstone, held that the
sovereign power of society resided in the legislature.30
Although Blackstone was anything but a believer in popular
sovereignty, the familiar belief in legislative power was
adapted by many patriots to emerging conceptions of
popular sovereignty.

According to these lights, sover

eignty indeed lay in the people— until the people delegated
that sovereignty to the legislature, which thereafter held
it unmolested.

This, of course, was a variation of the old

British conception of sovereignty, and was perhaps best
expressed by Benjamin Rush in 1787.

"The people of America

have mistaken the word sovereignty," said Rush.

"It is

often said that 'the sovereign and all other power is
seated in the people.'

This idea is unhappily expressed.

It should be— 'all power is derived from the people.'
possess it only on the days of their elections.

They

After

this, it is the property of their rulers, nor can they [the
people] exercise or resume it, unless it is abused."31
This orthodox theory of sovereignty as expressed by
Rush remained a staple in America until at least 1787.
not in Virginia.

The 1776 constitution had implicitly

rejected this notion of legislative sovereignty, and the
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Court of Appeals made explicit the more radical theory that
the people were truly sovereign over all branches,
including the legislative, at all times.

The doctrine that

the constitution suggested and the Court clearly enunciated
was the notion that the constitution was a law superior to
mere legislative act.32

The importance of this constitu

tional supremacy for notions of popular sovereignty lay in
the fact that by enshrining the constitution above statute,
the court was at the same time placing the people above the
legislative branch (and implicitly, above all others).33
Throughout the train of cases asserting constitutional
supremacy, the Court of Appeals equated the language of the
constitution with

the will of

the

the court rebuked

the General

Assembly's attempt to

establish a new court
"Remonstrance” to

people.

When, in1788,

system, the justices in their

the legislature

portrayed the constitu

tion as a document "which the people in 1776, when the
former bands of their society were dissolved, established
as the foundation of . . . government . . .," wherein "the
people" allocated the functions of government to the
various branches.

Consequently, concluded the court, no

act of a mere department of government could be permitted
to contravene this "act of the people"— i.e., the constitu
tion.34

Similarly, George Wythe, in his ringing dicta in

Caton v. Commonwealth. depicted the legislature as
circumscribed by the constitution, or, as Wythe phrased it,
by "the bounds prescribed to.them by the people."35
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The Court of Appeals, then, established the constitu
tion as higher law; in so doing, it played a pivotal role
in the elaboration of a new theory of politics quite
distinct from any that had been inherited from England.
What was truly important about this line of decisions were
the resulting implications for notions of republican
government.

For, in asserting the primacy of the constitu

tion, the Court generated "a revolution in . . . concep
tions of law, constitutionalism and politics" which worked
”a transformation . . .

in the people’s traditional

relationship to government.”36
For instance, the notion of constitution as higher law
dramatically altered theoretical conceptions of the
formation of civil government.

The traditional view had it

that government originated in a kind of contract between
government and the governed, where each party had recipro
cal duties.

This, at least, was the reigning "Whig” view

in the eighteenth century.

But, as Gordon Wood has

perceived, the belief in the omnipotent power of the
people over government required a profound shifting of the
basis for the Whig understanding of politics.37

No longer

were there equal parties at the inception of government;
now the people had all the authority, and delegated it at
their discretion to institutions of government.

Fortu

nately, John Locke— who had contributed so much to the
contract theory of government— also provided the theoreti
cal conceptualization for the new world view.

"This,"
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noted Wood, "was the idea of the social compact, . . . not
a governmental contract between magistrates and people,
rulers and ruled, but an agreement among isolated
individuals in a state of nature to combine in a society— a
social compact which by its very character was anterior to
the formation of government."

This, then, was a theory

that comported with the new notion of popular sovereignty.
"Only a social agreement among the people," concluded
Wood, "only such a Lockean contract, seemed to make sense
of their rapidly developing idea of a constitution as a
fundamental law designed by the people to be separate from
and controlling of all the institutions of government."38
The new notions of sovereignty also had an impact far
beyond the level of mere abstract theory.

The most obvious

change resulting from the shift in conceptions was in the
locus of sovereignty.

Virginians had, in the words of

John Murrin, "separated sovereignty from government in a
way that no one had dared try before."39

The American

Revolution, then, had "introduced into world history the
practicability of the people organizing themselves into a
government of their own creation, whereby the people are
made forever sovereign, and where the limits of government
are defined in order to preserve that sovereignty."40
Gone, then, was the Blackstonian notion of legislative
sovereignty; gone, indeed, the notion that any department
of government retained the ultimate authority.

As St.

George Tucker portrayed it, in the constitution "the
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legislature . . . [and] the other branches find . . .
limits, which cannot be transgressed without offending
against that greater power from whom all authority, among
us, is derived; to wit, the PEOPLE."41
The idea of an organic, higher law also had more
subtle implications.

In it the Virginians found new

protections for certain fundamental rights.

In England,

governmental power was virtually boundless.

Such limita

tions as there were, such as notions of contract and, in
particular, the rights and procedures embodied in the
common law, were insufficient against the arbitrary acts of
crown and parliament.

The Virginians, by establishing the

ascendancy of a constitution and declaration of rights
containing a statement of fundamental rights, placed an
added and formidable barrier to government usurpations.

As

Tucker put it, "all acts of the legislature [or, indeed,
the other branches] of this Commonwealth, which violate . . .
the Bill of Rights, and Constitution of this Commonwealth,
are not binding upon . . . any Citizen of the Common
wealth," and, moreoever, such aggrieved citizen "hath an
undoubted right to redress, by application to the judicial
Courts of the State . . .."42

This is not to say that such

rights were inviolate, but they did gain an added measure
of protection by their inclusion in a written constitution.
Similarly, the new conception of constitution also
worked a fundamental change in ideas about modification of
government itself.

In the English tradition, although
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there were certain safeguards against governmental abuse
(such as the common law), in the face of persistent or
blatant transgressions on the part of the governing
authority, the only real recourse for those oppressed was
to revolt.43

In Virginia, under the theory of a constitu

tion grounded in the ultimate authority of the people, such
a drastic remedy was not necessary.

In Virginia, "the

People, whenever they see fit may make any alterations in
the Constitution which they may deem necessary to their
happiness, and . . . prosperity . . .."

Nor were there any

limitations on the popular power; the people could "put the
execution of their authority into whatever hands they
please:

and all the powers of the State . . . must obey

them . . .."44

Indeed Virginia's declaration of rights

specifically provided that, if the government proved
unsatisfactory, "a majority of the community hath an
indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right, to
reform, alter, or abolish it . . ,."45

Such constitutional

language made this innovation manifest; the right of
modification would have existed had that document remained
entirely silent on the topic.
In s\im, Virginia adopted a revolutionary solution to
the problem of sovereignty.

The Commonwealth broke with

English tradition, and at the very inception of the
Revolution placed sovereignty squarely in the hands of the
people.

To complement this radical departure, Virginians

were forced to devise equally radical new notions of
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constitutionalism.

They achieved this through the

innovation of a written constitution.

With the Court of

Appeals leading the way, Virginians came to view that
constitution as representing a higher law; a doctrine with
immense theoretical and practical repercussions.

Viewing

the people as sovereign and the constitution as organic law
forced marked changes in the theoretical underpinnings of
civil government, spurred the revolutionary concept of
sovereignty as divorced from government, elevated certain
"fundamental" rights to a hitherto unrealized level of
status and protection, and, finally, incited a dramatic new
conception of the people's ability to alter government by
means ahort of revolution.
These innovations, taken together, were nothing short
of a revolutionary change in the theory and practice of
government, and each of these departures could be traced,
in one way or another, to the new concept of popular
sovereignty.

Due in no small part to the decisions of the

Court of Appeals, the Commonwealth of Virginia adopted a
dramatically republican response to the entirely new
situation confronting the Commonwealth at the outset of the
Revolution.

Given this radical choice, what is arresting

about the Virginia experience is the conservative way that
this radical response was applied, yielding a perhaps
uniquely Virginian amalgam of revolutionary republicanism
and conservatism.
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For all the genuinely republican aspects of Virginia's
1776 constitution with its embrace of popular sovereignty,
the surpassing irony was that the implementation of that
doctrine was unabashedly conservative, with a focus on the
importance of— and the protection of— property in the form
of land and slaves, and the maintenance of the existing
social and political order.
The constitution crafted by the framers in May and
June of 1776 was, in the words of J. R. Pole, "far from
revolutionary."46

Although the rhetoric and theoretical

implications of the doctrine of popular sovereignty seemed
to promise a new order, the framers' interpretation of just
which people were to exercise this sovereignty cast an
entirely different light upon the subject.

The topic was

addressed in both the declaration of rights and the
constitution itself.

The declaration of rights proclaimed

that "elections of members to serve as representatives of
the people, in assembly, ought to be free . .

The

framers then added another clause declaring that "all men,
having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest
with, and attachment to, the community, have the right of
suffrage . . .."47

It was the "evidence of permanent

common interest" which was the rub, and which formed the
basis and justification for Virginia's policy toward the
suffrage.

The constitution itself added the necessary

substantive application of this concept.

"The right of

suffrage in the election of members for both Houses," it
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provided, "shall remain as exercised at present."48

The

suffrage requirements referred to in the constitution were
contained in a 1736 statute which, in essence, gave the
vote to adult white males who owned a "freehold" (an
interest in land lasting an indeterminate amount of time,
usually a fee simple or an estate for life) of one hundred
acres of unimproved land, or twenty-five acres with a
dwelling attached, or a freehold in a town.49
In imbedding the "freehold suffrage" requirement in
the constitution, the framers were making a major statement
about the nature of their political society and how and by
whom it was to be governed.

By granting the vote, in

effect, only to those holding a permanent interest in land,
the framers narrowly interpreted what represented "suffi
cient evidence of permanent common interest with, and
attachment to, the community."

This raised two concerns.

First, and most obviously, it granted the vote only to the
landed interests, at the expense of those whose holdings
were in some form of personal property, or indeed of those
who had insufficient wealth to meet the suffrage require
ments.

In theory, at least, the policy interests of

holders of landed and non-landed wealth might not always
coincide, and the latter, without any input via the ballot
box, stood to come out on the short end of any such
dispute.

The second concern related to the number of

people actually disenfranchised by these suffrage require
ments.

There has been some debate over this issue among
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scholars, but in the best and most recent estimation,
Alison Goodyear Freehling has suggested that, even after a
minor liberalization of the landholding requirements in
1785, only 40 to 50 percent of the state's adult white
males were qualified to vote.30

This, of course, chal

lenged republican notions that "popular sovereignty" should
require universal white manhood suffrage.
Nor were the suffrage requirements the only anti
republican aspects of the 1776 constitution.

The appor

tionment of representation in the General Assembly was
equally suspect.

The constitution provided that each

county should send two representatives to the House of
Delegates, and that the counties should be allocated into
twenty-four districts, each to elect one member to the
Senate.31

While these requirements did not appear unjust

on their face, the reality was dramatically different.
Because a number of smaller, less populated counties were
concentrated in the older, eastern, conservative "Tide
water” region of Virginia, the allocation of delegates by
county gave a huge boon to that region.

Even at the time

of the framing of the constitution (and these conditions
were exacerbated in later years), the Tidewater gentry,
with one-third of the adult white male population, held the
reins of power in both the House of Delegates and Senate.32
Similar to the effects of the freehold suffrage, the
apportioning of representation without regard to population
had anti-democratic effects.

The combination of the two
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trends not only limited participation in government to
adult white male landholders, it also skewed the influence
of even that minority in the direction of the owners of the
large, slave-holding plantations of eastern Virginia.
Moreover, it must be remembered that in so structuring the
legislative branch, the framers ipso facto allowed
slaveholding easterners to control all branches of the
Commonwealth’s government, including appointments to the
governorship and the Court of Appeals.53
The really interesting thing about these blatantly
aristocratic provisions is that at the time of their
adoption they sparked no real dissent.

As J. R. Pole put

it, "The failure of the legislature of the Revolutionary
era to break with the freehold basis is matched by another
failure— that of the unenfranchised class to make any
effective protest.”54

This very lack of dissent speaks

volumes about the nature of Virginia society at the
Revolution.

With the exception of some agitation by

certain religious sects on other issues, there was a
general acceptance of the political status quo ante as
represented by the 1776 constitution.

"It seems to have

been commonly accepted," noted Pole, "that the gentry
exercised their traditional leadership by a right as
natural as that by which the freeholders participated in
elections."55

And it was Pole who has given us the best

explanation of the social, economic, and intellectual
belief system which upheld elite leadership in the
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Commonwealth.

The old system survived the shocks of

revolution, said Pole, because "it was in a high measure
representative of the prevailing social order."

The landed

gentry who provided the leadership of the Revolution
controlled every aspect of local life, dominating the two
most salient institutions, the county court and the local
established church.

This should not be overly surprising,

when it is recalled that "great landed property naturally
induced such power in an agrarian community."

Moreover,

deference to the gentry wa3 a matter of "unchallengad
social habit," and (with the exception of some of the
religious sects), the interests of the leadership were seen
as coinciding with those of the majority.55
The end result of all this was to cement the existing
elitist orientation of Virginia's political institutions.
It was a political settlement that was to prove extraor
dinarily longlasting in the Commonwealth.

The Court of

Appeals, of course, did not directly participate in the
political choices inherent in the suffrage and apportion
ment policies.

Its support was more implicit, in its

implementation of the constitutional order that dictates
those results.

The Court of Appeals had a much more direct

role in shaping Virginia's unique radical-conservative
Revolutionary settlement in other areas of the law, which
will be discussed shortly.
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While popular sovereignty was the operative theor
etical construct underlying Virginia’s constitutional
order, the constitution itself was designed as a practical
blueprint for the establishment of a workable governmental
system in the Commonwealth.

Here, too, the Court of

Appeals played an important role in implementing the intent
of the framers, and in doing so the court made such
previously theoretical doctrines as the separation of
powers a reality.
The drafters of the Virginia frame of government
deemed the concept of a "separation of powers" important
enough to insert it in both the declaration of rights and
the constitution itself.

Article V of the declaration

proclaimed that "the legislative and executive powers of
the state should be separate and distinct from the
judiciary . . . ," while the Constitution itself provided
that "the legislative, executive, and judiciary depart
ments, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither
exercise the powers properly belonging to the other . . .."s7
The really intriguing aspect of Virginia's separationof-powers concept, however, is that the Commonwealth did
not practice what it preached.

While the Virginia

constitutional provisions just cited appeared to stand
four-square behind the separation-of-powers theory, the
remainder of that document, and the actual practice in
Virginia, put the lie to any notion of a rigid adherence to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the doctrine.58

In reality, virtually all power was

placed in the legislature, particularly vis-a-vis the
executive.

The Governor was chosen annually by the

legislature, which also had the power of impeachment.

The

Governor could neither veto legislation nor had he power to
prorogue or adjourn the legislature.

The Governor could

not act without the advice and consent of his Council (also
appointed by the legislature), whose proceedings must be
laid before the Assembly upon demand.

Neither could the

Governor nominate judges; again, this lay within the
province of the legislature.

The ultimate blow to

executive power came in Article IX.

Under this provision

the Governor "shall not, under any pretence, exercise any
power or prerogative, by virtue of any law, statute, or
custom of England."

Instead, "he shall . . . exercise the

executive powers of government according to the laws of the
Commonwealth."39

According to St. George Tucker, "This

declaration instantly levelled the barriers of distinction
between the legislative authority, and that of the
executive, rendering the former completely paramount to the
latter . . .."6 0
The source of this emasculation of the executive, even
in the face of a titular commitment to a separation of
powers, is not far to seek.

Tucker acknowledged that "The

constitution of this Commonwealth was formed at a time,
when the spirit of equality was at its utmost height, and
under circumstances which contrived greatly to augment that
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natural jealousy of executive power, to which all free
states are prone, and for which, the convention then saw
the most just and cogent reasons."61

Virginians had had

more than a taste of executive tyranny under Lord Dunmore,
and were extraordinarily careful in structuring their new
government to avoid the possibility of such a despotic
executive again.62
The "perversion" of the doctrine of the separation of
powers caused by the restrictions on the executive did not
mean that this doctrine was a mere sham in Virginia.

Once

the framers got beyond their fear of executive tyranny, the
doctrine seemed both wise enough and safe enough.

Beyond

the obvious autonomy of the legislature, the judiciary was
given a considerable degree of independence, with tenure
"during good behavior" (but judges, too, were subject to
impeachment).

St. George Tucker explained how this

restriction of the executive, coupled with the independence
of the judicial and legislative branches, was consistent
with republican precepts:

" [The members of the Virginia

convention] had learned from the history and example of
their mother country, that limitations of the executive
authority were nugatory, if that authority be united with
the legislative, or if the judiciary be subservient tc it
or united with either.”63

Hence the republican doctrine of

the separation of powers came to be proclaimed in the new
/

commonwealth's frame of government.

But merely articulat

ing a republican ideal is a far cry from implementing it.
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The prospect of the three branches of government remaining
securely within each’s appointed sphere had its allure, but
it was foolhardy to believe that there would be no friction
or conflict between departments, particularly when this
idea of separation was so untried.
conflicts did arise.

And, inevitably, such

It was here that the Virginia Court

of Appeals established itself as the chief arbiter of such
conflicts and in the process made meaningful a theoretical
doctrine that had theretofore never been attempted in
actual practice.
The early cases addressing the separation of powers
were the now-familiar ones which treated high constitu
tional issues.

In the first of these, the 1782 case of

Commonwealth v. Caton, Judge George Wythe defended the
court's right to determine whether a legislative pardon
had been valid in terms of " . . - the powers which the
different branches of government may exercise."

According

to Wythe, the separation of powers reached its full flower
"when those who hold the purse [the legislature] and the
sword [the executive], differing as to the powers each may
exercise, the tribunals who hold neither [the courts] are
called upon to declare the law impartially between them.
For thus the pretensions of each party are fairly examined,
their respective powers ascertained, and the boundaries of
authority peaceably established."

By applying the

separation of powers doctrine in such circumstances,
concluded Wythe, "tyranny has been sapped, the departments
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kept within their own spheres, the citizens protected, and
general liberty promoted."64
The Court of Appeals returned to the topic of the
separation of powers in the next constitutional conflict
that came before it— the brouhaha over the establishment of
a district court system in 1788.

In their Remonstrance to

the General Assembly, the justices based their assertion of
the act's unconstitutionality upon the principle of the
separation of powers.

Pointing to the constitution, the

court asserted that "In that solemn act, the people
distribut[ed] the governmental powers into three great
branches, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in order
to preserve that equipoise, which they judged necessary to
secure their liberty, declaring that those powers be kept
separate and distinct from each other . . .. "6 3
illustrated the point in colorful language:

The court

". . .

For

vain would be the precautions of the founders of our
government to secure liberty, if the legislature, though
restrained from changing the tenure of judicial offices,
are at liberty to compel a resignation by reducing salaries
to a copper, or by making it a part of the official duty to
become hewers of wood, and drawers of water.

Or, if, in

case of a contrary disposition, then can make salaries
exorbitant; or, by lessening the duties, render offices,
almost sinecures:

the independence of the judiciary is, in

either case, equally annihilated."66
its intended effect.

The Remonstrance had

Governor Randolph immediately called
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a special session of the legislature, and the General
Assembly rescinded the initial act and replaced it with
another which maintained the district court system, but set
up the Court of Appeals as a separate entity with no
circuit duties.67
The new district court act was much less distateful to
the Court of Appeals on a practical level, since they were
no longer obligated to ride circuit.

But the constitu

tional objection remained, because the later act, in
effect, dissolved the old Court of Appeals and erected a
new one in its place.

The justices, caught between their

constitutional principles and a recognition of the need for
a remodelled judicial system, took the only feasible way
out, and resigned.

In doing so, the judges "administered

another lesson to the Assembly on the subject of the
independence of the judiciary.”68

The justices asserted

that, "however painful the repetition," they were constitu
tional officers, not subject to removal by the Assembly.
Since it was their "duty to guard against encroachment,”
they thereupon resigned.69

The establishment of the new

Court of Appeals, containing many of the former justices,
then proceeded unimpeded.

It is interesting to note that

there was an echo of this debate as late as 1811, when
Judge St. George Tucker resigned from the bench in protest
to a new law which required the Court to sit at least 250
days in the year.70
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By 1801, the doctrine of the separation of powers was
so well established that the court could summarily reject a
challenge to its application.

In that year, a case arose

involving a Frenchman named Beaumarchais who had sold goods
to the Commonwealth during the Revolution, and now sought
to have the accounts adjusted.71

Beaumarchais had first

sought redress through the General Assembly, where he was
rebuffed.

He then petitioned the courts.

The Common

wealth's defense was that the Court had no jurisdiction,
because the legislature had already spoken.

President

Judge Pendleton made short work of such an argument.

"We

are as much bound," said Pendleton, "to support the
legitimate powers of the Judiciary, as [the Judiciary]
...

is not to invade what hath been assigned to

others."72

Pendleton reminded the parties that the

"Constitution creates three branches of government, and
declares that their powers shall be kept separate and
distinct, and those of one not exercised by the others."73
The President Judge went on to reprimand the counsel for
the Commonwealth.

"But this is said, by one gentleman, to

be an invasion of the State sovereignty and its attributes,
and by another to be a prostration of the Legislature at
the feet of the Judiciary:

Sounding term3i but which would

have been more properly used, when the Constitution was
framing, in opposition to the creation of three depart
ments, than now, as objections to the exercise of the
powers alloted to each."74
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By the 1828 case of Crenshaw v. Slate River Co.. the
Court of Appeals could assert the fact of separation
without need of further elaboration.

"The Constitution

declares," the court stated simply, "that the Legislative
and Judicial Departments, shall be distinct and separate;
so that, neither shall exercise the powers properly
belonging to the other."75
In sum, the conception of a separation of powers among
the three branches of government thrived in Virginia, in
large part because the Virginia Court of Appeals was
assiduous in delineating and responding to threats to the
balance of the system.

In so doing, the court made

practicable a doctrine that had theretofore existed only in
republican theory.

The court's key role in assuring the ascendancy of the
constitution, and in the practical application of the
constitution’s theory and frame of government, masked a
development which was more subtle, but every bit as
important to the institutional development of the new
commonwealth.

In the determination of the handful of key

adjudications of "high” constitutional law, the Court of
Appeals carved out a unique role for itself as interpreter
of the constitution and as an important republican
institution in its own right.
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The court's prominent role in Virginia's constitu
tional structure has since become so axiomatic as to make
it difficult to appreciate the ambiguities in the court's
status at the inception of the Commonwealth.

One of the

complicating factors was the ambiguous nature of the
Court's charter.

The actual role of the Virginia courts in

the constitutional structure was left disturbingly vague
by the Virginia framers.

The constitution's only

mention of specific courts was the directive to the
legislature to appoint "Judges of the Supreme Court of
Appeals, and General Court, Judges in Chancery, Judges
in Admiralty . . .."

The result was, that while the

courts themselves were constitutional in nature, all the
details of their make-up and jurisdiction were left to
legislative discretion.76

Indeed, it was not until 1779

that the General Assembly got around to establishing a
supreme appellate tribunal.77
The Court of Appeals responded to its ambiguous
constitutional-legislative nature in a mature and dis
criminating fashion.

It never lost sight of the fact that

the specifics of its jurisdiction were statutory, and the
Court did not hesitate to acknowledge this reality.

As

Judge Tucker once put it, "All the powers of this Court are
statutory; it has no claim whatever from any other source,
neither custom, prescription, long usage, or precedent,
have any pretensions here, independent of statutory
provisions.”78

This recognition of the statutory nature of
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its jurisdiction was coupled, however, with a dogged
resistance to any hint that the legislature could undermine
the court's constitutional right to exist as an independent
entity.
The court took its stand early, with the first
constitutional adjudication of Commonwealth v. Caton.
Although the court's role had been left undefined by the
constitution, here the court showed no hesitation.

In

asserting jurisdiction to decide the case, Judge George
Wythe made a stirring statement as to the power of the
court, couching it in unmistakably republican terms.

In

this case of a dispute between the two houses of the
legislature, Wythe held that it was the duty of the court
to step in and protect "the community” from the usurpation
of a particular branch.

Citing the case of an English

chancellor protecting the rights of an individual against
the Crown, Wythe intoned that “if it was [the chancellor's]
duty to protect a solitary individual against the rapacity
of the sovereign, surely, it is equally mine, to protect
one branch of the legislature, and, consequently, the whole
community, against the usurpations of the other."79
Moreover, it was the particular province of the court to
make such a determination.

As Wythe stated in his

conclusion, "whenever the proper occasion occurs, I
shall feel the duty [to step in]; and, fearlessly,
perform it . . .."80
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The Court of Appeals took an even stronger stance in
the 1788 crisis over the creation of the district courts.
In their "Remonstrance" to the legislature, the judges
identified their court "as one of the three pillars on
which the great fabric of government was erected," and went
on to lecture the General Assembly on the necessity of
their judicial independence.

"The propriety and necessity

of the independence of judges is evident in reason and the
nature of their office; since they are to decide between
government and the people, as well as between contending
citizens; and, if they be dependent on either, corrupt
influence may be apprehended, sacrificing the innocent to
popular prejudice; and subjecting the poor to oppression
and persecution by the rich."81

To avoid such unjust

results, and to fulfill its proper function in Virginia's
constitutional scheme, the Court of Appeals must have
complete independence from the legislature and the
executive.
The court continued to assert and protect its judicial
province in the nineteenth century.

In 1818 the General

Assembly had chartered a corporation, the Slate River
Company, and granted it the right to make the Slate
navigable.

The legislature asserted that those individuals

already having milldams on the stream must comply or face
having their dams destroyed.

The Court of Appeals voided

this law, maintaining that this determination of the status
of private rights was an unwarranted interference into a
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sphere particularly appropriate to judicial cognizance.
The court made its position very clear.

"The questions,

whether the rights of the owners of mills, or of the
public, for the purposes of navigation, are preferred by
Law generally, or in any particular case," said the court,
"are emphatically Judicial in their nature, depending on
the effect and construction of former Laws; and, if upon a
full and careful consideration, we conscientiously differ
in opinion in any particular case from the Legislature, we
are bound by the highest obligations of duty to ourselves
and our country, to pursue our own judgment."82
The General Assembly incited a similar response when
it passed a statute which directly overruled a line of
judicial decisions.

While the Court willingly acknowledged

the legislature's right to make prospective changes in the
law, it bristled at the intimation that such enactments
were intended to affect jtsdicial determinations of cases
which arose prior to the passage of such an act (but coming
up on appeal after its enactment).

In 1819 the legislature

had directly overturned a long series of decisions by the
Court of Appeals construing the validity of the conveyance
of certain "future interests" in property.

Nevertheless,

when, in 1827, the Court next decided a case on this
subject that had arisen prior to the statute, it maintained
the old rule.

In doing so, Judge Dabney Carr resisted any

suggestion of legislative dominance.

"As to the idea that

the law of 1819, is an expression of the legislative
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opinion, that the Courts have heretofore decided wrong on
this subject, and furnishes us with a fair opportunity [in
this case] to break the toils in which former decisions
have bound us, I would remark, 1. That it is not the
province of the Legislature to censure the exposition which
the Courts give to any law . . .."83

The same judge was

even more forceful when a similar situation arose regarding
the proper procedure for challenging land titles.

"It is

one of a large class of cases, in which the judicial
decisions point out to the Legislature what they [the
legislature] consider an evil, and they [the legislature]
apply the remedy.
looks forward.

But," continued Carr, "the remedy always

The Legislature do not mean to say, 'You

must decide thus and thus, in cases now depending before
you.'

This would be usurpation.

This act, then,"

concluded Carr, "while it acknowledged the rule established
by Noland v. Cromwell to be, at that time, existing law,
did not intend to affect its operation in past or depending
cases, but merely to provide for the future . . .."84
This fierce resistance by the Court of Appeals to
legislative encroachment can be viewed in terms of sound
republican principles.

Blackstone had noted that in

England the courts were but creatures of the crown.

In all

courts "the king is . . . represented by his judges, whose
power is only an emanation of the royal prerogative."83
republican Virginia, however, quite the contrary was the
case.

In Virginia, commented St. George Tucker, "the
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judicial power, far from being an emanation from the
executive, is intended by the American constitutions as a
counterpoise, or check to its excesses, and those of the
legislature."86

This had important ramifications for

liberty, which Tucker was quick to acknowledge.

He went on

to stress that an independent judiciary was as important in
a republican Virginia as it was in England:

"This absolute

independence of the judiciary, both of the executive and
the legislative departments, which I contend is to be
found, both in the letter and spirit of our constitutions,
is not less necessary to the liberty and security of the
citizen, and his property, in a republican government, than
in a monarchy. . . . in a republic . . . the violence and
malignity of party spirit, as well in the legislature,
as in the executive, requires not less the intervention
of a calm, temperate, upright, and independent judi
ciary, to prevent that violence and malignity from
exerting itself . . ..”87

In sum, the Virginia Court of

Appeals, in the first decades of the Commonwealth, staked
out a unique place for itself in the republican firmament,
and thereby became a ksy institution in the implementation
of republican ideals.
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By the third decade of the nineteenth century,
Virginia's new constitutional order was in place.

The

constitution was viewed as a higher law which represented
the will of the people in a regime founded upon the concept
of popular sovereignty.

The institutions of government had

by that time achieved a mutually acceptable settlement with
respect to their respective roles and relations in a
republican commonwealth.

In short, many of the doubts and

unanswered questions facing the Commonwealth in 1776 were
non-issues by 1830, having been resolved in the intervening
decades.

In this process of achieving a constitutional

settlement, the Virginia Court of Appeals played a leading,
perhaps the leading, role.

Through its determinations of

practical issues which arose in the course of attempting to
implement the new republican ideals, the court resolved
high issues of constitutional law which defined Virginia's
institutions, its theory of government, and the practical
governance of the Commonwealth.

The Court of Appeals was,

in other words, the prime "interpreter" of Virginia's
republican principles and polity.

The republican system

which the court helped so much to implement, however, was
remarkably conservative in its character, a somewhat
incongruous thread which was to be found woven through the
entire fabric of Virginia's revolutionary settlement.
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CHAPTER III
THE ENGLISH LEGAL HERITAGE
IN A REPUBLICAN COMMONWEALTH

The establishment of Virginia's constitution, and its
implementation by the Virginia Court of Appeals, was a
first and key step in creating a new republican order.
this was only a beginning.

But

One recent scholar has

commented that "What in the final analysis gave meaning to
the Americans' conception of a constitution was not its
fundamentality or its creation by the people, but rather
its implementation in the ordinary courts of law."1

This

statement could be expanded to include the proposition that
the definition of Virginia's entire revolutionary settle
ment was accomplished in large part by the Virginia
judiciary.

The process of that settlement began with

Virginia's accommodation with its English heritage; it is
to this that we first turn.
Virginia's republican constitutional order was in many
ways a dramatic departure from its colonial past.
Nevertheless, it was neither possible nor desirable to
erect a republican commonwealth that represented a complete
overthrow of Virginia’s English heritage.

The difficult

task for Revolutionary Virginians was not so much what
63
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should be eradicated in the interests of republicanism, but
rather, what should be retained in the interests of
freedom, stability, and consistency, and how it should be
modified to meet the requirements of the Commonwealth's
republican orientation.
One of the most revealing examples of the subtle and
complex nature of Virginia's adaptation to republicanism in
the aftermath of the Revolution lay in the accommodation of
her English legal heritage to the requirements of the new
republican order.

Virginia society inherited a legal

system that was at once monarchical, oligarchical, feudal,
and a bastion of individual liberties and property rights.
Going about the business of resolving the complexities
induced thereby provides an object lesson in Virginia’s
measured response to the challenges posed by the Revolu
tion.
The Virginia Court of Appeals embraced, on the whole,
the English legal heritage, despite the violent separation
from Great Britain.

This loyalty to English precedents was

another illustration of the conservative tenor of the
Revolution in Virginia.

The English common law continued

to be revered because it was perceived to be a bulwark of
English— and hence American— liberty.

Adherence to English

precedent also maintained stable rules of law, which in
turn protected existing property rights.

At the same time,

however, the Court of Appeals was not slavishly devoted to
the common law, and the court's departures from accepted
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precedent illustrate the nature of Virginia's revolutionary
settlement.
The instances of judicial deviation from English rules
of law during the Commonwealth's first decades were
infrequent but illuminating.

One example of the Virginia

court's departure from English precedents occurred when the
English rules clearly contravened republican principles.
The Court of Appeals also consistently supported the will
of the Virginia legislature— as expressed through statute—
over traditional rules of law.

This demonstrated a respect

for manifest policy choices by Virginians over English
tradition, and was also an early indication of the court's
perception of its limited role in the making of policy.
Another instance where the Court of Appeals refused to
blindly follow the English rules was when they did not
comport with local conditions in Virginia.

Likewise, the

court refused to stand on technicality when to do so
prevented the execution of an individual's obvious intent.
Finally, the court also stepped in when the common law or
statute provided no clear guidance.

In such cases, the

Court of Appeals articulated a policy based upon principles
of "reason."
Largely through the contributions of the Court of
Appeals, then, the English legal heritage was adapted to
the Virginia experiment.

On the whole, traditional legal

rules went unchallenged, evidencing a conservative respect
for stability and property rights.

Where the court did
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depart from English legal precedents, it was for the
purpose of implementing legislative policy, or adapting the
common law to Virginia's situation.

The result was a legal

system which was tradition-laden, but not tradition-bound;
a conservative yet pragmatic jurisprudence which was to
define Virginia's approach to the new order.

Theoretically, at any rate, once the Virginia colony
slashed its ties with the mother country, the source and
authority of the British legal system were extinguished.
In this veritable "state of nature,” it was the duty of the
new sovereign and independent state to fill the vacuum by
establishing a new legal order.2

One of the first orders

of business for the Virginia Convention in May 1776 was to
address the matter of the continued validity in Virginia of
the British statutes and the English common law— that
amalgam of rights, duties, and liabilities built up through
centuries of judicial decisons in the English courts which
formed the basis for the vast majority of the substantive
law that governed the rights and obligations of all English
subjects.

The Virginia Convention did not hesitate, and

immediately embraced the English system.

In order "to

enable the present magistrates and officers to continue the
administration of justice . . . till the same can be amply
provided for," the Convention specifically adopted the
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English common law, and all applicable English statutes
passed before 1607, "until the same shall be altered by the
legislative power of this colony."3

The end result was,

as St. George Tucker described it, "That the common law of
England, and every statute of that kingdom, made for the
security of the life, liberty, or property of the subject,
before the settlement of the British colonies, respec
tively, so far as the same were applicable to the nature of
their nature and circumstances, respectively, were brought
over to America . . .."4
The hasty adoption of the essence of the English legal
system at the very moment the Virginians were engaged in a
violent revolt against that government is not the con
tradiction that it would at first appear.

In many ways

the Virginians— taking their cue from the British "Opposi
tion" writers of the early eighteenth century— believed
that their revolution was not a revolution at all but
merely a last, desperate attempt to recover the traditional
English liberties that had been lost at the hands of a
"corrupt" English government.3

One of the bulwarks of

those traditional English liberties was the substance and
procedure of the English common law.

Accordingly, the

common law was claimed as the "birthright” of American
citizens.6

The Virginia Court of Appeals was fully aware

of the libertarian nature of the common law inheritance.As Judge Tucker phrased it, "No man I trust would be more
jealous than I of the danger of preserving any part of the
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theory of monarchy in our Commonwealth; but the rights of
individuals, upon whatever theory originally founded, after
having settled into the known law of the land for six
centuries, in England, and after being considered in a
similar light in this country, from its first foundation,
ought not to be shaken, unless the imperative voice of the
constitution, or of the legislature, shall compel it to be
done."7
There was also a more pragmatic reason for adhering to
the known rules and procedures of the common law which the
Court frequently articulated.

That was the idea that it

was important that the law remain predictable.

Nowhere was

the rationale for this position more cogently arrayed than
in the early case of Commonwealth v. Posey, which dealt
with a 200-year old precedent which had been definitive in
construing the English statute regarding the benefit of
clergy.

{The "benefit of clergy" was a privilege of

exemption from execution in a capital crime granted
originally to clergymen but later expanded to include many
others.)

In Posey, Judge William Fleming gave the

essential rule;

" . . .

precedents, so long acquiesced in,

cannot be overturned, without more danger than benefit, as
no point will ever be settled."8

But it was Judge Peter

Lyons who expressed the underlying rationale:

"The

security of men's lives and property require that [the
earlier cases] should be adhered to;

for precedents serve

to regulate our conduct, and there is more danger to be
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apprehended from uncertainty, than from any exposition,
because, when the rule is settled, men know how to conform
to it; but when all is uncertain, they are left in the
dark, and constantly liable to error . . . ."9

The

importance of this holding did not go unrecognized.

Nearly

fifty years later (in 1833) Daniel Call, in publishing his
edition of this case, added a postcript that "No cause
decided, since the revolution, is more important than this,
as it fixes, by the opinion of a large majority of the
judges, distinguished for their patriotism, independence
and ability, a principle necessary for the tranquillity of
society, and the safety of the general transactions of
mankind, namely, that a settled construction of a statute,
forms a precedent, which should be adhered to as part of
the law itself; and ought, upon no criticism of words, to
be departed from.

Accordingly, the decisions of the court

[of appeals], since that period, abound with instances of
the same kind; but none of them state the ground and reason
of it, with so much force . . .."10
Call was right about the Court of Appeals1 continued
respect for the rules of property as established by the
English cases.

The reports teem with similar professions

of allegiance to the accepted common-law interpretations of
legal doctrines.

In 1827, the Court refused to overrule a

longstanding interpretation of the effect of language
creating a "future interest" in property, even though the
legislature had shown a clear dissatisfaction with the
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judicial reasoning in such cases.

The Court, normally

deferential to legislative wishes, here refused to change
its position (in a case that arose prior to the enactment
of the corrective statute).
the Court's reasoning.

Judge Dabney Carr articulated

While a statute was prospective,

and gave everyone notice of the new rule, a judicial
decision was by its very nature retrospective.

"If we say

that these decisions [that the Court has held to over the
years] are wrong," asserted Carr, "all the estates which
have been settled, all the contracts which have been made,
all the titles which rest on the foundation of their [i.e.,
the former cases'] correctness, are uprooted."11
Carr stop there.

Nor did

If all those decisions were overturned,

it would be impossible to foresee "the extent of the
mischief."

"But, only open the door," concluded Carr,

" [and] proclaim to the world that all which has heretofore
been done is wrong; and then we shall see the wild uproar
and confusion among titles, which will follow.

Is it not

better to prevent this, by holding on in the course we have
so long run?"12
So strong was the loyalty to precedent that the Court
was willing to fellow a common-law rule even when the
rationale underlying that rule had been lost in the mists
of time.
intoning:

As late as 1829 we find Judge William Cabell
"It cannot be admitted, that a law ceases to

exist, merely because the reason which gave rise to its
adoption has ceased.

If this were admitted, we should
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demolish at once, much of the venerable fabrick of the
common law."13

And Judge John Green, searching in 1830 for

the reasoning behind the doctrine that all judgments
"relate back" to the first day of the judicial term,
finally threw up his hands in despair.

"This general

principle of the common law, like many others, is of such
remote antiquity, and so long recognized without dispute
that the reasons and policy are, in great degree, left to
conjecture.1,14

Even more revealing are the cases where the

judges toed the common-law line even in the face of their
own sense of justice.

Throughout the first five decades of

the new republic judges subsumed their own views to the
interest of upholding precedent.13

Perhaps Spencer Roane

summed it up best in the case of Claiborne v. Henderson in
1809.

Roane noted that there are "innumerable instances to

be found in the books, of a reverence for decisions, and
rules of property which have been established by the
concurrent decisions of successive Judges, and acted under,
for a long series of time.

They ought to be adhered to as

the sine qua non of all certainty and stability in the law,
the private opinion of any single Judge to the contrary
notwithstanding.M16
Given this reverence for common-law precedent, both in
terms of its protections of individual liberties and
because of the fear of disruption from an overturning of
established rules, it should come as no surprise that the
Virginia reports abound with professions of allegiance to
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the common law.17
be so.

Indeed it is logical that this should

As one commentator has put it, "English precedents

had been for two centuries the ways and woof of the
Virginia system, and it was neither possible nor desirable
to cast them aside."18
Perhaps the most telling indicator of the continuing role
of the English common law in Virginia's system came in the
early 1830s, when Henry St. George Tucker advised practic
ing attorneys concerning the matter of rent payments when
the lessor died before the rent payment was due.

Under

English law, the death of the lessor absolved the renter
from liability to pay rent, unless the lease specifically
provided otherwise.19

Although common sense dictated that

this should not be the outcome, Tucker warned lawyers that
"until . . . some adjudication shall justify us in
departing in practice from English authority, it will be
always safest in practice to make reservations of rent in
conformity with their decisions . . .."2 0
Given the clear commitment in Virginia to English
precedent, what becomes most interesting and informative
are the exceptions to this common-law allegiance.

It is

manifest that only a deeply-held belief in some counter
vailing value or circumstance could induce the Virginia
Court of Appeals to depart from its respectful attitude
toward the common law.
Interestingly, one rationale for deviating from the
common law is expressed specifically in terms of republi-
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canism.

In the 1806 case of Baring v. Reeder, Judge Roane

acknowledged that "I consider myself bound to pare down the
governmental part of the common-law of England to the
standard of our free republican constitution . . ..1,21
St. George Tucker elaborated in his annotation to Blackstone 's Commentaries;

" . . . every rule of the common

law, and every statute of England, founded on the nature of
regal government, in derogation of the natural and
unalienable rights of mankind; or, inconsistent with the
nature and principles of democratic governments, were
absolutely abrogated, repealed, and annulled, by the
establishment of such a form of government in the states,
respectively.

This is a natural and necessary consequence

of the revolution, and the correspondent changes in the
nature of the governments . . ..22
A further subtlety was inherent in this perception of
the common law in light of republican principles.

Even

when the Virginia courts were at the height of their
"homage-paying'' to the English precedents, there was a
subtle but very important distinction between reliance upon
English decisions and their authority.

The Revolution,

argued St. George Tucker, "by separating us from Great
Britian for ever, put an end to the authority of any future
decisions or opinions of her judges, and sages of the law,
in the courts of this Commonwealth; those decisions and
opinions, I make no doubt, will long continue to be
respected in Virginia, as the decisions of the wisest and
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most upright foreign judges; but from the moment that
Virginia became an independent Commonwealth, neither the
laws, nor the judgments of any other country, or it's
courts, can claim any authority whatsoever in our courts
. . .."23

This, in the end, was exactly the point Roane

was making in Baring v. Reeder:
common law . . .

"On such rules of the

as are neither affected by a change in

the form of government, nor by a variation in the cir
cumstances of character of the nation, I am free to avail
myself of the testimony of able Judges and Lawyers of that
country . . . .

I am not willing that an appeal to my

pride, as a citizen of independent America, should prevail
over the best convictions of my understanding . . . .

I

wish it, however, to be clearly understood that I . . .
would not receive even them, as binding authority.

I would

receive them merely as affording evidence of the opinions
of eminent Judges as to the doctrines in question . . .."2 4
A more obvious exception to the preeminence of the
English common law in the court decisions of Virginia
occurred when the English precedents were displaced by
statutory provisions.23

The superiority of enactments of

the Virginia General Assembly to any common-law doctrine
was a commonplace.

This was made express in the statute

adopting English common law and statute in May, 1776, when
it was declared that the English law was to remain "in full
force, until the same shall be altered by the legislative
power of this colony."26

The Court of Appeals was
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assiduous in upholding this doctrine of legislative
supremacy where there was a direct conflict between statute
and common law.
example,

Whittington v. Christian is a typical

That case, decided in 1824, had to do with a

technical error in an action of ejectment.

When the

defendant sought to have the case dismissed under the
common-law rule, the Court looked to the more lenient
provision of the Virginia statute.

"It is true," admitted

Judge Green, "that this construction of the statute and the
rule of the common law referred to, cannot exist together.
The consequence is, that the statute abrogates the rule of
the common law in toto . . .."27

Similarly, in Templeman

v. Steptoe. Judge Tucker noted, in 1810, that under the
1785 statute of descents, it was "too plain to require
proof, that . . . all former Rules and Canons of
Inheritance and succession to estates within this Common
wealth, whether established by Common Law, or by Statute,
were rescinded, abrogated, and annulled, and that they
cannot be revived in any manner but by some express
legislative provision for that purpose."28
Within the parameters of absolute statutory super
iority in areas of actual conflict, however, there was
still room for a considerable amount of reliance upon
common-law principles and remedies.

Oftentimes Virginia

statutes were exact copies of or derivative from English
predecessors.

In such cases, the relevant common-law

doctrines were often used to inform and illuminate the
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statutory provisions.29

The Court of Appeals was also

quite careful when a new statutory remedy was enacted that
deviated from traditional common-law rights.

In such

cases, the Court acknowledged the statute, but took
especial care that the common-law remedies were also
available, unless the statute clearly abrogated those
rights.30

Thus in 1798 when a debtor sought to stave off

a creditor because he had not complied with the statutory
requirements on a bond, Judge Pendleton for the Court held
that it was "immaterial whether the creditor had or had not
a remedy by motion, under the Act of Assembly, since the
act having no negative words, the creditor had his election
to pursue the statutory mode, or his common-law remedy on
the bond."21

Ten years later Judge Roane commented with

respect to an alleged fraudulent transfer of slaves that
"the statutes in question are merely superogatory in
relation to the common law . . .."32

And in 1825 the

Court held that the statute regarding proof of a will "is
only cumulative, and does not deprive any party of remedy
at common law."33

Similarly, the Court held that "when a

statute gives a remedy without prescribing a particular
mode of proceeding, the mode of the common law is to be
pursued."34
Another situation in which the Court of Appeals was
willing to overcome its predilection for common-law
precedent was when the local conditions did not favor its
application.33

As a contemporary commentator noted in
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1821, "The common law of England is, at this day, the law
of Virginia, except so far as it has altered by statute, or
so far as its principles are inapplicable to the state of
the country.

It adopts itself to the situation of society,

being liberalized by the courts according to the cir
cumstances of the country and the manner and genius of the
people."36

Judge Roane added that "in applying . . . [the

common law] we must adapt [it] to the circumstances of the
case . . . so as to effect a reasonable and substantial
compliance therewith, rather than a literal one."37
One distinguishing circumstance in the new common
wealth was the variation in the court structure between
Virginia and England.

Judge Pendleton addressed the issue

in 1792 in Thornton v. Smith when he held that the
requirement of asserting a court's jurisdiction in the
pleadings was not necessary in Virginia.

Pendleton argued

that the English rule "grew out of the local situation of
the inferior courts in that country, and was grounded upon
considerations in which ours totally differ from theirs."
After discussing the confusing mishmash of jurisdictions in
England and the straightforward statutory scheme in
Virginia, Pendleton concluded that in this case "the
[English] precedents cannot bind us."38

A similar

situation confronted Judge Tucker in the 1809 case of
Nimmo's exr. v. Commonwealth.

The question there was

whether a decedent1s executor was presumed to know of
pending judgments which might bind the estate.

Tucker
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acknowledged that presumption applied in England.

"But,"

he interjected, "it is not every common-law rule, founded
upon the judicial system of that country, that can be
deemed, in strictness, applicable to the circumstances and
situation of this."

After noting that there were only four

courts of record in England, compared to over two hundred
in Virginia, Tucker concluded:
under such circumstances . . .

"Can it be supposed, that
an executor must at his

peril take notice of all judgments against the testator in
his lifetime, in what Court, or part of the state soever,
the same may be entered?

I conceive not . . .."39

Similarly, the dispersed nature of Virginia courts forced
some departures from traditional requirements.
pleading requirements were relaxed.

Often

"Considering the

circumstances in this country," noted the Court, "and the
dispersed situation of the attorneys and their clients who
can seldom communicate with each other but at court,
justice seems to require a relaxation in these rules of
practice."40
The demands of settling a new country also affected
the substantive rules of the common law.

In England, a

mere tenant on the land was limited as to his utilization
of permanent resources of the land such as timber.

If he

were to cut more trees than was reasonably necessary for
fencing and the like, he was liable to the owner of the
land for "waste."

But in Virginia, where there was a more

compelling need to tame and make productive the land, the
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rule was different.

In Findlay v. Smith, a life tenant was

permitted, in 1818, to extract unlimited quantities of
salt, and to use all of the woodland, if necessary, to
supply fuel for the operation.

As Judge William Cabell

explained, "the law of waste, in its application here,
varies and accommodates itself to the situation of our new
and unsettled country."41

Similarly the common-law right

of a purchaser of the land to the tenant's growing crops
was questioned in Virginia, "where lands are seldom let out
upon leases . . .. ”42
In sum, the Virginia Court of Appeals did not hesitate
to change common-law rules and procedures to conform to the
requirements of Virginia experience.43

On the other hand,

such deviations were relatively infrequent, and always
accompanied by an explanation of the circumstances which
demanded the variance.
Another exception to the tradition of common-law
preeminence in the Virginia courts was broad in concept but
rather strictly limited in practice.

It arose because

there were inevitably times when the common-law precedents
gave no guidance, or provided conflicting rules of law.

In

such cases, by default, the Court had to step in and make a
policy decision with little guidance from the precedents.
Such was the case of the interpretation of an insurance
contract in Bourke v. Granberry, in 1820.

There, the

precedents were diverse and conflicting, forcing Roane to
finally conclude, "We are to judge for ourselves in this
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chaos of judgments, and we submit the result of our best
deliberation-"44

Judge Coalter faced a similar situation

in 1829 regarding the admissibility of proof of handwriting
in a forgery case.

"The decisions, so far as I have

examined them, are not, I think, very consistent with the
general rules of evidence, or with each other, or with the
principles by which they profess to be governed; nor,
indeed, have I as yet been fully able to comprehend those
principles."43

In such cases, the Court had no alternative

but to strike out on its own without solid guidance from
the precedents.

On the whole, however, the Virginia Court

of Appeals was very circumspect in availing itself of the
opportunity to claim a lack of positive direction from
prior cases, thus justifying the creation of a new policy
initiative by judicial fiat.46
Despite the tradition of respect for precedent, there
was at least one particular area where the Court of Appeals
did evince a resistance to the pattern of adherence to
common-law rules— in the interpretation of wills.

Cases

involving wills provided much of the grist for the mills of
justice in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries.

And in most will cases, the standard deference

to English precedent was evident.

Indeed, one commentator

has noted that "owing to their great complexity, will
construction cases came before the appellate court in
disproportionate numbers.

They afforded numerous occasions

for the bar and bench to display their mastery of the
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obstruse doctrines of property law and the technical rules
for construing wills that had evolved with ever greater
refinement in a multitude of cases.

Not surprisingly, the

string of English citations was longest in will cases."47
One aspect of will construction, however, provided an
exception to this rule.

This occurred in the cases

involving the interpretation of the intent of the testator
(the writer of a will) in the application of the provisions
of the will.

The resistance to common-law rules in such

cases was partially justified in the familiar terms of a
lack of clear guidance from the common-law precedents.

In

a 1792 case the Court expressed its willingness to follow
the traditional rules of will construction— if it could
find them.

"If we could discover those settled rules of

construction," lamented the Court, "we would pursue them.
But, after all our researches, we are much inclined to
affirm . . . 'that cases on wills serve rather to obscure,
than illuminate questions of this sort."'48

Two years

later Judge Edmund Pendleton reiterated this argument.
" ...

In disputes upon wills,

. . . which depend . . .

on the intention of the testator . . . adjudged cases have
more frequently been produced to disappoint, than to
illustrate intention."

As a result, Pendleton concluded

that the proper way to decide such cases was not to rely
upon precedent, but upon "the state and circumstances of
each case.”49
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But this reliance upon the crutch of a lack of
"settled rules of construction" was a bit disingenuous.
For in the same case that Pendleton decried a lack of
established precedent, he went on to reveal the real theoryunderlying his approach to such cases.

"I am free to own,"

admitted Pendleton, "that where a testator’s intention is
apparent to me, cases must be strong, uniform, and apply
pointedly before they will prevail to frustrate that
intention."30

In supporting the perceived intention of

testators over technical rules of law, the Court of Appeals
was not so much rejecting precedent as it was acknowledging
and effectuating the clear aims of common men, unschooled
in the law.

Judge Carr in 1830 stated the reasoning of the

Court simply and directly.
of the bequest:

"The enquiry is to the meaning

it is a pure question of intention.

There

are no technical words or forms of expression used in the
will.

It is, evidently, the production of a plain man,

who, though he understood very well what he meant to say,
and was able to express himself quite intelligibly, knew
nothing of legal forms and legal phrases.

To ascertain his

meaning, we must not look to treatises on wills, or to
adjudged cases, but simply to the words he has used."31
Carr's statement, although more eloquent, was really
echoing the same point made by the Court in 1792.

In that

year, the Court in Kennon v. M' Roberts set up a simple
rule of interpretation:

"if the testator use legal

phrazes, his intention should be construed by legal rules.
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If he uses those that are common, his intention, according
to the common Tinderstanding of the words he uses, shall be
the rule."32
Perhaps the most illuminating cases where e testator's
intent clashed with a legal rule came when there was a
devise {i.e., a testamentary disposition of land) of real
property to the testator's children.

In 1797, for example,

John Guthrie, an uneducated man, left land to his eldest
son James.

Everything about the will indicated Guthrie's

intention to leave the land to James absolutely, without
limitation or restriction.

But Guthrie did not devise the

land to James "and his heirs," and by leaving out those
three key words, the common-law rule had it that James took
the land only during his lifetime, and that at his death it
went not to James' heirs or his own devisees, but to the
"residuary legatee" of Guthrie's will.

The Court of

Appeals in this case concluded that "if we consult common
sense and the reason of mankind, we shall be satisfied that
where a man gives an estate in lands, without limitation or
restraint, he means to give his whole interest."33

And so

the Court continued to hold until the problem was remedied
by a statutory abrogation of the common law.34
Despite examples of the Virginia Court of Appeals
effecting a testator's intent over technical rules of law,
there were acknowledged limitations to this policy in both
theory and practice.

Although it was a familiar refrain

throughout the period, Judge Carr perhaps articulated it
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best in 1825:

"In the construction of wills," said Carr,

"the cardinal point, the polar star, is the intention of
the testator; and this being clear, must be pursued, unless
it be in violation of some fixed and settled rule"
(emphasis supplied).33

Just exactly what were the "fixed

and settled" rules which no testator could abridge were
never clear, and, indeed, seemed to vary.

St. George

Tucker thought them limited to such citadels of common-law
construction as the rule against perpetuities (which
forbade making property inalienable beyond a certain
length of time) or the prohibition against devises in
mortmain (that is, to religious institutions).36

But in a

series of cases adjudged between 1791 and 1803, we find the
Court upholding rules of law against intention in a far
wider variety of instances.

Thus, despite the testator's

apparent intention, the Court strikes down the intended
conveyance of after-acquired lands,37 a 999-year lease,38
a remainder in slaves,39 and a remainder in land.60
The Court's struggles with the rule of law versus the
intent of the testator is revealing regarding the prevail
ing attitude toward the common law.

On the one hand, we

see the Court willing to throw over the shackles of ancient
law to give effect to the obvious desires of the
individuals.

In so doing, the Court was merely acknowledg

ing a pragmatic reality of the Virginia countryside:
unschooled men often made wills wherein their intent was
clear, but whose language did not comport with all the
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legal niceties.

The Court chose, where possible, to

recognize that reality.

On the other hand, the Court

could not— would not— overthrow the familiar rules of
common-law construction entirely.
antiquarianism.

This was more than mere

Again, the Court of Appeals shied before

the bugbear of unsettling property rights.

As Judge Peter

Lyons phrased the argument in 1803, "It is to no purpose to
be arguing about the intention . . .; for, mere intention
cannot prevail against a settled rule of interpretation,
which has fixed an appropriate sense to particular words;
because, when the sense is once imposed, they become the
indicia of the testator's mind, until the contrary is shewn
by countervailing expressions. . . . It is better that it
should be sc, too:

For, the law ought to be certain; and,

when the rule is once laid down, it should be adhered to:
Otherwise, what is called liberality, at the bar, will
degenerate into arbitrary discretion, and all must depend
upon the will of the Judge."61

Once again we see that

interesting mix of an abiding respect for the common law,
leavened by the acknowledgment of the requirements of
pragmatic reality.

And through it all was woven the

continuing support for fixed and settled rules of property.
Judge Lyons' concern that the law might "degenerate
into arbitrary discretion, and all must depend upon the
will of the Judge,"62 provides a key insight into why a
republican commonwealth like Virginia would unhesitatingly
accept an antique system of judge-made law derived from an
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essentially monarchical system.

For the judicial opinions

collectively known as the "common law" were not perceived
as the collective opinions of appointed judges, but as
reflections of a "higher" entity, and it was the nature of
this "higher law" to be protective of individual rights and
property.

Indeed, it was only when a court threatened to

deviate from the accepted notions of the "common law" that
individual liberties and property rights were endangered.63
This conception of law had been suggested by Coke,
propounded by Locke, and elevated to a commonplace by
Blackstone.64

In Virginia Spencer Roane admitted, in

1803, "I hold myself bound by well-established precedents,
and disclaim any power to change the law."63

Such a

position espoused the familiar doctrine of predictability
in law, but it also contained an undercurrent of republi
canism.

Thus to Virginians, adhering to the common law was

more than just a bow to accepted wisdom, more than a means
to avoid unsettling existing property rights:

it was an

affirmative statement of their belief in natural law and
natural right, which in turn was a fundamental basis of
traditional English (and hence American) liberties.66
In sum, the Revolution did not mean the overthrow of
English jurisprudence in Virginia.

Rather, "the great body

of English law . . . remained intact in post-Revolutionary Virginia.

Its rules and principles were the

predominant authority relied upon in arguing and
deciding cases . . .."67

This is not to say that,the
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common law was accepted unquestioningly.

When the English

cases did not suit the practical or ideological demands of
Virginians, the Court did not hesitate to cast them aside.
Henry St. George Tucker put it succinctly in 1831:

"the

common law of England is at this day the law of this
commonwealth, except so far as it has been altered by
statute, or so far as its principles are inapplicable to
the state of the country, or have been abrogated by the
revolution and the establishment of free institutions."68
Tucker hit the nail on the head.

Through it all, the

Virginia Court of Appeals incorporated the English common
law into the emerging jurisprudence of Virginia in a manner
consistent with republicanism.

In the great majority of

cases, the influence of the English precedents went
unchallenged.

When the English decisions were distin

guished or overruled, the Court always articulated its
reasoning for the exception.

And, indeed, it is the

exceptions that prove the rule.

The willingness of the

Virginia Court of Appeals to follow the common law when to
do so protected individual liberties and predictability in
social and economic relations, but to depart from English
precedent when it seemed contrary to republican principles,
or to the circumstances of the new country, or— especially—
to the will of the people voiced through statute, proved
its commitment to a new order.

For all this, however,

there is a strain of conservatism in the attitude of the
Court of Appeals toward the English heritage.69

With the
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exception of occasional and necessary deviations, the
commitment was to predictability and stability, which could
best be achieved by conforming to the safe and familiar
rules and procedures of the English common law.
Of course, as the decades progressed, an indigenous
Virginia law also gradually developed (although by 1830 the
citations to Virginia cases were still outnumbered by those
to their British counterparts).70

It is an interesting

study to review how the Virginia Court of Appeals treated
Virginia precedent.

Predictably, as a general rule, the

ability to cite a Virginia decision as directly on point
was a boon to any lawyer's argument.71

But there appears

an interesting dichotomy between the Court's treatment of
the pre-Revolutionary General Court cases and the respect
given the postwar decisions of the Court of Appeals.

It

was not uncommon for the Court of Appeals to disregard the
decisions of the colonial (read "royal”) General Court.

At

one point the Court noted that "it has never been pretended
that the decisions of the old General Court have been
considered as conclusive."72

Partially this was because

technically the old General Court was not a court of last
resort.

It was left unstated— and therefore a matter of

speculation— whether this disrespect had anything to do
with that Court's close association with the hated colonial
governors.73
The point about a willingness to overrule General
Court cases should not be overstated.

Consistent with our
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findings regarding the English common law, the stress was
on continuity rather than change.

Perhaps no case better

displays the limited nature of the Revolution's impact on
Virginia law than that of Wallace v. Taliaferro. decided in
1800.

That adjudication brought into question the binding

power of precedents from the old General Court regarding
property in slaves.

Judge Roane was aghast at the very

thought of questioning that line of cases.

"I had supposed

that no question would have been made of the competency of
those decisions to fix rules of property in this country
....

if we reject such rules of property as have been

fixed by that court and under which our people have
regulated their property through a long series of time,
the mischief, which would ensue, is incalculable."74

It

was Judge Pendleton, however, who directly responded to
any insinuation that the Revolution had engendered a
change in the law of property in Virginia.

Pendleton

assumed that such cases had been brought "to discover if
the Revolution had produced any change in the legal
sentiment.

Fortunately, for the peace of the country, the

experiment failed, and the point was left at rest."
chief justice concluded in a haughty tone:

The

"I imagine some

young gentleman of the bar, not old enough to know the
practice of the country, nor acquainted with the former
decisions, advised the suit . . . .1,75

Nowhere can one

find a better illustration of a Revolution admittedly
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fought for "liberty"— but one in which all the while
property rights were conservatively protected.
In any event, the Justices appeared even less likely
to overrule the decisions of their own predecessors on the
Virginia Court of Appeals.

In an early case, Judge

Pendleton felt he must offer an exaplanation for an
apparent deviation from a recent adjudication.

In Jollife

v. Hite he admitted that "Uniformity in the decisions of
this Court, is all important.

We have, however, progressed

but little from the commencement of our existence; and, if
in any instance, we should recently discover a mistake in a
former decision, we should surely correct it, and not let
the error go forth to our citizens, as a governing rule of
their conduct."7 6

As the decades progressed, the rare

instance of the Court overruling a previous decision was
without exception accompanied by such protestations as
Judge Carr's in 1830:

"I believe there are few men, less

disposed than myself, to disturb the decisions of this
court, made by the enlightened judges who have gone before
us.

Cases, however, do sometimes arise in which our

respect for their decisions must yield to a more imperious
duty."77
The discussion thus far has neglected the reception
greeted pre-Revolutionary English statutes in Virginia.
That story is more straightforward.

The same ordinance of

May, 1776, which accepted the English common law also
adopted "all statutes or acts of Parliament made in aid of
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the common law prior to . . . [1607].1,78

Here, too, the

Virginia Convention evinced a willingness to rely heavily
upon the English legal heritage.

But, it is interesting to

not & the English statutes that were not adopted by the
Virginia Convention in May, 1776.

By the specific language

of the ordinance, English statutes passed since 1607 were
not included.

This had the disadvantage of eliminating

salutary English laws passed since that date, but the
theory was that most such statutes had already been adopted
by the colonial legislatures— or soon would be by the new
General Assembly.79

And this proved true enough.

The new

Virginia legislature did copy many prior English statures
(such as the statute of frauds,80 making certain improve
ments where necessary81 ).

The reception statute of 1776

also accepted only British statutes "which are of a
general nature, not local to that kingdom . . ..”82

As

St. George Tucker phrased it, this meant that some English
enactments did not transfer because they were considered
"obsolete, or have been deemed inapplicable to our local
circumstances and policy.1'83

Finally, and most important

ly, the acceptance of British statutes was only "until the
same shall be altered by the legislative power of this
colony."84

It was here that the most significant activity

occurred, as the Virginia General Assembly undertook
between 1776 and 1792 a "revisal" of the laws of Virginia
which significantly altered both the common law and statute
law of England as they had been originally adopted in May
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of 1776.

The substance of that revisal will be analyzed in

some depth in the next chapter; here it need only be noted
that with the completion of the revisal in 1792 the General
Assembly was evidently satisfied with its comprehensive
nature, because in that year it moved to repeal the
ordinance of 1776 adopting the British statutes, and that
thenceforth, "no such statute or act of parliament shall
have any force or authority within this commonwealth."83
In repealing the British legislation, the General Assembly
sought to come full circle, and exercise, in St. George
Tucker's phrase, "the undisputed right which every free
state possesses, of being governed by its own laws."86

In

doing so, however, the legislature in no way intended that
its constituents should be deprived of any of the liberties
which had been enjoyed under British law.

To ensure that

such would be the case, a caveat was inserted in the 1792
legislation saving "all rights arising under any such
statute or act . . . and . . . the right and benefit of all
. . . writs, remedial and judicial . . ,."87

In its application of the English legal heritage to
Virginia's new order, the Virginia Court of Appeals went a
long way toward enunciating and defining the nature of
Virginia's Revolutionary settlement.

The first and most

important attribute of this judicial settlement was the
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traditional and conservative nature of the court's approach
to change in the legal traditions inherited from England.
The reliance upon existing rules of law maintained the
libertarian aspects of the English common law, but also had
the effect of protecting property rights and thereby
sustaining the existing social order.
The Court of Appeals, however, was not slavish in its
devotion to English law.

The most important exception to

the court's usual loyalty to traditional legal rules
occurred when the Virginia General Assembly overruled
English statute or common law by statutory enactment.

The

court at all times deferred to the legislature in such
instances, displaying a respect for the more ''popular"
branch of republican government and its policy determina
tions.

At the same time, the court continued to support

traditional rules of law and property unless they were
directly and unequivocally overruled by the General
Assembly.
Moreover, the Virginia Court of Appeals displayed a
distinctly pragmatic vein when it came to the application
of English precedents.

For example, it refused to do so

when the results did not comport with the realities of
Virginia’s situation, or when the technical rules of the
common law yielded an unreasonable result.
In all of this, one fact emerges as particularly
striking.

Throughout the period stretching from the

Revolution to 1830, the Court of Appeals displayed a
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remarkable consistency in its approach to the salient
issues which arose.

The court displayed a like respect for

traditional rules of law in the 1790s as in the 1830s.
Similarly, respect for statutory pronouncements spanned the
decades under study, and the same continuity can be seen in
the other topics discussed.

Indeed, in all areas, examples

of judicial attitudes can be drawn as easily from the early
nineteenth-century reports as from those of the late
eighteenth century.

It is significant that in 1830 the

Court of Appeals was evincing a judicial approach nearly
identical to that of forty and fifty years earlier.

This

doctrinal stability in the face of social and economic
change in the Commonwealth would loom as important as many
of the court's substantive pronouncements.
A corollary to these conclusions pertains to the
evolving role of the Court of Appeals.

In the decades

between the Revolution and 1830, the court became a key
player in the process of defining the nature of Virginia's
adaptation to its new status as a republican commonwealth
free from the dictates of English law and policy.

Perhaps

no other institution made a greater contribution to the
complex task of interweaving the threads of the English
legal heritage into the fabric of a republican legal
system.
In sum, by 1830 not only had the Court of Appeals
played a pivotal role in establishing and defining
Virginia's new constitutional order, but it had also been
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instrumental in adapting the inherited English legal system
to a republican commonwealth.
remained static, however.

Not all Virginia law

The Revolution also engendered

significant change in certain areas of law, and the Court
of Appeals played an equally important role in this aspect
of the Revolutionary settlement.

It is to the legal

innovations of republican Virginia that we now turn.
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CHAPTER IV
REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES IN ACTION

Despite all the emphasis upon tradition and stability
displayed by the Virginia Court of Appeals in its handling
of the Commonwealth's English legal heritage, there was
unquestionably a very real transformation in certain areas
of Virginia law as a result of the Revolution.

These

changes in the law were radical, and comprised the first
and best articulation of the substance of the republican
revolution in Virginia.

The innovations were initiated by

the General Assembly, which thereby placed Virginia in the
forefront of the republican movement.

Importantly,

however, the radicalism of the alterations was tempered by
a resistance to wholesale change on the part of both the
legislature and the courts.

The Court of Appeals, in

particular, while supporting the application of republican
principles whenever possible, nevertheless drew the line
when the new republican statutes unfairly challenged stable
and predictable rules of property.

In applying the new

statutory scheme the court was also obliged, on occasion,
to confront and decide between conflicting republican
principles.

In so doing, the court further defined its

role in the new Commonwealth.

The result was that in the
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decades after the Revolution, the Court of Appeals made a
significant contribution to the substance of Virginia's
Revolutionary settlement, placing a conservative "gloss" on
republican principles, while at the same time restricting
its own role in the making of policy.
One of the most important developments in postRevolutionary Virginia was the series of statutes enacted
between 1776 and 1792 which clearly reflected the repub
lican principles of the new Commonwealth.

These enact

ments, together with the judicial application of their
provisions in practical situations, provide the first
indicia of the substance of the republican revolution in
Virginia.

While the revisal of the laws was unquestionably

republican in nature, the overall tone of Virginia's
legislative revisions was much more restrained than it
might have been.

This analysis will begin with an overview

of the direction of legislative reform, and then turn to a
more detailed study of the more republican measures as
they were enacted by the General Assembly and applied by
the Court of Appeals.

The result illuminates again the

somewhat peculiar nature of Virginia's experiment in
republicanism.
While the Virginia legislature passed some important
legislation on an individual basis (in particular the
abolition of "estates tail" in 1776),1 most of the
legislative reform was channeled through a more formal

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

104
revisal of the laws begun in 1776.

A review of the

progress and product of that revisal is illuminating.2
The need for such a modification became apparent
following the break with Great Britain.

There was great

uncertainty concerning the applicability of English law,
and a recognition that a revision and recodification of all
laws in force in the new Commonwealth was sorely needed.3
The state legislature appointed a committee of revisors—
Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Pendleton, and George Wythe— to
effect the needed changes.
The revisors, particularly Jefferson and Wythe, sought
to execute "an impressive series of reforms . . . which
established the priorities which the new republic would
honor."4

Jefferson, in particular, was eager to remake

the legal structure of the Commonwealth.

He hoped to

remold it both in form and substance so that it would more
nearly reflect the leading principles of the Revolution.3
Jefferson's approach sprang from the conviction, as he
later expressed it, "that our whole code must be reviewed,
adapted to our republican form of government . . . with a
single eye to reason, and the good of those for whose
government it was framed.1'6
But a close analysis of the revisal itself suggests
that the results were quite different from what Jefferson's
rhetoric implied.

While there were liberal and republican

aspects of the endeavor, the overall effect of the revisal
was conservative.

Despite Jefferson’s strong words, it is
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clear that from the beginning the revisors decided to limit
the scope of their undertaking.

The language of the

enabling act had been quite broad, giving the revisors
"full power and authority to revise, alter, amend, repeal
or introduce all or any" of the laws of the state.7

But

they quickly decided on a much more limited endeavor.

The

first question to be settled, according to Jefferson, was
"whether we should propose to abolish the whole existing
system of laws, and prepare a new and complete Institute,
or preserve the general system, and only modify it to the
present state of things."8
limited alternative.

"The committee chose the more

Thus the revision was based on the

basic principle of building upon existing laws, rather than
attempting a new system."9
Furthermore, although Jefferson aimed at a revisal
along liberal, republican principles, the revisors were not
in full agreement about how far the new legal code should
go toward codifying these ideas.

Edmund Pendleton, for

example, acknowledged that Virginia needed a general
revision of its laws, but he was less willing to make
radical changes than was Jefferson.

For instance,

Jefferson and Pendleton disputed the future of primogeni
ture.

Jefferson wanted it abolished.

Pendleton originally

wanted to retain it, and then, as a compromise, offered to
follow the Hebrew principle of double portions to the
eldest son.

His reasons were essentially conservative.

Pendleton knew that the political, economic, and social
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system in Virginia, as in England, was based upon land
tenure, and he believed that estates must be kept intact if
the existing systems were to endure.
did not carry the day.

Pendleton's position

Nonetheless, this fundamental

disagreement about succession demonstrates the conflicting
forces within the committee of revisors.10
When the revisors completed the project in 1779, their
efforts received only a lukewarm reception in the General
Assembly.
bills.

The revisors' report was in the form of 126

It was introduced near the end of the session, and

consideration of so formidable a document was postponed by
the legislature.

It appeared that no one in the House of

Delegates was prepared to fight for acceptance of the
reforms, and they languished for five more years, until
James Madison succeeded in directing legislative attention
to the matter.

Certain conservatives at that time opposed

the proposed code on general principles, but Madison
succeeded in 1785-86 in winning the enactment of
approximately half of the bills in the package.

While

Madison eventually had some success, however, the difficul
ties he encountered in obtaining approval of the sig
nificant reforms was evidence that few of Virginia's
leaders were as willing as Jefferson to accept significant
alteration in the laws.11
Even more revealing are the specific bills which did—
and did not— gain enactment.

By far the greater number of

proposed bills were of a mundane nature, without any
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ideological connotation.

On the other hand, one enactment

that certainly reflected republican principles was the
statute of descents enacted in 1785.

In addition, by

Jefferson's own admission, there were only four others
which were "interesting," and which were broadly
philosophical in concept.
Assembly.

Two of these measures passed the

The first granted citizenship to newcomers to

Virginia, and thus affirmed the right inherent in all men
to seek "happiness.1,12

Significantly, this was one of the

few bills that passed in 1779, in the first flush of
Revolutionary liberalism.

The second bill of significance

represented the high water mark of liberalism in the 1780s:
the famous Statute for Religious Freedom of 1786.

In this

measure, written by Jefferson, the assembly extended
religious liberty to all, without qualification.

Moreover,

the act included a philosophical preamble with an assertion
of complete intellectual liberty.
have smooth sailing.

But the bill did not

When first introduced in 1779, enough

people regarded it as a "diabolical scheme" to prevent its
passage.

And even in later passing the act, a considerable

number of legislators rejected the sentiment of the
preamble, and its language had to be amended and
restrained.13
Meanwhile, two other "liberal" bills were rejected by
the General Assembly.

In a measure dealing with crime and

its punishment, Jefferson attempted to make criminal
sanctions more rational and humane.

The bill met intense
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opposition and was rejected, largely because it "mitigated
penalties in advance of general public opinion."14

A

final pet measure of Jefferson's was a bill proposing the
extension of public education.

To contemporary Virginians,

however, Jefferson's education proposal seemed both overly
comprehensive and revolutionary, and even the limited part
of the proposal that was enacted was not implemented in the
state's localities.13
The impression that is gained from all this is that,
while the forces of change were not absent in postRevolutionary Virginia, they were generally counterbalanced
by more conservative elements content with the status quo.
This perspective is reinforced by following the later
efforts at completing the revision of Virginia law.

As

early as 1783, when the more radical measures of the
revisors met with strong opposition, the legislature
recognized the need for more rationality in the laws of
Virginia and ordered what became known as the Chancellor's
Revisal.

This was merely a non-reformist compilation of

the laws, rather than a revision.16

Between 1787 and

1792, attempts to complete the revisal were carried out by
three successive groups, but the result of their work was
vastly different from that of the original revisors.17
The new revisors lacked a strong personality committed to
reform who could influence the direction the revisal would
take.

Instead, they relied on legislative direction, which

was decidedly conservative.18

The House of Delegates
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instructed the new revisors that "no new matter should be
introduced into the system; the object of the act under
which the said Revisors were appointed, being to compile a
new and concise edition, and not to form a new code of
laws."19

This more limited revisal was adopted in 1792.

In sum, despite Jefferson's assertions that the
revisal of the laws in Virginia marked the dawning of a new
liberal and republican day with respect to the Old
Dominion's legal code, there is little evidence that there
was much more than a lurching, temporary movement in that
direction, soon overcome by a return to conservatism.20
That the revisal of Virginia's laws during the years
1776 to 1792 contained many elements of conservatism should
come as no surprise.

As one scholar commented in 1831, "We

can scarcely presume that any but enthusiasts would adopt a
jurisprudence entirely foreign to their habits instead of
the institutions of their fathers."21

And, although there

were radical ideas abroad in these years, moderation
prevailed in Virginia.22

In the end, "the laws adopted by

the state legislature were essentially the same that had
governed Virginia for generations."23
To say that the Virginia revisal of the laws had a
conservative cast is not to diminish the very real and
substantial republican advances made by certain pieces of
legislation passed during those years; such legislation
effected a fundamental restructuring of certain areas of
Virginia law, and the republican implications were
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profound.

It is to these enactments, and in particular to

their application by the Virginia Court of Appeals, that we
now turn.
Thomas Jefferson had identified a handful of bills in
the proposed revisal of the laws as particularly important
from a republican point of view.

One of these was the act

granting citizenship to newcomers to Virginia.24

To

Jefferson, this bill recognized the "natural right which
all men have of . . . seeking . . . happiness wheresoever
they may be able . . .."2S

Here, then, was a "natural

right" duly legitimated by the legislative authority.

The

Court of Appeals, in construing a later version of this
statute, was quick to acknowledge the right, but as quick
to note the limitations that could be engrafted even upon
natural rights.

In the 1811 case of Murray v. M'Carty,

Judge William Cabell recognized that "nature has given to
all men the right of relinquishing the society in which
birth or accident may have thrown them; and of seeking
subsistence and happiness elsewhere; and it is believed
that this right of emigration, or expatriation is one of
those 'inherent rights, of which when they enter into a
state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive, or
divest their posterity"' (quoting directly from the
Virginia declaration of rights).26

But at the same time,

Cabell took care to add that this right could be regulated
in the community interest.

"But, although municipal laws

cannot take away or destroy this great right, they may
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regulate the manner, and prescribe the evidence of its
exercise . . . .”27

in subsequent cases the Court enforced

these municipal regulations of citizenship by denying the
vote to a citizen of the Virginia lands ceded to the
District of Columbia,28 and by demanding that the statutory
requirements for expatriation be met.29
Of much more importance to republican principles were
the statutes which sought to cut out, "root and branch,"
those aspects of English law which were most closely linked
to England’s feudal heritage.

Feudalism was the soul of

English law, and an understanding of its functions is key
to understanding the provisions and practices which formed
the bulk of Virginia's legal heritage.

After the Norman

conquest (a rudimentary form may have existed earlier),
England had joined much of the rest of Europe in employing
a "feudal" system which was to dominate England for several
centuries and which still lies at the heart of much of
English and American jurisprudence.

Feudalism, simply put,

was a political and social system which originated in the
military needs of the most powerful men in society.

To

secure a loyal following, a "lord" would enter into a
complex, reciprocal relationship with his "vassal" which,
at base, depended upon mutual loyalty.

In simplified form,

in return for homage and service from the vassal, the lord
pledged his protection and provided land to the vassal.
This vassal, in turn, often entered into a similar
relationship with others, becoming their "lord" and they
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his vassals.

The result was a pyramidal structure of

mutual obligations and landholding, which "grew into a
complete and intricate complex of rules for the tenure and
transmission of real estate, and of correlated duties and
services; while, by tying men to the land and to those
holding above and below them, it created a close-knit
hierarchy of persons, and developed an aggregate of social
and political institutions."30

As early as the end of the

twelfth century, feudalism in its pure form was at an end
even in England, but its influence lingered on,
particularly in English law.

Indeed, as late as the 1760s

Blackstone concluded, "It is impossible to understand, with
any degree of accuracy, either the civil constitution of
this kingdom, or the laws which regulate its landed
property, without some general acquaintance with the nature
and doctrine of feuds, or the feudal law . . . ."31
The problem for Virginians at the time of the
Revolution was that feudalism, with its pyramid of
dependence leading ultimately to the monarch himself, was
strikingly anti-republican.

For a generation steeped in

the Harringtonian belief in independence based upon the
free and unrestrained ownership of land, the residual
restraints on property grounded in the feudal past were
unacceptable.

As a result, St. George Tucker recognized in

his annotation to Blackstone, "It was expected that every
trace of that [feudal] system would have been abolished in
this country when the republic was established."32
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In May, 1779, the General Assembly moved to do just
that.

In what Tucker called a "remarkable passage,” the

legislature, in order "that the proprietors of lands within
this Commonwealth may no longer be subject to any servile,
feudal, or precarious tenure; and to prevent the danger to
a free State from perpetual revenue,” provided that "the
reservation of royal . . . quitrents, and all other
reservations and conditions in the patents or grants of
land from the crown of England . . . under the former
government . . . are hereby declared null and void; and
that all lands . . . shall be held in absolute and
unconditional property to all intents and purposes
whatsoever . . ..”33

By the operation of this act, the

possession of all lands in Virginia became "allodial," that
is, independent, and held of no superior at all.34
Important as the 1779 statute was as a symbolic
eradication of the residual feudal "incidents" on land, of
much more substantive importance were the statutes striking
at the complex web of law relating to the descent and
conveyance of property which was firmly rooted in the old
feudal relationships.

These alterations— the abolition of

entails and primogeniture, the new egalitarian statute of
descents, the elimination of the right of survivorship, and
others— represented, in St. George Tucker's words, "a
desire to conform to the newly adopted principles of
republican government."33
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The first and perhaps most famous of these statutes
was the one which abolished entails.

An entail (or "fee

tail" or "estate tail") was a limitation placed upon the
succession to real property (and, in Virginia, slaves)
which worked to the benefit of particular heirs, and to the
exclusion of others.

Typically, a testator in his will

would leave

certain property "to A, and the male heirs of

his body."

The "heirs of his body" was a formulaic phrase

(there were

several others) connoting a fee tail, which

here must descend in the male line.

If for any reason

there were no male heirs in a particular generation, the
fee tail was extinguished and the property either "revert
ed" back to the original grantor, or, if he had so
provided,
man.

the "remainder" went to a designated remainder

By establishing an estate tail, a grantor could

guarantee that the family plantation would remain in the
same family for generations.
The feudal nature of estates tail was acknowledged in
an early Court of Appeals case.

In the 1797 case of Kennon

v. M 'Roberts. the Court depicted the "spirit of the
[feudal] system, unfriendly to alienations, or divisions of
lands . . . .

[This] spirit established the rights of

primogeniture, and . . . permitted estates in tail . . ,."36
The reason, explained Judge Pendleton a decade later in
Bradley v. Mosby. was that it was in the "interests of the
Barons to keep estates, as much as might be, in one hand
[or family]."3 7
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The extent of the utilization of estates tail in
Virginia has been the subject of some debate, but there can
be no doubt that the elimination of both entails and
primogeniture in Virginia had— at the least— an immense
symbolic impact.38

The perception, at least, was that,

prior to the Revolution, estates tail were "greatly
favoured in Virginia,"39 and the reason was not far to
seek.

As late as 1830, Judge Carr explained it in Orndoff

v. Turman by quoting Thomas Jefferson:

"In the earlier

times of the colony, when lands were to be obtained for
little or nothing, some provident individuals obtained
large grants; and desirous of founding great families for
themselves, settled them on their descendants in fee tail.
The transmission of the property, from generation to
generation, in the same name, raised up a distinct set of
families, who being privileged by the law in the perpetra
tion of their wealth, were thus formed into a patrician
order . . ..1,40
By the coming of the Revolution and with it the
principles of republicanism, the tolerant attitude toward
entails had greatly changed.

No longer was preserving the

estates of powerful governing families such a priority.
Jefferson charged that "the whole corps" of these wealthy
families was devoted to "the interests and will of the
crown.

Instead of an aristocracy of wealth, of more harm

and danger to society," Jefferson called on the General
Assembly "to make an opening for the aristocracy of virtue
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and talent, which nature has wisely provided for the
interests of society, and scattered with equal hand through
all its conditions."

Jefferson concluded that such a move

was "deemed essential to a well-ordered republic.”41
Judge Pendleton concurred that notions of republicanism had
brought about the change in attitude.

In the 1797 case of

Carter v. Tyler, he noted that "The revolution . . . having
produced a new order of things, this great subject [of
entails] came before the legislature in October 1776.1,42
Carr, writing in 1830,

filled in the details:

"We had

just cut ourselves loose from a monarchy, and established a
republican form of government.

This was the first assembly

that met under the new constitution, and it became its duty
to remodel the laws, and adapt them to the genius of our
infant republic.

In this labor, it was natural that the

laws of entails should attract the earliest attention:

a

law, mischievous in its effects upon the general interests
of society, and peculiarly hostile to the experiment we
were then making."43
The result of all this was the statute abolishing
entails passed in that October session of 1776.44

The

statutory intent, according to Carr, was "to cut up estates
tail, root and branch,"43 or, as Henry St. George Tucker
put it in 1831, "our revolutionary ancestors,

. . . instead

of tampering with so noxious a plant, resolved to lay the
axe to its root by a total abolition."46

When it was
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discovered that the language of the 1776 act contained
loopholes, these were closed in 1785 and 1792.47
The Court of Appeals of Virginia was assiduous in its
application of these statutes to conveyances of land and
slaves.

In a long line of cases the Court consistently

interpreted language in conveyances that had traditionally
created estates tail to continue to do so (even in
conveyances drafted long after the statute when presumably
the grantor knew the law).

Such conveyances were by

operation of the law immediately converted to a fee simple
(that is, to absolute ownership in the original grantee).48
The effect of such conversions to a fee simple was to cut
off the reversion or remainder, thus freeing the property
from the restrictive aspects of the fee tail.49
The willingness of the Court of Appeals to enforce the
legislative mandate reflects both its deference to
legislative initiative and, undoubtedly (as is clear from
some of the judicial language already quoted) because of a
sincere belief in the republican principles involved.
Perhaps what is more revealing are the cases where the
Court did not construe the conveyance to be a fee tail and
thereby converted to a fee simple.

These types of

decisions fell into two general categories.

In the first

were a few exceptional cases where, despite language which
normally was deemed to create a fee tail, the Court held
that an entailed estate was not created.

Usually these

situations arose in "will" cases, where by leaving the
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conveyance untouched the Court in effect upheld a later
transfer of the property to, say, the testator's grandchil
dren, a result clearly implementing the testator's
intention.
The case of Smith v. Chapman50 is a good example.

In

1790, long after the abolition of entails, William Carr
(the testator) drew a will which, in effect, left property
to Carr's children for life, then to Carr's children's
children (Carr's grandchildren).

But, if Carr’s children

had no "issue of their body," the estate would go to Carr's
wife.

As we have seen, under normal circumstances, the

"issue of the body" language was a formulaic phrase which
made the conveyance a fee tail.

If so, Carr's children

would take an estate in fee simple by operation of the
statute, and the provisions for Carr's grandchildren and
his wife would be obliterated.

In this case, the Court

avoided this result by construing the grant to the
grandchildren to be a valid "executory devise"— that is, a
valid future interest in the property.

In doing so, the

Court continued its tradition of supporting a testator's
intent to provide for his family.

A case such as Smith,

however, was rare, and the Court was usually content to
convert the fee tail to a fee simple without considering
the consequences.51
Indeed, the real surprise is that the Smith v. Chapman
scenario was not played out more often.

Almost identical

fact patterns emerged numerous times both before and after
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Smith, and the Court usually continued to decide that a fee
tail was created and then converted to a fee simple.

St.

George Tucker may have provided the best explanation.

"It

may seem very hard," admitted Tucker, "that an estate given
by words which so clearly manifest the donors intention
towards a particular set of persons, should be defeated by
a general rule of law.

But , . . the legislature [and the

Court] from the experience of ages being sensible of the
bad policy of suffering perpetuities in estates to be
created by any set form of words, probably found it would
be unsafe to permit any evasion of the act for preventing
entails to be introduced by any set form of words, or
device whatsoever .1
,32
Of more interest is the other category where the Court
declined to convert an obvious fee tail into a fee simple
according to the statute.

While it is clear that the

General Assembly intended to totally eliminate fee tails,
"root and branch," by the statute of October 1776, through
inartful draftsmanship a loophole had been left.

The 1776

statute eliminated all estates tail except a "tail on a
tail"— that is, where A left an estate in tail to B, and if
B had no issue of his body, to C in tail.33

This was a

technical but very real exception, which clearly did not
conform to what the legislature had intended.

Neverthe

less, when just such a case (Roy v. Garnett) came before
the Court of Appeals in 1794, th^; Court felt compelled to
uphold the fee tail as valid.34

This loophole was quickly
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closed in 1785,33 but the fact that the Court of Appeals
chose to uphold the fee tail is quite revealing.

In one

sense it confirms the impression that the Court took its
direction straightforwardly, and literally, from the will
of the legislature as expressed in statute.

It also

demonstrates, in a broader sense, an example of "conflict
ing republican principles."

It is clear that Roy v.

Garnett dealt with an unintended loophole in a statute
designed to implement an important tenet of republicanism.
But the "law" did not so provide in this particular case,
and the Virginia Court of Appeals deferred to the express
words of the statute— that is, to the express words of the
representatives of the people.
In contrast to Roy v. Garnett was the 1830 case of
Orndoff v. Turman.36
created in 1745.

There, an estate tail had been

In 1769, Turman,37 the tenant in tail,

conveyed an absolute, fee simple interest (which of course
he did not have) to Orndoff.

In 1816 Turman died.

In

this litigation Orndoff sought to confirm his fee simple
interest.

Orndoff argued that, even though Turman had not

possessed a fee simple when he made the conveyance in 1769,
Turman's fee tail had been converted to a fee simple by
operation of the act of 1776, thus legitimating the
conveyance.

On the other side, the heirs of Turman argued

that when Turman made the alleged fee simple conveyance in
1769 his fee tail had thereby been "discontinued," and was
thus not subject to the 1776 statute until the property
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descended to his heirs at his death in 1816.

At that time,

argued the heirs, the statute operated to convert the fee
tail into a fee simple in the heirs.
The Court frankly admitted that the statute did not
address this particular case.38

Under the reasoning of

Roy v. Garnett, since this was apparently a loophole in the
statute, it would be logical to assume that the fee tail
converted into a fee simple, if at all, in 1816.
Judge Cabell was candid on this point.

Indeed

"If I felt myself

bound to give the statute a strict and technical construc
tion, I confess I could not deny the correctness of this
position.”39

But here Cabell refused to be confined to

technicalities, and sought instead to enforce the true
intent of the legislature.

"Can any man read the preamble

of this statute," asked Cabell, "and believe that this was
the intention of the legislature?

It is a law founded on

great principles of national policy.

It is a highly

remedial statute, intended to remove great political and
moral mischief.

So far from being restricted to a rigid

technical construction, according to the letter, I feel
myself compelled to construe it according to its spirit,
and thus to bring within the scope of its operation all
cases that come within the mischief intended to be provided
against."60

Judge Carr chimed in:

"A thing which is

within the intention of the makers of a statute, is as much
within the statute, as if it were within the letter."
again:

And,

"Intention is the governing principle, the essence
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of the law."61

Judge Green inserted a succinct dissent,

reminding the majority that "the present case does not come
within the literal terms of that statute."62
Here we have the interesting phenomenon of a Court of
Appeals in 1794 refusing to expand the intent of the
statute abolishing entails beyond the precise statutory
provisions, while in 1830 the Court in a similar case took
a much more liberal stand.63

One must be careful, however,

not to make too much of a single instance; for one thing,
the facts of Orndoff v. Turman do not as clearly demon
strate that the case was obviously outside the statute.
While the statute abolishing entails is perhaps
Virginia's most famous Revolutionary strike at the
aristocratic aspects of the English law, the act which
undertook to eradicate feudal vestiges in the most
fundamental fashion was undoubtedly the statute of descents
passed in 1785.64

Neither the legislature nor the Court

of Appeals ever harbored any doubts as to the radical
nature of this act.

Judge Tucker acknowledged that by this

statute "all former Rules and Canons of Inheritance and
succession to estates within this Commonwealth, whether
established by Common Law, or by Statute, were rescinded,
abrogated and annulled."65

Judge Pendleton agreed;

"That

the act of 1785 has totally done away [with] that common
law [of England], as to the course of descents, has not
been, nor can be doubted."66
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The full impact of the Virginia statute of descents
upon the feudal English system can perhaps best be revealed
by comparing the essential principles of the English course
of descents with the changes engendered by the Virginia
statute.67

The feudal system, based as it was on a purely

personal relationship between lord and vassal, required not
only absolute loyalty but also someone with the ability to
fulfill the military and other obligations attendant upon
the feudal connection.

It was chiefly these requirements

that generated the rules governing the common law of
descent.
The first of the feudal rules of inheritance was that
of primogeniture.

This held that if the possessor of land

died intestate,68 his property descended to the eldest
surviving son.

This had the effect both of keeping the

property intact, and of ensuring that it passed on to the
person most likely to have the ability to take up the
deceased father's obligations.

The Virginia statute wasted

little time in abolishing this concept, providing that all
children took equally.69

In a similar vein, the English

law of descents maintained that, in Blackstone's words,
"the male issue shall be admitted before the female,"70
and for many of the same reasons concerning the nature of
feudal obligations.

Again, Virginia struck at the heart of

this set of assumptions by providing that real property
should "pass in parcenary [that is, jointly] to his kindred
male and female."71

By this clause, commented Henry St.
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George Tucker, "the preference of males to females is
altogether abolished."72
Another concept that loomed large in feudal
inheritance law was the concept of "blood"; that is, the
English law of descents emphasized that property must
remain in the bloodline of the person who had first
acquired the land.

This made perfect sense from a feudal

perspective, since the top priority was loyalty, and blood
has always been thicker than water.73

Again, the Virginia

statute of descents completely stood such thinking on its
head.

Where at common law a property would escheat to the

crown before descending to someone not of the whole blood,
in Virginia those of the "half-blood" (one common parent)
took half portions, bastards could inherit and transmit
property through the mother, and spouses could inherit in
the absence of other heirs.74

St. George Tucker gives the

rationale behind Virginia's liberal approach:

"It seems to

have been the opinion of the framers of that act, that if
he neglected to make any disposition thereof, in his
lifetime, the law ought to give it to those persons whom he
would most naturally have preferred if he had made such a
disposition. *'73
A further manifestation of Virginia's emphasis upon
property passing to the "loved ones" of the deceased can be
found in the Commonwealth’s amendment to the English
treatment of "ascending succession."

Blackstone noted

that, in England, "The first rule [of descent] is, that
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inheritances shall lineally descend to the issue of the
[decedent]

. . . but shall never lineally ascend.”76

Henry St. George Tucker explained:

"So that, in England,

if a man dies seised [that i s , possessed] of an estate of
inheritance, leaving no other kindred than his father, his
land will escheat to the crown rather than pass to the
father as his heir."

Tucker went on to observe:

"In

Virginia, this absurd notion is abolished, and the father
is preferred to all other kindred except descendants."7 7
In sum, it is clear that the Virginia Statute of
Descents of 1785 represented a radical departure from the
common law.78

"That important act," said St. George

Tucker in 1803, "wholly changed the course of descents,
introducing and establishing principles in direct opposi
tion to those of the common law, and scarcely agreeing with
it in any one principle."79

Indeed, wrote Tucker, "the

common-law rules of inheritance were wholly and entirely
abolished, and an entire new system of jurisprudence
substituted for them in Virginia, the grounds and founda
tions of which, are wholly incompatible with those rules
and maxims, which were generated by and interwoven with the
feudal system of which, it appears to have been the policy
and intention of the framers of our law, to eradicate every
germ, and obliterate every former trace."80
While the General Assembly took the lead in enacting
an entirely new system of descents based upon republican
precepts, it was left to the Virginia courts to apply the
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new arrangement.

The Court of Appeals in construing this

statute acknowledged and applauded its republican inten
tions.

It was clear that the Court attributed the genesis

of the act to the new republican form of government.
Carr described the scenario.

Judge

"Among the first cares of

this Commonwealth, after the close of the war, was the
framing of a body of Laws better suited to our actual
situation, than those which had governed us, as part of a
Monarchy . . . .

Our Statute of Descents is part of the

fruit of [these] labors."81

Judge Fleming, although

writing nearly thirty years earlier, would have agreed.
"The Legislature conceiving, that the rule of descents by
the common law was not well adapted to the genius of the
people and the form of our Government, totally changed it,
by the act of 1785."82
it up.

It was Judge Carr who best summed

"Every body knows," he said, "that these [English]

Canons of descent are the creatures of the Feudal System,
and however calculated to support a Government like that of
England, are in violation of natural affection, and
repugnant to the free spirit of a republic."83
The Court of Appeals elaborated upon its perception
of the substance of this proclaimed "free spirit of a
republic."

The abolition of feudal vestiges was certainly

one important aspect.

While Judge Carr had acknowledged

that the English "Canons of Descent are the creatures of
the Feudal System,"84 Judge John Coalter was willing to
elaborate.

"The principles of our Revolution . . .," he
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said in 1828 r "required that those Feudal doctrines of
primogeniture, preference of males over females, that lands
should not lineally ascend, the rules as to the half-blood,
and the blood of the first purchaser, &c., should be done
away, and that the course of descents should conform to the
new state of things."05

There were also more practical

aspects to the Virginia policy toward descents.

Conforming

the distribution of property to the "natural objects" of
the deceased's affection certainly made more sense than
allowing the land to escheat to the state for want of a
descendant who fit in the proper common-law category.
Beyond these more obvious justifications for the 1785
statute, however, the Court of Appeals also was able to
discern the essential principle underlying much of the
statutory scheme.

It was a principle as novel to real

property law as it was antithetical to traditional feudal
notions.

In the 1828 case of Davis v. Rowe, Justice Carr

identified the essential purpose of the statute quite
lucidly.

"The provisions of this Law stand in striking

contrast with the Canons of Descent of the Common Law," he
said.

"Its great object was equality."86

confirmed by the statutory provisions.

This is

In addition to such

obviously egalitarian measures such as the abolition of
primogeniture and the taking of equal portions by males and
females alike, other sections provided that eligible heirs
should take equally ("per capita"), and enlarged the
common-law treatment of "hotchpot" (which allowed an heir
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to share equally even though he had received "advancements"
from the estate).87
As was the case with the application of the statute
abolishing estates tail, the adjudications in the Court of
Appeals that are most illuminating are those where the
application of the statute was not automatic.

In these

cases are revealed both the limits of court-applied
republican principles and occasions where equally republi
can values pulled in opposing directions.

It is quite

interesting to note the cases where the Virginia statute of
descents of 1785 was not applied.

The Court of Appeals

refused to apply the provisions of the new law to cases
that arose prior to the enactment of the statute.

In

Shelton v. Shelton, the issue was whether the "surplus" of
an estate passed to the executors or to the next of kin.
While admitting that "our new statute of distributions has
put an end to the dispute as to all cases subsequent to its
passage" (it thereafter went to the next of kin), in this
case arising prior to 1785, the Court applied English
precedents and ordered the surplus to go to the execu
tors.88

Likewise the Court refused to apply the new

notions of land descending according to "title" rather than
by the common-law rule of "seisin" in a case that arose
before the act.89

Such refusal to apply the statute

retroactively sprang not so much from any anti-republican
bias, as from a deeply-rooted respect for stable and
predictable rules of property.
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A reprise of the interesting problem of the judicial
treatment of omissions in a statute also appeared under the
statute of descents.

It will be recalled that in our

discussion of the law of entails the 1794 case of Roy v.
Garnett refused to deviate from statutory language, even
though there plainly had been an oversight.

In the much

less clear case of Orndoff v. Turman in 1830, the Court
appeared more willing to give effect to legislative intent
over precise statutory language.90

The same type of

situation arose under the statute of descents in the case
of Davis v. Rowe in 1828.91

In that case Anthony Gardner

died intestate (that is, without a will) leaving only
nieces and nephews as his heirs— one on his brother's side,
four on his sister's.92

At common law, these nieces and

nephews would have taken "per stirpes"— that is, they would
have stood in the shoes of their parents, and taken the
portion of the estate that would have gone to the parent
had he or she lived.

In this case, Gardner's sister would

have received half of his estate, and his brother the other
half.

Thus, under the common law, the brother's only child

would take one-half the estate, while the four children of
the sister would split the other half (each getting oneeighth of the entire estate).

The Virginia statute of

descents, however, had followed a diametrically different
policy, providing that estates should be distributed per
capita— that is, in equal shares to those eligible to
inherit.93

The problem in the Davis case was that,
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although the statute specifically mentioned almost all
conceivable kin as within the per capita provision
(children, mother, brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, etc.),
it did not mention nieces and nephews.

Thus, although the

spirit of the statute clearly pointed toward an equal
division of the estate, it was silent as to the specific
individuals involved in this controversy.

The question was

whether, in the absence of a statutory mandate, the commonlaw rule of per stirpes distribution applied.
The majority in Davis, similar to the previous
decision in Orndoff, admitted that the case did not come
within the specific provisions of the statute.

Neverthe

less the Court held that it was clear that the legislature
intended to completely abrogate the common law, and that
the spirit of the law equally clearly favored a per capita
distribution.

Judges Green and Cabell in dissent argued

that, under Virginia law, the common law applied where the
statute, as here, was silent.94

Here we find the Court

making a much more definitive statement than can be gleaned
from Orndoff.

Here, although the Justices were divided,

the Court committed itself to a policy of supporting
legislative intent in the absence of a specific statutory
provision.

It appears to be a clear departure from the

earlier technicality of Roy v. Garnett.

In so doing it

supported the republican policy of the statute without
really doing violence to the equally republican concept of
deference to the popular (i.e., legislative) will.
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The Davis decision did bring some illumination to the
issue of the Court's perception of its role in the
republican schema.

More revealing, however, were a brace

of cases decided in 1800-1801 in which the Court of Appeals
faced squarely a blatantly anti-republican amendment to the
act.

The statute of 1785, a product of the Jefferson-

Pendleton-Wythe revisal, was almost flawless in its
drafting.

Indeed, as Judge Carr said in the 1828 case of

Davis v. Rowe, "Our Statute of Descents . . . has hitherto
*

been admired as a model of conciseness and perspecuity, and
so well has it answered its end, that this (I think) is the
first serious contest, which has arisen in a period of
forty years, on a provision of the Law, which came from the
hands of the Revisors."9 3
the Statute in 1790.96

Not so the amendments added to

In that year additional provisions

addressed the principles of inheritance to be followed in
the cases of infants who died intestate.

As Henry St.

George Tucker put it, "These sections, which are stuck like
wens upon the original act, and deform its fair propor
tions, have given rise to more litigation within a few
years than the residue of the act will occasion in a
century."97
The reason for all the problems was that the inter
polated provisions were substantively different from the
original statute, and represented a policy diametrically
opposed to that act.

The new sections provided that if any

part of the real property in the infant’s estate had
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derived from the father, that property was to go to the
father or his next of kin, to the exclusion of the mother
and her kin.

Likewise, land derived from the mother was to

be distributed on the maternal side.

This was clearly a

resurrection of the principle of keeping the property in
the "blood" of the original possessor.
The first case was that of Brown v. Turberville, which
came before the Court in 1800.98

The problem in that case

did not directly involve the 1790 amendments, but arose
because those amendments were inartfully interpolated into
the original act.

Under section five of the 1785 act, if

any person (infant or adult) died without children,
parents, brothers, sisters, or their descendants, the
estate was divided into two halves ("moieties"), half to be
distributed on the paternal side (to the grandfather or
other kindred) and half on the maternal side.

As we have

seen, in 1790 this was amended in the case of infants, and
the estate went wholly to the parental side from which it
"derived."

The 1790 amendments were designed to apply only

to infants, while the 1785 approach was retained as to
adults.

Unfortunately, when the 1790 amendments were

integrated into the statute of descents during the
recodification of 1792, inartful draftsmanship clouded the
whole issue.

The new amendments were inserted intact (now

as sections five and six of the recodified act).99

The

original 1785 section five then became the new section
seven.

In doing so, the draftsman inserted into the 1785
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language a clause designed to acknowledge the new treatment
of infants' estates.

But the inserted language was not

limited to infants, and a literal reading of the 1785
provision as amended would have it apply only when an adult
died without the designated close relatives, and without
having derived any of his land from either his father or
mother.

Clearly this was not the intent, but that is what

the statute now said, and, predictably enough, someone soon
sought to take advantage of it.

Hence the case of Brown v.

Turberville came on before the Court of Appeals.
In Brown. George Waugh, an adult, died intestate,
unmarried and without issue or other close relation, and
with land which had derived from George's father.

The

plaintiffs were kindred on George's mother's side, seeking
a moiety of the estate under the intention of the 1785 act.
The defendants claimed all the estate as George's father's
kin under the precise language of the 1792 recodification.
When the matter came before the Court of Appeals, the Court
did not duck the issue, but met it directly, unanimously
supporting the parties claiming under the 1785 intent.

The

eagerness with which they sought to avoid the 1792 language
can be seen by the fact that the respective judges came tip
with no fewer than three mutually exclusive theories to
support their conclusion.
Judge Carrington acknowledged that there had been an
oversight in the drafting of the 1792 provision, and
recommended the literal -insertion of the missing language
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into the statute.
" . . .

"This supplement," said Carrington,

according to the rules of expounding statutes, I

think we have a right to make."

He added that "by this

means, the whole act will be rendered consistent, and all
cases of intestacy will be provided for,* agreeable to the
meaning and intention of the Legislature.

Which is

certainly better," concluded Carrington, "than by adhering
to the literal expression, to disappoint the will of the
Legislature, and defeat the intention of the Law
altogether."10«
Judge Fleming was chary of such a drastic remedy.
Instead, he sought "a plain natural interpretation which
will effect this important object, without any violence to
the text."

Fleming's solution was to construe the 1785

statute as still in existence, since "the act of 1792 only
repeals so much of other laws, as comes within its own
purview . . .."101
Judge Lyons would take a broader approach.

"It is a

rule in the construction of statutes," said Lyons, "that
the intention, when it can be discovered, must be followed
with reason and discretion, although the interpretation may
seem contrary to the letter of the statute."

He proceeded

to take "the whole act, and all other acts made on the same
subject, into one view, moulding them according to the rule
laid down . . .

to the truest and best use; and rejecting

what shall appear to be inconsistent and absurd, and
tending to defeat the intention of the Legislature."102

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In

135
summing up. President Judge Pendleton acknowledged that
"the Court differ in their reasons," but the result was a
unanimous decision for the plaintiff and the intent of the
1785 statute.103
It was not so easy a year later when the case of
Tomlinson v. Dillard came before the Court.104

In that

case it was an infant, Benjamin Tomlinson, who died
intestate, deriving his property from his father, but
leaving his mother as his closest relative.

This set of

facts brought the case directly within the 1790 amendments.
The same judges who had reached to uphold the 1785 statute
in Brown the year before could find no justification for
doing so here.

Judge Fleming admitted:

moment's doubt upon this case.

"I have not a

The language of the acts of

Assembly leaves no room for criticism . . . .

For, whatever

latitude a Court may think proper to indulge, where the
expressions are ambiguous, they certainly have no right to
do so, when the words are clear; but, if inconveniences
follow from a literal construction, they must be redressed
by the Legislature, and not by the Court; who are not to
torture the words in order to discover meanings which the
Legislature never had; but are to pursue the plain import
of the statute, without regard to consequences."103
Carrington and Lyons reluctantly agreed.

Said Lyons:

"The

inclination of my mind would have led me to support [the
opposite conclusion]; but the words of the act of Assembly
are too strong to be resisted."106

All these judges
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distinguished (that is, found a difference in) the Brown
decision.

Only Judge Roane found reason to dissent, basing

his opinion on the fact that in this case personal property
would be affected (under a statute decreeing that personal
property should pass in the same manner as real estate),107
which would lead to some absurd results, clearly beyond the
legislative intention.108
Although the Court spoke in terms of statutory
construction, they were fully aware of the ideological
implications of these disputes over the intestacy law.
Roane detailed again the republican basis for the 1785
statute.

That law "was part of a system commenced with a

view of conforming our laws to the genius of our govern
ment, and abolishing the feudal and monarchical principles
derived to us . . . from the parent government of Bri
tain."109

Indeed, the "great principle of the [Virginia]

law was, to lose sight of the stock from whence the land
descended (or, in feudal language, the blood of the first
purchaser)

. . . and to make that will for [the deceased],

in case of intestacy, which the natural affections of
mankind authorise us to infer, he would have made for
himself . . ,."110
17901

How contrary were the amendments of

Roane did not pull punches.

"Habituated to respect

the Legislature of our country, I have, nevertheless, no
hesitation to say that this law of 1790, was anti-republi
can and aristocratic; founded on false principles; and on a
total dereliction of the policy of the act of 1785.

It was
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anti-republican and aristocratic, because it tended to keep
up the wealth of families; and so contravene the wise
policy which annihilated entails in 1776.

It was founded

on false principles, because it forgot that the infant was
the owner of the property and had respect only to those
from whom he had derived it, who had parted with the . . .
interest therein . . . and because it made a disposition
for the infant, which he never would have made for
himself . . .
A decade later, despite a parting salvo, even Roane
admitted defeat.

In the nearly identical case of Templeman

v. Steptoe,112 Roane asserted that "as to the question now
made upon the act of descents, I believe it will be
admitted that I have borne my testimony [alluding to
Tomlinson] against the policy which gave rise to the act of
1790, restoring, in a measure, the feudal principle of the
blood of the first purchaser.

But," Roane finally

admitted, "while I shall never be in favour of extending
that principle in doubtful cases, by construction, I do not
deny the power of the Legislature to make the innova
tion."113
It is an appropriate postscript to note that the Court
of Appeals did not wholly throw its hands up in despair.
Even while denying the mother recovery under the 1790
amendments in Tomlinson, Judge Pendleton had called for a
legislative remedy to a problem the Court felt powerless to
change.

On the other hand, said Pendleton, "if the
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Legislature are silent upon the subject, that silence ought
to be considered as an approbation of the opinion of this
Court, and the point will be settled.1,11 *

The General

Assembly was not silent, and in that very session passed a
law to overrule the 17S0 provisions.1*3
The appellate decisions implementing the Virginia
statute of descents, particularly the Brown and Tomlinson
decisions, offer an unparalleled opportunity to gauge the
role the Court of Appeals was to play in implementing the
"republican revolution."

It cannot be questioned that the

Court favored the republican principles which were
represented in the 1785 statute of descents.

Whenever

there was the least bit of latitude, either in the facts of
the case adjudicated, or in the statutory provision, the
Court, as in Davis v . Rowe116 and Brown v . Turberville117
stretched to the utmost to fulfill the republican prin
ciples of the statute.

However, there were also limits

beyond which the Court would not go.

It would not, for

example, construe the law to have an ex post facto
application (Shelton v. Shelton118).

Nor would it buck the

unequivocally-expressed intention of the legislature, as in
Tomlinson v. Dillard.119

But even there, the Court acted

in a thorouughly republican fashion.

In choosing to defer

to the policy decisions of the legislative branch, the
Court of Appeals in reality merely chose to follow the
republican belief in majority rule rather than the antifeudal republican principle of equality in descents.
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Facing republican principles in conflict, the Court merely
expressed its perception of their relative merits.
The revisal of the statute of descents, together with
the abolition of quit rents and entails, did not exhaust
the feudal doctrines exploded in republican Virginia.
more are worthy of brief review.

Two

The first related to the

feudal favoring of heirs-in-remainder; the other was the
doctrine of joint tenancy with right of survivorship,
which, ironically, operated to exclude heirs.

Both of

these doctrines were repudiated in Virginia, in favor of
more expanded notions of individual intent, the alien
ability of property, and support for the "natural objects"
of an individual's affection.
One time-honored common-law rule with its roots in the
feudal past held that where an estate was conveyed to an
individual without specifying that it also went to his
"heirs," that person took only a life estate in the
property, and at his death it reverted back to the original
grantor or his heirs.
of logic.

This rule seemed to fly in the face

As the Court of Appeals said in Kennon v.

M 1Roberts, "Common sense would have dictated, that an
absolute estate should pass by a conveyance unlimited as to
duration, and containing no provision for its return to the
grantor . . ..1,120

The Court explained the anomaly in

terms of feudal principles.

"When upon the adoption of the

feudal system in England, an arrangement was made of the
various tenures by which lands were to be holden . . . The
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spirit of this system," the Court continued, was "unfriend
ly to alienations, or divisions of lands:

and therefore,

the rule that such conveyances passed only an estate for
life, was established."121

The ultimate objective of this

particular rule, was to "favor . . . the heir at law, [and]
narrow as much as possible the operation of all convey
ances, calculated to disinherit him.1,122
The Court of Appeals of Virginia chafed at this rule,
particularly in the context of the construction of wills.
"If we consult common sense and the reason of mankind,"
asserted Judge Lyons in Fairclaim v. Guthrie, "we shall be
satisfied that where a man gives an estate in lands,
without limitation or restraint, he means to give the whole
interest . . ..”123

Accordingly, the Court snatched at any

straw that would enable it to circumvent the common-law
rule.

When a testator had failed to use the words "and his

heirs," but did use some similar language, such as "to him
and his assigns,” the Court interpreted such language to be
tantamount to "and his heirs."124

Soon the Court needed

only to see the testator's expression of intent to dispose
of his "estate" in the preamble to his will in order to
deem it an absolute conveyance.123
But the Court was only willing to go so far.

Despite

the "new cases" which limited the effect of the rule, the
Court acknowledged that "all [cases] which may come before
us, arising at a prior period [that is, anterior to the
statute which later corrected the problem], must be decided
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according to the law of that time [i.e., the common
law].”126

Nor would the Court go to absurd lengths to find

language with which to subvert the rule.

In Mooberrv v.

Marve, the Court refused to hold a devise of lands without
words of perpetuity as a fee simple, where the testator's
intent did not demand it.

"Where a will is systematically

composed, and the meaning plain, the court will not, for
the purpose of enlarging estates of devisees . . .
transpose expressions in other clauses, and obviously
relating to other subjects.1,127
What the Court of Appeals strove to effect in a
limited manner by textual interpretation, the legislature
accomplished in one bold stroke.

In 1785, the General

Assembly enacted a provision whereby "Every estate in lands
which shall hereafter be granted . . . although . . . words
heretofore necessary to transfer an estate of inheritance
be not added, shall be deemed a fee-simple [that is, an
absolute estate], if a less estate be not limited by
express words . . .,"128

Thereafter the Court had its

mandate, and cases arising after the statute presented no
problem.129
Even though heirs were favored in medieval law as a
means of preventing the alienation of lands to those
outside the stock of the original holder, there were times
when a lord wished to circumvent the heir.

In earliest

times, this was simple enough, because the lord granted
property only for a lifetime anyway.

But a traditional
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right evolved of a holder's heir taking the property at the
holder's death.

Sometimes, however, the heir was not the

lord's first choice to assume the mantle of his vassal.
As Henry St. George Tucker explained, sometimes it was
preferable to take "the services of a sturdy follower, who
had attained the thews and sinews of manhood," rather than
those of a "puling infant."130

One solution was the joint

tenancy with right of survivorship.

In the joint tenancy,

the lord granted the feud to two men, securing the whole
estate to the survivor of them (rather than one-half going
to the deceased tenant's heirs).

As Tucker noted, this

worked well enough in a pure feudal system, but when feuds
were replaced by "improper" feuds— that is, when the
estates began to be bought and sold— "the doctrine, though
continued, was absurd."

Tucker provided a simple example:

"If A and B purchased with equal funds, it would seem very
unjust, that the survivor should have all," to the
exclusion of the deceased’s heirs or devisees.131

The

Virginia legislature, in the midst of smashing other
seemingly inane feudal vestiges, obliterated this one as
well, by statute of 1786.132

Again, once the legislature

acted, the Court of Appeals fell in line.133
In all this exertion to sweep away feudal vestiges, it

iLs

pairv i c u l s * l y

i

n

v

S

that was left untouched.

*

t

o

o^s

j_ rs s s n s T ^ t

Despite all the legislative and

judicial activity in striking down feudal land-holding and
inheritance patterns, in at least one area— the payment of
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interest on back rent due— the Virginia Court of Appeals
refused to set aside traditional practice.
In a typical feudal relationship, the "payment" for
the use of land was not in money, but "in kind"— often in
some form of service to the lord.

Under feudal concep

tions, the idea of paying "interest" on such an obligation
had no place.

If the user of the land did not timely

supply the lord with the appropriate goods or services, the
lord's remedy was to secure the payment by the process of
"distress" (or "distraint"), whereby the lord seized the
tenant's personal property until the rent was paid.134
With the use of "improper feuds" and money rents, the
argument against the payment of interest on rent in arrears
lost much of its force.

Nevertheless, the Virginia Court

of Appeals consistently refused to deviate from the commonlaw rule disallowing interest in such instances.133
In doing so, the Court unabashedly acknowledged the
feudal roots of the policy.

St. George Tucker in 1809

noted that "though, in late years,

[rent] usually consists

of money, yet it did formerly, and still may consist in
other things incapable of any profit, as spurs, capons,
horses, corn, &c. or in services, or manual operations, as
in doing suit at the Lord's Court, or ploughing his lands,
£c. the remedy for all which, if withheld, when it ought to
be paid, is by distress . . .."136

In the same case

Spencer Roane argued to no avail in dissent that times had
changed.

"It is said," admitted Roane, "that interest
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ought not to be given, because rents were 'anciently
payable in spurs, capons &c. which yield no profit.’

It is

not denied that this was anciently the case," continued
Roane, "but the true idea of rent is, that it issues out of
the land demised [rented] . . .."
policy argument.

Roane concluded with a

"Even the detaining of spurs, capons, or

a horse, while such detainer is profitable to the tenant,
is injurious to the landlord; and this is the true ground
of giving damages [i.e., interest] . . ,."137

The majority

of the Court ignored this more modern conception.
Nor was the Court swayed by the fact that interest was
generally payable in similar situations.

In 1827 Judge

Carr acknowledged, "I have felt the full force of the
remarks of the counsel for the appellee, shewing . . . that
with us, interest . . .

in almost all cases . . .

constantly allowed . . .,"138

is

Judge Green agreed that "the

spirit of our laws is, to allow interest in almost all
cases . . .."139

Nevertheless, both judges, and the Court,

refused to allow interest on rent arrears.
It becomes then a matter of some importance to explain
why the Court of Appeals was in this instance so hesitant
to override a policy that was clearly feudal in its
genesis, and which breached the tide of Virginia legal
policy.

The answer is quite simple.

perception of its role.

It lay in the Court's

St. George Tucker made the key

observation in the case of Newton v. Wilson in 1809.

"The

landlord is neither by the common law, nor by statute.
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entitled tc- interest upon rent-arrear . . . ” (emphasis
supplied).140

In other words, when the Court had no

mandate by statute or prior case law to make a policy
change, it felt that no such change could be made.

As late

as 1827, Carr acknowledged that, by rights, "[interest on]
rent arrears ought also to be allowed . . . .

I confess, I

think this the substantial justice of the case; and if it
were res intecra [that is, a new issue] I should not feel
much hesitation on the subject."

Nevertheless, Carr

refused to follow his inclinations, because, he explained,
"every day's experience impressed me more deeply with the
importance of the maxim stare decisis [i.e., the doctrine
of adhering to prior cases]."141

Again, John Green agreed.

"If the question under consideration was a new one,” he
said, "or if the former decisions of the Court on this
subject had passed without a deliberate examination of this
subject, I should have inclined to think that interest
ought to be allowed.

The cases, however, appear to have

been carefully considered, and fix the rule . . . .
precedents, I think, bind us . . .."14Z

These

In sum, the Court

of Appeals in these cases took a remarkably restrictive
view of its own policy-making capabilities, even in the
face of a clearly archaic feudal rule.
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This rather lengthy analysis of the republican
principles embodied in the revisal of Virginia's laws
between 1776 and 1792143 is justified by the fact that
during this relatively brief span of time, the Virginia
legislature moved to secure the Revolution, passing more
laws of an "ideological" orientation during this period
than in any other.

During those same years, and after, the

Virginia Court of Appeals placed its stamp on the "republi
can revolution" engendered by the General Assembly through
its application and interpretation o f .those laws.
judicial stamp was one of intriguing complexity.

That
The

Court consistently supported the legislative initiative in
its rhetoric (except when there was legislative "backslid
ing" from republican principles, such as the 1790 amend
ments to the statute of descents).

Nevertheless, the high

court was extremely cautious in its substantive holdings.
The Court would neither apply the new statutory principles
retrospectively so as to threaten long-accepted rules of
property nor (except in limited situations) repudiate
statutory language, no matter how unsatisfactory.

Nor

would the Court— as in interest on rent-arrears— boldly
change long-established policy.

The resulting conclusions

about the nature of the Court's contribution have become a
recurring litany i

support for republican principles within

a framework of stable property rights and, in particular, a
deference to legislative policy-making.

By the same token,

judicial support for these republican principles should not
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be underemphasized.

Our discussion has centered on the

exceptions to such support because they are just that:
exceptions, which help us to delineate the limits of
judicial support for republican ideals.
Another familiar refrain was the consistency of the
court's decisions over time.

Again we find the Court of

Appeals’ approach substantially unchanged over the decades
studied.

The only possible exceptions to this were such

late cases as Orndoff v. Turman (1830) and Davis v. Rowe
(1828), where the court appeared willing to depart from
strict legislative language to achieve legislative intent.
Neither case, however, represented an affirmation of any
dramatic new approach to judicial policy making.
The Orndoff and Davis adjudications offer an oppor
tunity to address a subtle yet important issue that has
been central to our entire discussion of the process of
defining Virginia's Revolutionary settlement:

the

respective roles of the legislature and judiciary in the
new republican system.

It is to the further clarification

of that subject that we now turn.
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St. George Tucker, Commentaries, vol. 1, bk. 2, pp. 169 n.
(a), 170-71. By far the majority of cases deal with joint
obligations. treated in section three of the act. There,
again, we see the Court of Appeals following the common-law
rule prior to the legislative enactment. Richardson v.
Johnston, 2 Call 527 (1801); Watkin's exr. v. Tate, 3 Call
521 (1790); Chandler's extrx. v. Hill and Lipscombe, 2 Hen.
& M. 124 (1808); Braxton's admx. v. Hilyard, 2 Munf. 49
(1811); Harrison v. Field, 2 Wash. 136 (1795). See Roane's
admr. v. Drummond's adror., 6 Rand. 182 (1828); Henry St.
George Tucker, Commentaries, vol. 1, bk. 2, p. 279.
134. See Newton v. Wilson. 3 Hen. & M. 470 (1809); Black's
Law Dictionary, 5th ed., s.v. "distraint," "distress."
135. See, e.g., Skipwith v. Clinch, 2 Call 253 (1800);
Cooke v. Wise, 3 Hen. & M. 463 (1809); Newton v. Wilson, 3
Hen. & M. 470 (1809); Mickie v. Lawrence, 5 Rand. 571
(1827). The Court intimated in these cases that, in
extreme cases, interest could be assessed by a jury (but in
Cooke the Court forced the plaintiff to release the jury's
award of interest). See a general discussion in Henry St.
George Tucker, Commentaries. 2:6-7.
136.

Newton v. Wilson. 3 Hen. & M. 470, 483-84 (1809).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

156
137.

Id. at 497.

138.

Mickie v. Lawrence. 5 Rand. 571, 572-73 (1827).

139.

Id. at 576.

140.

Newton v. Wilson, 3 Hen. & M. 470, 485 (1809).

141.

Mickie v. Lawrence, 5 Rand. 571, 573 (1827).

142. Id. at 576. For a more in-depth analysis of the
of the Court, see Chapter III.
143. There were some other statutes with obvious
republican genes, such as the law forbidding hunting,
fishing, or fowling on private lands without permission.
In England this had been a particularly obnoxious stamp of
the royal prerogative, as well as a method of keeping the
"lower sorts" in submission. Rev. Code (1803) c. 38
[passed 1792]? see St. George Tucker, Blackstone's
Commentaries, 3:395 n. 2, 411-13, 414 n. 3.
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CHAPTER V
POLICYMAKING IN A REPUBLICAN COMMONWEALTH

Our analysis of Virginia's Revolutionary settlement
began with the Commonwealth's establishment of a new
constitutional order, and its concomitant commitment to
popular sovereignty and the separation of powers.

We next

turned to the issue of the accommodation of Virginia's
English heritage to the demands of the new order.

Finally,

we addressed the substance of republicanism as it was
applied in Virginia.

One issue implicit in all of these

topics was that of the proper role of the various depart
ments of government in articulating policy in a republican
commonwealth.

The resolution of that issue was a matter of

some importance.

The determination of the locus of

policymaking in the new republican order shaped all of the
matters under analysis:

conceptions of sovereignty, the

interrelationship of governmental departments, and the
substance of applied republican principles.
Of the three branches of government, the role of the
executive can be safely relegated to a minor role, because
that branch was dominated by the legislative department.
The major articulators of policy, then, were the legisla
tive branch and its judicial counterpart.

Fortunately, the

157
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role of each (and the nature of their interaction) is
particularly clearly defined through a study of the case
law.

Statutory enactments are dependent upon judicial

interpretation for their practical implementation when
disputes arise under such enactments.

This makes such

adjudications an ideal medium for evaluating the extent
legislative policy was modified by judicial decision.

At

the same time, the court decisions reveal the extent to
which the judiciary was willing to set its own policy
agenda independent of the legislative branch.
In Virginia, the interaction between court and
legislature was laced with subtleties, but the general
outline was clear.

The Virginia Court of Appeals displayed

a deep respect for legislative policymaking throughout the
early decades of the republic.

In most cases, the court

readily subsumed its own policy preferences to that of the
legislature.

Interestingly, this support of legislative

intent assumed different guises.

At times the court upheld

statutory language strictly; at other times it departed
from the statute to achieve legislative intent.

In either

case, however, the court exhibited a deferential attitude
toward the legislative branch.

Of course, there were many

instances when the legislative will appeared unclear, or
was absent, and in such cases the court was obliged to
implement policy according to its own best dictates.

More

importantly, there were also times when the Court of
Appeals resisted legislative initiative.

Such instances

\
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outlined the limits of legislative supremacy, and defined
the Revolutionary settlement.
All of these subtleties make for a fitting epilogue to
our analysis of Virginia's theoretical and substantive
response to the demands of a republican order.

Both in its

policy of deferring to the legislative will, and in its
contrary stance of repudiating legislative enactments which
contravened the constitution, the Court of Appeals achieved
nothing less than the implementation of popular sover
eignty.

And, in its restraints on legislative pronounce

ments , the court confirmed a perhaps uniquely Virginian
respect for tradition, stability, and the protection of
interests in property.

The idea of legislative ascendancy was a commonplace
in post-Revolutionary Virginia.

It was in the nuances of

this doctrine, however, that the shape of Virginia's
accommodation to the new order became most apparent.

In

those instances where the court deferred to legislative
initiative, and especially in those instances when it did
not, we find an example of the application of republicanism
in all its subtlety.
The most obvious example1 of judicial deference to the
legislative will came in instances where statutory language
clearly and unequivocally applied to the facts of the case
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before the court.

For example, in. holding in 1797 that

there could be no appeal from an interlocutory (that is,
intermediate) decree of the High Court of Chancery, Judge
Spencer Roane simply said, "The words of the law are so
explicit, that argument cannot render them clearer."
Justice Paul Carrington added that "although this may be
inconvenient, the Court cannot alter the law."2

Similarly,

when in 1824 a lower court of chancery neglected to require
a party to post a bond before receiving an injunction, the
Court of Appeals was emphatic.

"As to cases coming within

the provisions of this act, . . . the statute is explicit
and imperious, and takes from the Chancellor all discretion
. . . as clearly as words could do . . .."3

In sum, the

court always looked first to any applicable legislative
enactment.
tive.

If that enactment applied, it was determina

As Edmund Pendleton once succinctly explained the

court's holding regarding the dismissing of an appeal, "On
a view of the act of Assembly, it appears that the
Legislature fully contemplated this subject."4

Therefore,

there could be no further argument.
Of course, it was not always so obvious that the
statutory language applied to the case at bar, or if it
did, that the legislature meant that it should apply to the
case at bar.

In such instances, there were essentially two

options available to the court:

to adhere to the strict

language of the statute, or to grant a more expanded
application of the legislative provisions.

At various
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times the Court of Appeals pursued both options, and it is
informative to observe the circumstances under which the
court chose one or the other approach.
At times when the court followed che "strict"
construction of a statute, it was merely making a reason
able interpretation of a provision which might be subject
to more than one application.

For example, a 1792 statute

provided that, if a man died leaving "no child," his wife
was entitled to one-half of his personal estate; if the
deceased left children, the wife was to receive only onethird of the personal estate.3

In the 1806 case of Bernard

v. Hipkins, Hipkins had died leaving a wife and grandchil
dren, but no surviving "child."

Counsel for the grandchil

dren argued that in the statute the term "child" should be
construed to mean "issue," which, under the accepted legal
definition, would include grandchildren.

The Court of

Appeals refused to agree, holding that the legislature
meant "child," and therefore the wife did take a moiety of
the estate.6
Other cases are more instructive.

The court often

deferred to the strict legislative policy even when that
policy did not make intuitive sense.

For example, a

statute had been passed which provided that a gift of a
slave was void when no deed of gift had been recorded, and
when the donor retained possession.

This made perfect

sense as to creditors of the parties, who may have been
defrauded thereby, but there was no similar rationale to
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void the gift as between the parties themselves.
Nevertheless, in the 1828 case of Durham v. Dunkly, the
court, while acknowledging the lack of logic, held that
this "was a matter of Legislative discretion."

Despite the

seeming equity on the side of the donee, the court
concluded that "the Law is not so written; for it declares
that the Deed shall pass no estate in slaves, unless
executed and recorded according to Law."7

In a similar

case respecting the emancipation of slaves, the applicable
statute, while requiring a recording of the deed of
emancipation, did not require it to be recorded in the
county of "current residence."

While this, according to

the court, "might be more desirable, the Court cannot
prescribe such a rule as it may think expedient, but must
apply the rule prescribed by the statute, to all cases
indiscriminately."8
The court also on occasion applied statutory language
strictly even when the justices were convinced the
legislature did not intend the result reached in that
particular case.

In the 1794 case of Roy v. Garnett, the

Court of Appeals refused to "paper over" a loophole in the
statute abolishing entails.

Even though the court was

convinced that the failure to convert certain "fee tails”
into "fee simple" estates was a mere legislative oversight,
it did not feel at liberty to defy the clear statutory
language.9

The court responded similarly in 1830 when a

new statutory provision inadvertently changed the practice
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of recognizing deeds executed in the county courts of
Kentucky.

Such deeds had routinely been deemed valid ever

since a statute of 1792 had expressly made them so.

But in

the recodification of Virginia law in 1819, this particular
provision had been unintentionally omitted, resulting in
its effective repeal.10

The Court of Appeals, while

acknowledging the clear mistake made by the legislative
branch, nevertheless admitted that "the objection . . .
cannot be got over."11
Despite the court's consistently deferential attitude
toward legislative enactments, there were a number of cases
where the Court of Appeals departed from the standard of
strict construction, and instead applied the applicable
statute in a manner which seemed to expand the literal
meaning of its language.

And, indeed, there was the

occasional instance where the court appeared to positively
defy legislative strictures.

It is important to analyze

these seeming exceptions carefully, in order to better
understand the extent of legislative pre-eminence in the
new republican polity, and to elucidate the role of the
court in the policy-making process.
Perhaps the easiest cases of this ilk to explain
involved legislative omissions in provisions that did not
affect any substantive rule of law.

The court would often

step in and remedy the defect in such instances, justifying
its action in terms of fulfilling, rather than deviating
from, legislative intent.- For example, in the 1797 case of
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Gaskins v. Commonwealth, Gaskins, the sheriff of North
umberland County, had suffered a judgment.

He eventually

filed a writ of supersedeas (an appeal) to the General
Court, but not until after five years had passed.

At the

time of the filing of his supersedeas, a statute required
such writs, when involving other courts in the Common
wealth, to be filed within five years.

The statute was

silent, however, as to any time limitation with respect to
the General Court.

Despite the legislative silence, the

Court of Appeals applied the limitation anyway.

"If . . .

in grammatical strictness, there be a doubt in this
particular," said Spencer Roane for the court, "yet,
certainly a liberal construction of the words would extend
to this case; for, clearly, the Legislature must have meant
to include all Courts, and emphatically the General
Court . . .."12

Similarly, where a statute granted the

High Court of Chancery power to issue writs of execution
(that is, methods of enforcing the decree of the court) in
the same manner as common-law courts, the Court of Appeals
in 1801 construed this language to grant the High Court of
Chancery a similar common-law power to assess damages for
the obstruction of those writs, even though the statute was
silent as to that particular point.13
The cases that posed the most difficulty, however,
were those where a strict application of the statute led to
an unreasonable result or to a clear repudiation of
legislative intent.

An example of a case of this kind was
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the 1825 adjudication of Steptoe v. The Auditor*.

The

statute at issue in that case allowed the Auditor of the
Commonwealth to bring an action against the Clerk of the
County Court for the failure to pay over taxes collected.
In such cases, the statute provided for a $600 penalty to
be assessed against the clerk.14

In this case the clerk,

after the institution of the suit, had made a proper
accounting, and the issue was whether the penalty should be
applied anyway, since the clerk's action had not been
timely.

Counsel for the clerk argued that "it is impos

sible to suppose that the Legislature meant to subject him
to the penalty and the sum due also.”

But the majority of

the court took the General Assembly at its word.

"To this

[argument], I answer," said Judge Dabney Carr, ” . . .
that the law is express . . .

we [the court] are not

permitted to speculate upon the improbability of the
Legislature's intending to pass a law so cruel, and
thence to conclude it is not the Law? it being our business
dicere et non dare jus ["to express and not to make the
law"] . . . .

With the hardship of the case, I humbly

conceive we have nothing to do.

We must execute the law.

If it operates harshly, it will be for the power which has
inflicted the wound, to administer the cure."13
The majority opinion by Carr in Steptoe is perhaps the
best articulation of the prevailing view of the right of
the legislature to enact virtually any provision it chose,
be it wise or unwise, just or unjust.

Carr was, then,

\
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making an important statement about the court's perception
of its own role as well.

But there was a dissent in

Steptoe, and it reflected not a rejection of the essential
principles set out in the majority opinion, but a belief
that, somehow, the legislature did not mean what it
apparently said.

John Coalter in dissent openly proclaimed

his "unwillingness . . .

to charge the Legislature with an

unreasonable accumulation of fines and punishments for the
same offence . . .."

Coalter concluded that "therefore,

the law ought not to be so construed, unless such construc
tion is imperatively forced upon us."16

Taking his cue

from Coalter, Judge William Cabell looked for a means to
avoid such an imperative.

Looking to the entire "system of

laws," Cabell found "one principle generally pervading the
whole; that public officers, receiving money for the
Commonwealth . . . and unjustly holding it, are coerced to
pay it, not by arbitrary penalties, but by damages
graduated according to the amount received, by a certain
per centage thereon."
of justice.

Cabell then turned to the concept

The graduated scale of percentage damages,

he said, "is a reasonable and just principle.

But

justice revolts at the idea of inflicting an arbitrary
penalty . . ., without regard to the amount due; of
inflicting the same penalty, for the non-payment of one
dollar, and of one thousand."
Coalter had begun;

Cabell concluded where

"I cannot believe the Legislature

intended this injustice."17
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The Steptoe case is instructive.

Coalter and Cabell

were clearly reaching to avoid a result they felt unfair,
and it is important to note that the dissenters did not
prevail.

But the dissent demonstrates the sort of approach

the court sometimes took in hard cases.

While never

repudiating the principle of legislative ascendancy, the
Court of Appeals sometimes labored to bring a case within
what it thought was the "true" intent of the General
Assembly.
One more example will suffice.

A statute permitted a

landlord, if he suspected his tenant was about to leave the
premises, to "attach” (that is, have seized by the court)
the property of the tenant to secure unpaid future rents.18
In 1825, in Redford v. Winston, the tenant challenged this
as unfair, since he was not permitted to make any defense
at the time, but was left to an action at law against the
landlord for damages if the attachment turned out to be
wrongful.

Here it was Judge Coalter who showed his respect

for the legislature.

He acknowledged that it "would seem

to me to be very reasonable, that in the case of wrongful
attachment, under the act of Assembly in question, the
defendant should have some means of defending himself."
But Coalter found himself forced to defer to legislative
wisdom.

"But when I consider that this law has been in

force for near a century, and that it has frequently been
before the Legislature, as well upon revisals of the law,
as for amendments thereto, without any provision to this
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effect being made, . . .

I am led to believe that the

mischief . . . has not been so great, as at first view
would seem; and that therefore, no remedy in this respect
has been thought of, or deemed necessary.1,19
This time it was Judge John Green (in the majority in
the Steptoe decision) who suggested that the court might
impose some limits on the legislative language.

Green

looked beyond the immediate issue of absconding renters
which had occupied the General Assembly and perceived a
perhaps unanticipated threat to the tenant.

"To give a

construction to this statute," warned Green, "which would
enable the landlord to attach for all rents which might
thereafter become due, at ever so remote periods, would
involve such consequences as I am sure the Legislature
would never have sanctioned, if foreseen."

Therefore the

statutory language, in Green’s view, "cannot receive a
literal interpretation, without violating the literal
meaning of many other words in the same clause, and
involving the consequences before alluded to."

Therefore,

held Green, the landlord could only attach for the rent
payment next due, and not for other future rental pay
ments.20

We find here in this qualification of legislative

language the same essential elements present in the Steptoe
dissent;

1) an implicit deference to the legislative will,

in the assumption that the General Assembly had not
"foreseen" the difficulty articulated by the court; 2) an
effort to make the new interpretation seem consistent with
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the statute by accepted methods of statutory construction;
and 3) a willingness, in the end, to refuse to accept a
literal interpretation of the statutory language.
These cases bring us to the important topic of the
extent to which the court was willing to circumvent
legislative policy in the course of resolving the adjudica
tions that came before it.

There can be no doubt that it

was well accepted that a court could, at certain times,
vary the terms of a statute with complete propriety.

In

the 1810 case of Dillard v. Tomlinson, St. George Tucker
was merely quoting Blackstone when he said, "It is another
fundamental rule in the construction of statutes, that it
is the business of Judges to know the mischief the statute
was meant to remedy, and ’so to construe the act as to
supress the mischief, and advance the remedy.'"21

And, as

Henry St. George Tucker noted, "Cases are sometimes
considered as embraced by the equity of a statute . . . .
On this principle, the letter of an act is sometimes
restrained, and sometimes enlarged."22

The danger, of

course, was that a court could use an entirely legitimate
rule of statutory construction as a pretext for undermining
or deviating from the policy set out by the legislature.
It is therefore important to look more closely at judicial
deviations from statutory language in Virginia, to see if
the Court of Appeals remained within "acceptable" bounds of
judicial initiative.
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The 1803 case of Marks v. Bryant is a good example of
the court making a reasonable expansion of statutory
language to secure the underlying legislative intent.

A

Virginia statute provided that a nuncupative (i.e., oral)
will was valid only "if it be made in the time of the last
sickness of the deceased at his habitation . . . except
where the deceased is taken sick [away] from home, and dies
before he returns to such habitation . . ..”23

Thomas

Womack met all of the preceding requirements, with the
exception that he was already feeling ill before he
travelled to his sister's home (and thus was not "taken
sick" while away from home).

In this case, the court

allowed Womack's nuncupative will to stand anyway.

As

Judge Tucker explained it, "I conceive it would be adhering
too closely to the letter of the law, if we were to
pronounce that no nuncupative will made under such
circumstances ought to be established.

The object of the

law was to prevent frauds and impositions upon sick
persons, by enticing them from their friends and relations,
to the residence of strangers, where advantage might be
taken of their weakness and infirmity . . . .

[I]t appears

to me . . . that the case [at bar] is . . . fully within
the true intent and meaning of the law.''24
An example that was perhaps not so obvious or
justifiable, and therefore more illuminating, was that of
purchasers of lands who had notice of a prior, but
unrecorded, claim to an interest in the property.

Two
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cases decided in 1823 are revealing.

The basic statutory

rule was that "all . . . conveyances . . .

of any lands

. . . shall be void as to all creditors and subsequent
purchasers, unless they shall be . . . recorded . . .."2 5
In the case of Robert's widow v. Stanton, however, the
Court of Appeals, acting as a court of equity,26 refused to
void a prior claim to land that had never been recorded,
because the subsequent purchaser had notice of the prior
claim.27

While this seemed a direct contradiction of

statutory language, it was not so egregious as might first
appear.

The reasoning for such a holding was articulated

in the subsequent case of Newman v. Chapman.

There, Judge

John Green stated that "the object of the statute requiring
mortgages [etc.] to be recorded, and declaring that, if not
recorded as the statute prescribes, they shall be void as
to creditors and subsequent purchasers, was to prevent
. . . the frauds which might otherwise be practised . . .
on creditors and subsequent purchasers, by concealing it."
On the other hand, if, as here, "a purchaser has actual
notice otherwise, he is not only not prejudiced by the
failure to record it, but is himself guilty of a fraud in
attempting to avail himself of the letter of the statute,
to the prejudice of another who has a just claim against
the property."28

In the end, then, these cases were really

of a piece with the Marks case involving the nuncupative
will:

each of these decisions was an attempt to secure a

compliance with the perceived intent of the legislation.
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Nevertheless, upon closer inspection, there was a
difference between the Marks case and the Roberts and
Newman adjudications, and it was a difference of poten
tially large import.

In both Roberts and Newman the

plaintiff, when faced with statutory language seemingly
against his cause, turned to the Court of Chancery, that
is, to ''equity," to seek redress.

It is thus necessary to

turn to a brief discussion of equity jurisdiction in
Virginia, and then to assess whether it provided a vehicle
for the evasion of legislative intent.
"Equity" had grown up alongside the common law in
England, but was quite distinct from it.

It originated

when individuals would occasionally seek redress from what
they considered unjust treatment in the king's courts (and
other places) by petitioning the king's "conscience"; that
is, by asking the king’s chancellor to intervene and "do
justice."

This the chancellor would often do in his court

of chancery, cutting through the technicalities of the
common law to ensure fairness in individual cases.

What

began as a rather arbitrary intervention in the interests
of fairness eventually became a quite formalized system of
procedure, which existed alongside the common law but was
entirely distinct from it.

By the seventeenth century, the

courts of chancery, or "equity," had established a more-orless well-defined jurisdiction.

One large area of equity

jurisdiction stemmed directly from its historical roots:
stepping in to do justice when that was denied a party at
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common law.

Thus a party could resort to equity if the

common-law form of redress (usually money damages) was
insufficient.

The court of chancery could instead restrain

an injurious activity through injunction, or mandate the
"specific performance" of a contract if necessary.

The

equity courts would also intervene to correct injustice
done at law due to fraud, mistake, or accident.

Partly as

a result of the vagaries of history, equity also assumed
the primary jurisdiction over certain types of cases, such
as those involving trusts and mortgages.29

The Roberts and

Newman cases came within the equitable jurisdiction over
"fraud."

As Judge Coalter put it in Newman, the

plaintiff's "only remedy was in equity; and there he can
only prevail on the ground of fraud . . .."3 0
The question that arises is whether the equitable
mandate to "do justice" was flexible enough to undermine
statutory dictates.

While the nuances of equity jurisdic

tion in Virginia are quite complex, and well beyond the
scope of the present enquiry, it can safely be said that
equity was not used as a vehicle by the courts to undermine
the legislature.

The essential rule was laid out by St.

George Tucker in 1808 in Commonwealth v. Colquhouns. where
he said "Neither a Court of Law, nor a Court of Equity can
carry a statutory remedy further than the statute allows,
nor supply a casus omissus in any statute."31

The 1797

case of Anderson v. Anderson is illuminating, because it
involved the same recording act as the Roberts and Newman
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cases, but without the allegation of fraud.
faced the question directly:

The court

"The next question," said

Judge Peter Lyons, "is whether a Court of Equity can supply
the omission in not recording [the conveyance]

. . .

according to the act of Assembly for regulating convey
ances?"

Or, to ask the question another way, "when a

statute says expressly, that a conveyance shall not bind
[subsequent purchasers and creditors], can a Court of
Equity say that it shall?"

Lyons responded to his own

questions in the negative.

"Surely that would be to

repeal the act," he said, "and therefore equity will not
interpose in such cases . . .."

Lyons went on to

illustrate the depth of the deference shown to legislative
enactments, even by courts of equity.

"For the power of a

statute is so great," he continued, "that it has been said,
that even infants would have been bound by the act of
limitations [a statute requiring an injured party to bring
an action within a certain time period, or lose his cause
of action], if there had been no exception with regard to
them, contained in the statute itself."
with a blunt statement:

” ...

Lyons concluded

[A] Court of Equity must

consult the intention of the Legislature as well as Courts
of Law; and when the Legislature have determined a matter
. . ., a Court of Equity cannot intermeddle, or relieve
against the express provisions of the statute."32
As straightforward as Lyons' comments were, it was the
case of -Innis v. Roane in 1793 that best defined the role
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of a court of equity in relation to the legislative will.
In that case, Roane, as a Revolutionary War veteran, had
attempted to secure a life-time pension under a 1779
statute granting such recompense to Revolutionary officers
who had served until the end of the war.

When the courts

of law determined that he was not eligible under the
statute, Roane turned to equity.

There, Judge Wythe, of

the High Court of Chancery, ruled that he should receive
the pension.33

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rebuffed

Wythe and defined the limits of both courts of law and
courts of equity.

Judge Roane, for the court, noted that

"It is said that a difference arises from the greater
powers of a court of equity to dispense with observances
which the law requires.
distinction:

But there is no foundation in the

On the contrary, the construction of statutes

is peculiarly proper for courts of law; and when made,
those of equity are bound by it; for the latter can no more
dispense with the requisitions of a statute, unless from
particular circumstances of fraud, force, or accident
taking a case out of its operation, than courts of common
law can:

Both being equally bound by the legislative will,

acting within its prescribed limits."34
We have seen, then, that the Court of Appeals did
sometimes deviate from, or place a "gloss" upon, statutory
language, but that when it did so, it was in an effort to
support the perceived legislative intent.

Importantly,

although the rules of statutory construction and the nature
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of equity jurisdiction gave the court some latitude to
expand the application of a statute, the Court of Appeals
did not use these as a pretext for usurping the role of the
legislature in the making of policy.33

The judicial

application of statutory language was not without its other
pitfalls, however, which posed a challenge to a court
apparently dedicated to deference to legislative direction.
In particular, the court was sometimes faced with situa
tions where the General Assembly's own language did not
seem to mesh with its stated objectives.

In such cases,

the Court of Appeals faced the dilemma of enforcing
statutory language or enforcing legislative "intent.”
One of the better examples was the case of Bernard v.
Scott's admr., decided in 1825.

This action had to do with

the collection of sheriffs' commissions on forthcoming
bonds, which were bonds a judgment debtor could post as
security for his promise to have his goods "forthcoming" on
the day of the sheriff's sale in execution of the judgment
against him.

Under earlier case law, it had been held that

a sheriff was not permitted to include his commission in
the forthcoming bond, and therefore many sheriffs had had
trouble collecting their due.

The General Assembly had

moved to remedy this problem in 1794, when it provided that
such commissions could be included in the bond, "but [the
sheriff] shall not demand or receive such commissions . . .
unless the same shall be forfeited."36

This last proviso

was entirely sensible, and intended to prevent the double
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recovery of commissions.

As things were supposed to work,

the sheriff was to receive his commission either when he
sold the debtor's goods, or, when the debtor failed to
produce them or otherwise satisfy the claim (and the
forthcoming bond was thereby forfeited).

As often

happened, however, the statute contained an undetected
loophole, and, as usual, someone eventually discovered it
and tried to take advantage of it.

It was found that a

debtor, by paying to the creditor the whole amount of the
bond, except the sheriff's commission, could technically
avoid the statutory provision, and avoid paying the
commission.

It was an extremely difficult and technical

point, perhaps best explained by Judge John Coalter:

"But

it is said that [the sheriff] only is entitled, in case the
bond is forfeited; and that if the debt, interest, and
costs, including those commissions, are paid, the bond is
not forfeited; and then the sheriff (not being entitled to
this commission), must return the money; or that it is not
necessary to pay it, in order to save the forfeiture."
Coalter concluded that "This involves us in a kind of
logical absurdity or dilemma, which we cannot suppose the
Legislature intended.”3 7
It was Judge Dabney Carr who cut to the heart of the
matter.

"This law was made for the benefit of sheriffs,

and yet . . . by a literal construction of this law, the
sheriff loses his commission . . . .

It is not proper, it

is scarcely decent, to deduce such absurd conclusions from
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Legislative enactments."

Carr was quick to recognize the

difficulty of the situation, but did not let it deter him.
"There must," he continued, " . . .
which will avoid this dilemma.

be some construction,

What that construction is,

I confess I have not been able exactly to discover.

I

must, therefore, leave it with my bretheren, more
experienced and abler than I am, to untie this gordian
knot.

For myself, I must cut it, and say, that though I

cannot pretend to see precisely what the Legislature meant,
I feel sure they did not mean, in such a case as this, to
deprive the sheriff of his commission."

Carr was careful

to couch his rather breathtaking exercise in judicial
statesmanship in terms of legislative intent.

"The law of

1794," he explained, "intended to better [the sheriff's]
condition; to give him something which he did not before
possess.

The Legislature could not mean (though the words

seem to import it) that this law should receive a construc
tion which would defeat its object . . . .

To avoid these

consequences, I am obliged to decide that the bond is
forfeited, and the sheriff entitled to his commission.”38
Other cases of this sort were not so dramatic as the
Bernard case.

Several we have met up with before.

It will

be recalled that in the early (1794) case of Roy v.
Garnett, the Court of Appeals refused to depart from
statutory language which contained a loophole in the
statute abolishing entails.39

On the other hand, the case

of Orndoff v. Turman also dealt with that statute, and the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

court, in 1830, seemed more willing to go with the
legislative intent over the precise statutory language.
While the facts of Orndoff were somewhat confusing,40 the
essential matter at issue was not.

It was simply this:

whether a fact situation not directly addressed by the 1776
statute could still be deemed within its provisions.

In

Roy v. Garnett, the answer had been in the negative.

In

Orndoff, however, the court was more flexible.

Judge

William Cabell was quick to acknowledge counsel's argument
that the statute did not literally apply.

"If I felt

myself bound to give the statute a strict and technical
construction," he said, "I confess I could not deny the
correctness of this position . . .."

But Cabell refused to

allow himself to be bound by such a narrow vision.

"Can

any man read the preamble of this statute," asked Cabell,
"and believe that this was the intention of the legisla
ture? . . . It is a highly remedial statute, intended to
remove great political and moral mischief (i.e., entails).
So far from being restricted to a rigid technical construc
tion, according to the letter (of the law]," continued
Cabell, "I feel myself compelled to construe it according
to its spirit, and thus to bring within the scope of its
operation all cases that come within the mischief intended
to be provided against."41

Dabney Carr agreed.

He stated

forthrightly that "a thing which is within the intention of
the makers of a statute, is as much within the statute, as
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if it were within the letter.”

Carr summed up:

"Intention

is the governing principle, the essence of the law."42
A similar case was that of Davis v. Rowe in 1828.
That case, it may be recalled, dealt with the provision of
the 1785 statute of descents which called for a per capita
distribution of the assets of an estate.

The problem was

that, in including an extensive list of relatives to which
the provision applied, nieces and nephewswere excluded.
The question before the court was whether

the statute

should be extended to include nieces and nephews, or
whether, in the absence of specific statutory language, the
common-law rule of per stirpes distribution should apply.43
The majority of the court, as in Orndoff, admitted that the
case did not come within the specific statutory provisions.
Nevertheless, it was clear to the majority that the General
Assembly intended to wholly abrogate the common law, and so
the per capita approach was extended to the omitted
relatives.
The Bernard, Orndoff, and Davis cases appeared to
stand for the proposition that the Court of Appeals was
willing to ignore legislative language and implement
legislative intent.
that.

But it was not quite so simple as all

In Roy v. Garnett the court had gone precisely the

other way,44 and even in Orndoff and Davis there had been
strong dissents.

In Orndoff, Judge John Green had

dissented, harking back to the more restrictive view of Roy
v. Garnett.

Green pointed out that "The present case
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certainly does not come within the literal terms of that
statute. . ..

Nor," he added, "do I think that the case

comes within the equity of the statutes."

That being the

case, it was clear to Green that the court was bound by
what the statute said.43
Green in dissent.

In Davis. William Cabell joined

It was clear to the dissenters that in

Virginia the common law applied where the statute was
silent.

Thus the nieces and nephews in Davis should take

per stirpes.46

It seems, then, that the Court of Appeals

struggled with the issue of applying the statute according
to its spirit rather than following its letter.
Perhaps nothing better indicates the force of the
conflicting theories, and of the continuing nature of the
dilemma, than two sets of cases which arose at either end
of the time period under study.

The turn-of-the-century

adjudications of Brown v. Turberville and Tomlinson v.
Dillard we have come across before.47

In both those cases

the provision at issue was a 1790 amendment to the statute
of descents, designed to apply to infants who died
intestate.

The Brown case of 1800 actually involved an

adult, but, because the 17S0 amendment had been inartfully
integrated into the statute in the recodification of 1792,
the provision appeared to apply to infants and adults
equally.

The court did not hesitate to circumvent the

statutory language in the light of so obvious a legislative
mistake.

What is interesting, however, is the fact that

the judges felt compelled to come up with mutually
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exclusive theories to support their conclusion.

Paul

Carrington acknowledged that there had been an oversight in
the drafting of the 1792 provision, and felt that the court
was justified in baldly inserting the necessary language
into the statute so that the true legislative intent would
be fulfilled.

"This supplement," said Carrington, " . . .

according to the rules of expounding statutes, I think we
have a right to make."

He added that, "by this means, the

whole act will be rendered consistent, and all cases of
intestacy will be provided for, agreeable to the meaning
and intention of the Legislature.

Which is certainly

better," concluded Carrington, "than adhering to the
literal expression, to disappoint the will of the Legisla
ture, and defeat the intention of the Law altogether."48
Judge William Fleming shied away from such a drastic
remedy.

Instead, he sought "a plain natural interpretation

which will effect this important object, without any
violence to the text."

Fleming's solution was to construe

the 1785 statute of descents as still in existence, since
"the act of 1792 only repeals so much of other laws, as
comes within its own purview . . .."49
his part, would take a broader approach.

Peter Lyons, for
"It is a rule in

the construction of statutes," said Lyons, "that the
intention, when it can be discovered, must be followed with
reason and discretion, although the interpretation may seem
contrary to the letter of the statute."

In order to

discover that legislative intention, Lyons proceeded to
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take "the whole act, and all other acts on the same
subject, into one view, moulding them according to the rule
laid down . . . and rejecting what shall appear to be
inconsistent and absurd, and tending to defeat the
intention of the Legislature."50

In summing up, President

Judge Edmund Pendleton acknowledged that "the Court differ
in their reasons," but the result was a unanimous decision
for the perceived legislative intent over the specific
legislative language.51
Only one year later, however, the court was unwilling
to resist the same legislative language when the case
involved an infant, which was directly within the legisla
ture's intent when enacting this amendment.

In Tomlinson

v. Dillard, the court did not hesitate to apply the
statute.

Fleming admitted:

upon this case.

"I have not a moment's doubt

The language of the acts of Assembly

leaves no room for criticism . . . .

For, whatever latitude

a Court may think proper to indulge, where the expressions
are ambiguous, they certainly have no right to do so, when
the words are clear . . .."

Furthermore, said Fleming, "if

inconvenience follow from a literal construction, they must
be redressed by the Legislature, and not by the Court; who
are not to torture the words in order to discover meanings
which the Legislature never had; but are to pursue the
plain import of the statute, without regard to conse
quences."52
Lyons:

Carrington and Lyons reluctantly agreed.

Said

"The inclination of my mind would have led me to
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support [the opposite conclusion]; but the words of the act
of Assembly are too strong to be resisted."33
The Brown and Tomlinson cases are important for our
understanding of the judicial view of legislative intent.
In a case (Brown) where the wording of a statute did not
comport with the desired objective of the legislative
branch, the Court of Appeals was willing to go to almost
any length to find for the intent over the strict legisla
tive language.

But in another case (Tomlinson) dealing

with the same statutory provision, the court meekly
submitted when it seemed within the legislative intent,
even though, as we have seen,34 the court did not like the
substantive outcome.
Interestingly, a brace of cases in 1829-1830 reveals a
Court of Appeals still struggling to achieve the resolution
of adjudications in a manner best suited to secure
legislative objectives, even when the statutory language
itself might not have done so.

These cases dealt with a

statutory provision which changed the impact of levying
execution upon a judgment debtor’s real estate.

Under

accepted practice, all creditors obtaining judgments
against a particular debtor could choose one of three
modes of enforcing (or "executing") that judgment.

The

first method was directed against the "body" of the debtor;
that is, by a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum (commonly
called a "ca. sa."), the debtor was imprisoned until he
satisfied the judgment.33

The second method was against
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the judgment debtor's goods, which were levied upon and
sold by a writ of fieri facias.

The last was against his

lands, whereby by writ of levari facias or by eleqit the
profits of the land were channelled to the creditor.36

In

1819, however, the General Assembly enacted a provision
stating that the capias ad satisfaciendum should thence
forward apply, in the case of insolvent debtors, not only
to the debtor's body, but also to bind his real estate.37
This provision not only confused the levying of executions
in general, but also brought into question the issue of
priority among creditors.

The objective of the legislature

had been rational enough:

it had sought by this provision

to end the practice of debtors selling their lands to
preferred creditors, and then declaring insolvency, thus
leaving nothing for the more diligent judgment creditor.
The unintended effect, however, was also to undercut the
rightful claims of other creditors who levied execution
after the initial ca. sa.
In 1829 the Court of Appeals acknowledged the problems
created thereby, but refused to remedy the situation by
judicial fiat.

As in Tomlinson. the court, in Jackson v.

Heiskell, refused to evade clear statutory language.

Judge

Dabney Carr noted that "It was said this construction [of
the new statutory provision] changes wholly the nature and
effects of the ca. sa.

And this is most true.

But,"

continued Carr, "the legislature had the right to do this;
and its words are so plain, that I am compelled to believe
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it meant to do it.

If inconveniences are found to follow,"

he concluded, "the same hand which gave the wound, must
administer the cure."38

Judge Green, on the other hand,

doubted "whether this [adverse] consequence was in the
contemplation or design of the legislature."

Nevertheless,

while he was "sensible of the great harshness, and (in its
practical application) inconveniences, of this new law," he
concluded that "those considerations belong to the
legislature, and not to courts of Justice."39

Cabell

concurred.
Since the Jackson case was a unanimous decision by the
three judges (Carr, Green, and Cabell) who heard it, it was
unusual that its holding would be directly overturned
barely a year later by the full five-member court.
Foreman v. Loyd that is exactly what happened.
maintained his prior position.

But in

Judge Carr

"I have found nothing to

change," he said, "in the view before taken.

The law,

however harsh, however unwise, is, to my understanding,
expressed in terms too plain to be changed by construction,
or judicial action in any form.

I must, therefor, adhere

to my former opinion on the question . . .."60

Green

likewise remained unswayed, declaring that, "upon recon
sideration, my opinion remains unchanged."61
It was the two justices who had not heard the case
before who tipped the balance.

John Coalter began his

opinion by setting out a maxim of statutory construction:
"In construing a remedial statute," he said, "the rule is
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to see how the law stood before, then what was the
mischief, and, finally, what remedy has been enacted."62
After completing his analysis along these lines, Coalter
came to the conclusion that "had the legislature intended
by that clause [the result that actually ensued], . . .

1

think it would not only have used more appropriate and
explicit words, but would have made some provision for the
subsequent judgment creditor . . .."

Coalter therefore

advocated a narrow construction of the provision to
eliminate its adverse impact.63

Francis Brooke, the other

justice hearing the case for the first time, agreed.

"In

construing a statute," he noted, "the first object is so to
construe it as to make it work a remedy for the mischief
intended to be prevented.

If all its words can be

satisfied by such a construction, we need not carry them
farther, however general they may be; expecially, if by so
doing we are met by inconveniences which we cannot be sure
were overlooked by the legislature."

He therefore

concurred with Coalter.64
It was Judge Cabell, who had joined with Carr and
Green in upholding the literal language of the statute in
the Jackson case, who proved the pivotal figure.

Mention

ing that since the Jackson case he had had the benefit of
reading the arguments of counsel in the published reports,
and of conferring with Coalter and Brooke, Cabell candidly
admitted that "the effect of these advantages has been to
convince me that I was in error; and I take pleasure in
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acknowledging it."

Cabell went on to presume that the

statute had, "in practice, a harshness of operation, which
was probably not foreseen, and, therefore, not intended by
the legislature.”

Since the General Assembly did not

intend what actually resulted, Cabell sought to conform the
statute to "suppress the mischief" which was the objective
of the legislature.

He therefore adopted the restricted

construction of the provision first advocated by Coalter:
"In construing this section so as to overreach only the
voluntary alienations of the debtor, and to apply the
proceeds of a sale by the debtor or the sheriff to the
payment of the different creditors according to the order
of the respective levies of their executions, we remove all
the evils which the legislature intended to remove."

But,

if the court were to persist in the Jackson approach of
"giving [the statute] a more extensive operation,"
concluded Cabell, "we go beyond the mischiefs which the
legislature designed to remove, and we give rise to new
ones which it is admitted they did not foresee, and
therefore could not intend."63
The Jackson and Foreman cases of 1829 and 1830 were a
fitting epilogue to the series of cases beginning shortly
after the Revolution and which involved the judicial
construction of legislative enactments.

In that half

century we have seen the Virginia Court of Appeals follow
statutory language strictly and liberally, and we have seen
the court place a judicial gloss on statutory provisions
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and refuse to place the same gloss on identical provisions.
We have seen the court stretch to interpret statutory
provisions in a manner that seemed to them reasonable and
fair, and stoically apply specific legislative language
against their own policy preferences.

In short, virtually

the entire universe of possible judicial interpretations of
statutes was displayed at one time or another in the years
between 1776 and 1830.

Closer inspection reveals, however,

that in the midst of variety there was continuity.

In all

the adjudications cited, be they liberal or strict
constructionist, the Court of Appeals whs guided by one
polar star:

to give effect to the legislative intent.

Granted, there were times the court did this by a literal
adherence to statute, and times when the "spirit" of the
law took precedence over mere language.
variations in approach were just that:

But even those
variations in

approach, and not conflicts over underlying principle.
If this were all, the conclusion to be reached would
be as unquestionable as it would be obvious.

But, as usual

in the world of jurisprudence, it was not quite as simple
as all that.

For there were occasions when the Court of

Appeals undeniably did refute legislative language, and not
all of those instances fit comfortably within the rubric of
a more generalized legislative intent.

While the excep

tions undoubtedly complicate the analysis, they are also
the best sources for a more sophisticated understanding of
legislative ascendancy.

For, as always, the exceptions

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

190
define the rule, and it is through them that we determine
the limits placed upon the realm of legislative policy
making.
The most obvious and perhaps the most important
instance of judicial limitation of legislative action lay
in the doctrine of judicial review.

The leading cases have

received ample discussion in earlier sections of this
study,66 but their implications for the notion of legisla
tive ascendancy need to be briefly expanded upon.

From its

very inception, the Virginia Court of Appeals boldly
asserted that the constitution represented a law higher
than mere statute.

The constitution, said the court, was

"the act of the people."67

When, on occasion, "the

constitution and the [legislative] act are in opposition
and cannot exist together, the former must control the
operation of the latter."68

Moreover, it was to be the

Court of Appeals which assumed the authority to "decide
between an act of the people [i.e., the constitution], and
an act of the legislature . . .."6 9
The sweeping nature of judicial deference to legisla
tive activity in most other areas makes this exception
appear all the more stark.

It is clear that only a value

or principle of overriding importance could induce the
court to defy the legislative branch in its policy
initiatives.

And the principle was, of course, nothing

less than the sovereignty of the people.

Thus, while the

court was willing to follow the legislative lead in most
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policy decisions, whether the substance of that policy be
thought wise or unwise, the court would not permit the
General Assembly to contravene the will of the people at
large as expressed in the constitution.
While most of the cases involving judicial review
which have been previously discussed revolved around such
institutional matters as judicial independence and the
separation of powers, there was one case in particular that
proved particularly illuminating with regard to judicial
willingness to restrict a substantive enactment by the
General Assembly.

In 1819, the legislature had enacted a

statute intended to secure the navigability of the Slate
River.

Under the act, the Slate River Company was granted

authority and inducements to complete the task.

One of the

provisions of the law required current owners of milldams
across the Slate to install locks for the passage of
traffic through their embankments.

Upon their "failure so

to do . . . the mill-dams are declared to be nuisances, and
may be abated [torn down]:

and the [Slate River Company

is] empowered to clear them away, and to charge the expense
of doing so to the owners of the mills."7 0
In the 1828 case of Crenshaw v. Slate River Co.,
Crenshaw, the owner of a mill along the Slate, sought
judicial intervention to protect his property rights.
issue, of course, was the right of the legislature to
interfere with private property rights.71

The Virginia

court had always been quite favorably disposed toward
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legislative actions taken in behalf of the "public good,"72
but here it drew the line.

The Court of Appeals did not

for a moment question the right of the legislature to take
private property for the public good.

"It will not be

denied, I presume," said Justice Carr, "that the Sovereign
Power (with us the Legislature) may, in their discretion,
[do such a thing] . . . .

That the eminent domain of the

Sovereign Power, extends to the taking private property for
public purposes, I am free to admit."

The key issue,

according to Carr, was not the legislative ability to
enfringe upon private rights in the interests of the
public good, but the requirement that the injured
individual must be satisfied for the damages incurred.
" . . .

To render the exercise of this power lawful," he

concluded, "a fair compensation must always be made to the
individual . . .."7 3
Judge John Green grounded the rationale for this
decision squarely upon the provisions of the Virginia
constitution.

He first admitted that the "Legislature of

the State is declared by our Constitution to be a complete
Legislature, and consequently has all the powers of
Sovereignty, except so far as they are limited by the
Constitutions of Virginia and the United States."

Green

went on to cite article I of the declaration of rights,
which protects, among other things, "the enjoyment of life
and liberty, and the means of acquiring and possessing
property . . .."

According to Green, "To deprive a citizen
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of any property already legally acquired; without a fair
compensation, deprives him quoad hoc, of the means of
possessing property . *

Therefore, said the justice,

the statute was unconstitutional and void.74
It is interesting to note the stress Green placed upon
the protection of private property in a constitutional
order.

One of the primary objectives of government, he

said, was the protection of private property.

As it

relates to the individual, the governmental protection of
property is "the only means, so far as the Government is
concerned, besides the security of the person, of obtaining
happiness.

Liberty itself consists essentially, as well in

the security of private property, as of the persons of
individuals; and this security of private property is one
of the primary objects of Civil Government, which our
ancestors, in framing our Constitution, intended to secure
to themselves and their posterity, effectually, and for
ever."73
While Green based his Crenshaw opinion upon the narrow
ground of the Virginia constitution, not all the justices
were so circumspect, and as a result Crenshaw provides an
inkling that there may have existed another limitation to
legislative enactments; a kind of "higher law" that might
best be described as the "law of reason."

In Crenshaw,

Judge Dabney Carr based his conclusion that there must be
just compensation to the individual upon more than just the
Virginia declaration of rights.

That principle, he said.
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"is laid down by the writers on Natural Law, Civil Law,
Common Law and the Law of every civilized country."
Accordingly, Carr concluded that "whether we judge this Law
by the principles of all Civilized Governments, by the
Federal Constitution, or that of our own State, it is
unconstitutional and void."76

Such intimations of some

extra-constitutional standard superior to legislative acts
were isolated, but not unheard of.

Another instance came

in the 1809 case of Currie’s admrs. v. Mutual Assurance
Society.

In that adjudication, involving the power of the

legislature to amend the charter of a corporation, Spencer
Roane noted that the power of a succeeding legislature to
alter the enactments of its predecessors "is bounded only
...

by the principles and provisions of

the constitution

and bill of rights, and by those great rights and prin
ciples for the preservation of which all just governments
are founded."77

These two brief judicial statements are

joined by Henry St. George Tucker, who wrote in 1831 that
"if a statute be obviously subversive of the principles of
common right and reason, it would probably be considered as
beyond the limits of legislative power . . .."7 8
The possible implications of a theory that allowed the
courts authority to reject legislative actions on the basis
of "common right and reason" are immense.
quick to add that "this is so delicate an

Even Tucker was
assumption of

power by the judiciary, that it ought not to be exercised
without the greatest caution and moderation."79

And, as we
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have seen, the Virginia Court of Appeals, if it truly
subscribed to such a theory at all, did not often utilize
it— certainly not to effect a wholesale departure from
legislative policy.
A third instance in which the Court of Appeals
appeared willing to defy apparent legislative policy
occurred when the statutory language was contrary to
longstanding practice.

The possible importance of actual

practice to the interpretation of statutory language was
suggested as early as 1791.

In Downman v. Downman's exrs.

the court addressed the re-opening of office judgments
[that is, default judgments entered by the court clerk upon
the non-appearance of the other party].

The district court

act of 1788 had provided that a defendant could appear and
plead anytime before the end of the next succeeding term,
at which time a final judgment would be entered.

In

construing the recently-enacted law, the Court of
Appeals noted that "these words . . . are the same as were
used in the old act of 1753, for establishing the General
Court . . ..”

Moreover, the court observed, "the practice

of that court was very liberal, in allowing a defendant to
plead . . .."

The court therefore permitted the office

judgment to be re-opened.80
The Downman case merely looked to existing practice as
a means of defining the application of a new statutory
provision which echoed a previous enactment.

There were

other cases where a reliance upon usage did not threaten
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legislative ascendancy.

Thus in its early years the Court

of Appeals moved to confirm the continued viability of such
longstanding practices as the use of a "scroll" instead of
a "seal” on sealed instruments,81 and the payment of money
owed to the opposite party's attorney.82

At times, the

court even cited usage to support a statute, as when a
question arose as to the legislative intent at the
enactment of a particular provision.83
There were other occasions, however, where existing
practice appeared to flatly contradict express statutory
language, and in such instances the Court of Appeals faced
the decision of which to affirm:

statute or practice.

In

fact, the court did both, at various times, and it is
instructive to briefly review examples of each.

The most

definitive statement in favor of statute over practice came
from Judge Dabney Carr in 1827.

The issue in Coleman v.

M'Murdo and Prentis was whether a later-appointed
administrator of an estate could sue his predecessors for
the mishandling of the estate's assets.

In response to

counsel's argument that this had been longstanding practice
in Virginia, Carr said that even if the court were willing
to "admit that such is the practice? yet, when this
tribunal is called upon to declare the law, I apprehend
that such practice deserves so much weight only, as to
insure a close and attentive examination of the foundation
on which it rests, and a determination not to disturb it,
unless we are convinced that it is in violation of law."
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Carr went on to say:

"But, if we be so convinced, then, I

hold, that however general, however ancient the error, we
are bound by the highest of all sanctions, to correct it
with an unshrinking hand; for, to this Court is confided
the duty of expounding the law in the last resort."84
Similarly, the court in Baker v. Preston in 1821 firmly
stated that it "would hold itself at liberty . . .

to

depart from a usage, which was in conflict with the actual
expressions of a statute, and perhaps in opposition to
great principles . . .."8S
On the other hand, there were also occasions when the
court was willing to accept common usage even though it
appeared to belie statutory language.

Two important cases

involved the declaration of rights itself.

In 1804, The

Case of the County L e w came before the Court of Appeals.
That adjudication arose under the language of article VI of
the declaration, which provided that "men . . . cannot be
taxed or deprived of their property for publick uses
without their own consent, or that of their representatives
so elected . . .."86

Under this provision, the Fairfax

county court had declared the collection of taxes by the
appointive county court unconstitutional.

Edmund Pendle

ton, for the court, admitted that the practice of assessing
the county levy appeared to contravene the constitution.
Nevertheless, he reasoned, the practice was of such
antiquity, and was so central to the functioning of
government, that it was impossible to assume .that the 1776
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Convention meant to do away with it.

Instead, despite

appearances, "the convention . . . did not consider
the article in the bill of rights as extending to the
case . . .."87

This adjudication, then, was not construed

to be a case of practice overruling constitutional
language; rather, it was a case of constitutional language
implicitly assuming the continuation of existing practice.
In the same year the Court of Appeals stretched this
line of reasoning a bit further.

The case of Turpin v.

Locket involved the constitutionality of an 1802 statute
which divested the Episcopal Church of its "glebe" lands.
The Episcopal Church had been the established church in
Virginia prior to 1785, and the glebe lands were lands
granted to the church by the state as a means of support
for its rectors.

The

1802 law was challenged on the ground

(among others) that it constituted an unconstitutional
taking of property.

Judges Carrington and Lyons, in

opposition to the law, cited The Case of the County Levy,
and stressed that the long practice of upholding the
church's right to the glebes had made it part of the
constitution.

The justices maintained that "written

constitutions are, like other instruments, subject to
construction; and, when expounded, the exposition, after
long acquiescence, becomes, as it were, part of the
instrument; and can, no more, be departed from, than
that."88

The court evenly split on the issue, and thus the

statute was upheld.

The Lyons and Carrington opinion,
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however, represented a further articulation of the County
Levy doctrine of practice shaping (if not overruling)
constitutional language.
An example of the apparent supremacy of practice over
statutory language involved the implied revocation of
wills.
will]

By Virginia statute, "No devise so made [by valid
. . . shall be revocable, but by the testator's

destroying . . . the same, . . . or by a subsequent
will . . . . Nevertheless, continued the statute, a will
could also be revoked— by statutory implication— if a
testator died childless, and there was an after-born child
unprovided for in his will.89

Despite the strong words of

the statute that "No devise . . . shall be revocable," the
Court of Appeals did allow for revocations that did not
come within the compass of the statute.

As Judge John

Green put it in 1827, "notwithstanding the statute, a
revocation in toto might be implied from facts afterwards
occurring," giving the example of a legacy which was
revoked by an advancement of that identical amount during
the testator’s lifetime.90

In allowing revocations beyond

the strict letter of the statute, the Court was following a
similar, longstanding interpretation of an equally strong
provision in the English statute of wills.91

This of

course raised the possibility that the court presumed the
English interpretation of similar language was implicitly
adopted by the Virginia General Assembly in enacting their
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own provision.

Such a view of the matter aligns the court

with legislative intent rather than against it.
Two other cases are much less ambiguous, and go
straight to the heart of the matter.

In 1800, the Court of

Appeals directed its attention to a 1727 statute regarding
a husband's right to his wife's slaves.
appeared unambiguous.

The statute

It provided that "where any feme

sole [unmarried woman] is or shall be possessed of any
slave or slaves . . . the same shall accrue to, and be
absolutely vested in the husband of such feme, when she
shall marry . . .."92

The longstanding common-law rule and

practice, however, held that a husband was not entitled to
his wife's personal property until he had exercised some
form of possession over it.93

In Wallace v. Taliaferro.

Judge Peter Lyons argued that the statutory language meant
exactly what it said, and that the husband had a right to
his wife's slaves whether or not he had exercised any
dominion over them.

"No rule is better settled," said

Lyons, "than that the general intention of the Legislature
ought to be observed.

I conclude, therefore, that the

makers of the act intended, that the words . . . should be
understood, according to their full and natural import."94
Lyons, however, was overruled by the other members of the
court.

In doing so, they looked to the longstanding

practice.

As Paul Carrington put it, "the question

was considered so well settled and understood, by the
people, that nobody has ever thought it worth while, to
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stir it . - .,"93

Pendleton agreed.

"I am satisfied [this

result] will tend to confirm long practice . . .,"96
Indeed, Pendleton thought the construction so well settled
that the legislature must have meant to adopt it as an
intrinsic part of the statute.

"Is not the . . . will of

the Legislature to be pursued," he asked, "although terms
may be used which might import a contrary will?"

He could

only surmise that "I imagine some young gentlemen of the
bar, not old enough to know the practice of the country,
nor acquainted with the former decisions, advised this
suit, on reading the clause, and being impressed with the
force of the strong expressions [contained therein]."97
A similar, albeit more dramatic, case arose in 1829.
In Sailing v. M *Kinney. M ’Kinney, as sheriff of Scott
County, had "farmed out" his duties to Sailing as deputy
(that is, Sailing paid a fixed fee to M'Kinney, and was
thereafter entitled to collect all fees which would
normally accrue to the sheriff).

However, under a statute

enacted in 1792, it was illegal for "any person . . . [to]
sell any office . . .

or deputation of any office . . .

or

receive . . . any money, fee or reward . . . for any office
...

or for the deputation of any office . . . which shall

in any wise touch or concern the administration of the
Executive Government, or the administration or execution
of justice, or the receipt or payment of the public
revenue . . .."

The act contained a proviso "That nothing

in this act . . . shall be so construed as to prohibit the
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appointment . . .

of any . . . deputy sheriff, who shall be

employed to assist their principals in the execution of
their respective offices."98

This case brought directly

before the Court of Appeals the issue of statutory language
versus common practice.
The majority of the court held that M ’Kinney's action’"’'
in "farming" the deputyship was entirely allowable.

John

Green for the majority began by asserting that M'Kinney’s
conduct came within the proviso of the statute and
therefore was legal, even by the terms of the act itself.
Green did not stop there, however, and went on to give a
second, startling reason for upholding M'Kinney.

"If,

however, these circumstances are not sufficient to justify
the conclusion, that upon the literal construction of the
statute the sale of the deputation of the office of
sheriff, is excepted from its provisions," he began, "still
the construction is so doubtful, and the practice in
question has so long prevailed, and is so extensive, and
the consequences of holding it illegal so extensively
ruinous, that if there be any case, to which the maxim
communis error facit jus ["common error makes law," or,
"what was at first illegal is presumed, when repeated many
times, to have acquired the force of usage; and then it
would be wrong to depart from it"]99 can apply, this is
surely one."

Green quickly supported his bold utterance by

adding, "That maxim has been held in England to sanction
practices even expressly against the statutes . . .."10°
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Justice Carr gave a ringing dissent, which clearlyarticulated the opposing point of view.

"It was also

contended, that though the sale of the sheriff's office be
not permitted by law, yet it has been the general idea,
that it was so, and the universal practice to farm it out;
and that this common error makes it lawful."
this idea out of hand.

Carr rejected

"I cannot assent to this position.

The sale of the deputation of this office is expressly
forbidden by the statute, unless the proviso excepts it.
have shewn it does not."

I

Assuming, then, that the practice

contravened the statute, Carr portrayed the resulting
situation in stark terms.

"Here, then, we have the statute

law prohibiting the sale . . . and we have the law of
common error, holding the sale . . . good.
follow?

We cannot serve two masters.

Which shall we

To me, it seems,

that we can know no law but that derived from the law
making power? and that, in opposition to such laws, error,
however common, however hoary, can impose on us no
obligation."141
In Wallace v. Taliaferro and Sailing v. M 1Kinney, we
have instructive examples of the Court of Appeals appar
ently departing from statutory language to uphold long
standing practice.
especially noted.

Two things, however, should be
First, in both cases the majority sought

to bring their interpretation within what they perceived as
the legislative intent.
spirited dissent.

Second, in each case there was a

Even more interesting were the reasons
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the court gave for taking the stand it did.

In Wallace. a

case involving property in slaves, Carrington frankly
admitted:

"I am not much disposed to indulge a construc

tion, which would put all to sea again, and might disturb
the titles of thousands.”

Pendleton agreed.

"I am

satisfied [this result] will tend to confirm long practice;
and preserve the peace of the country; which would have
been disturbed, by a contrary judgment."102

In Sailing,

Judge Green similarly commented that "the consequences of
holding it [the farming out of deputyships] illegal . . .
[would be] extensively ruinous . . .."103

Perhaps the best

articulation of the underlying basis for such decisions,
however, came in the 1821 case of Baker v. Preston.

There,

although the court found the usage [admitting copies of
deeds] compatible with statute, Spencer Roane added that
the court "would, especially, hesitate to repeal an usage,
which has been so general and universal, as that its
reversal would inundate this country with litigation, and
lay the foundations of innumerable appeals and law
suits.1,104
In these cases concerning the legitimacy of common
usage over legislative policy, we find another one of those
areas where there existed the potential for a considerable
amount of judicial discretion.
reality much less dynamic.

Again, however, we find the

In most instances, practical

usage comported with statute, and in doubtful cases
judicial assumptions ran, as before, toward theories of a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

205
failure in legislative foresight, or to poorly phrased
statutory language.

In those cases where the court did

indeed appear to be striking out on its own, its reasoning
reflected a now-familiar set of priorities.

In Wallace.

the court was forthrightly protecting property rights; in
Sailing, the maintenance of a long-established system where
venerable county leaders were appointed as sheriff, and
then turned around and "farmed" out the duties to another
person.

Undoubtedly the one thing which emerges as most
striking from a parsing of the Virginia case law in the
early national period was the consistent nature of judicial
deference to legislative actions and intent.

This

deference was woven into the very fabric of Virginia law in
this period, a fact which colored the emerging substantive
law, and, more, made an important statement about the
perceived wellsprings of law and the proper role of the
various political institutions in applying it.
The first and most obvious conclusion that can be
drawn is that the legislature was considered the proper
locus for the making of policy in the new commonwealth.103
Both judicial deference in the face of statutory language
and intent, and judicial restraint in approaching matters
allowing potential judicial discretion underscore that
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fact.

What is much more important than the mere fact of

legislative ascendancy in the policy-making sphere,
however, are the implications this portended for the new
order.
There were at least two major consequences which
flowed from the doctrine of legislative ascendancy.

The

first had to do with its implications for republicanism.
As William E. Nelson has perceived, "Shared ideas about the
sovereignty of the people and the accountability of
government to the people resulted at an early date in a new
understanding of the role of the legislature in the legal
system."106

In other words, the concept of popular

sovereignty— both in terms of power residing in the people,
and in terms of government being responsive to the people—
naturally led to a conception of legislative ascendancy.
And, indeed, the Virginia Court of Appeals was prominent
in acknowledging this new reality, recognizing the
legislators as "the immediate representatives of the
people, representing as well the justice as the wisdom of
the nation . . .."107

Nor was Virginia alone in this view.

According to Gordon Wood, no one doubted in 1776 that "the
legislature was the most important part of any govern
ment."108

As one contemporary journal explained it, "It is

in their legislatures . . . that the members of a common
wealth are united and combined together into one coherent,
living body.

This is the soul that gives form, life and

unity to the commonwealth."109

Accordingly, "It became
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clear that the legislature possessed 'full power and
authority . . .

to make, ordain and establish, all manner

of . . . laws, statutes, and ordinances . . .

as they shall

judge to be for the good and welfare of this Common
wealth. '"no
But as important as the legislature was to the
realization of popular sovereignty in a republican
commonwealth, there was another side of the popular
sovereignty coin.

That was the notion of the people as

superior to the legislature, and here, too, the Virginia
Court of Appeals played a prominent role.

For all of the

court's deference to the legislature, it also helped to
define— through judicial review— the limits beyond which
the legislature could not go.111

Thus, the Virginia

court's support for legislative ascendancy was a perfectly
republican stance; somewhat paradoxically, its restriction
of the legislature— when attributed to constitutional
mandate— was equally republican.

For, in one sense at

least, the court was as legitimate an oracle of the popular
will as the legislature.

The rationale for such an

assertion lay in the all-encompassing doctrine of popular
sovereignty itself.

The simple fact was that "the

representatives of the people [i.e., the legislature] were
not really the people, but only the servants of the people
with a limited delegated authority to act on behalf of the
people."112

In a similar manner, the courts could also be

seen as servants of the people.

Once the people were

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

208
recognized as truly sovereign over all branches of
government, the judiciary then had as much right to
participate in the fulfillment of the popular will as any
other branch.
Besides the implications for popular sovereignty, the
stances taken by the Court of Appeals in the interpretation
of statute had a significant impact upon the substance of
Virginia law.

In applying statutory language, the court

whenever possible continued to support traditional rules of
law, and, in particular, the rights of property.

When a

statute did not specifically overrule the common law, the
traditional rule of law remained in place.

When a

legislative enactment appeared to subvert established
practice, only clear and unequivocal language would cause
the court to interpret it as intending to overthrow
existing usage.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals was

forthright in explaining why.

By maintaining stable rules

of law, rights of property remained settled and undis
turbed .
The decisions of the Court of Appeals vis-a-vis the
legislature also reflected a distinctive view of the proper
role of the court in the making of policy.

The court

deferred to legislative will where it existed, and in the
absence of statute looked with approbation to traditional
rules of the common law.

Such a restrictive view of its

role as a positive maker of policy was tempered, however,
by a pragmatic willingness to adapt traditional rules of
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law to meet the needs of the new Commonwealth and the
requirements of common sense.
Finally, in our analysis of the decisions of the
Virginia Court of Appeals over a period spanning five
decades, there was— again— remarkably little sense of
change.

A random sampling of cases from the 1820s would

produce evidence of a judicial attitude toward policymaking
not dramatically different from a similar sampling in the
1790s.

This surprising stability in judicial approach

helps to explain the enduring nature of the substantive
treatment of law over the same period.
Virginia, then, in the first half-century after the
Revolution, gradually fashioned its own peculiar accommoda
tion with the forces unleashed by the Revolution.

In the

course of that settlement, however, the "rules of the game"
changed, in the form of the establishment in 1787 of an
entirely new governmental entity of unknown powers.
Virginia's response to this political innovation forms the
final topic of analysis.
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enactments are legion; at most, only the most salient
examples can be discussed in the text.
2.

Grymes v. Pendleton. 1 Call 54, 55 (1797).

3.
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Lockbridge v. Carlisle. 2 Leigh 186 (1830).

12. Gaskins v. Commonwealth. 1 Call 194, 199 (1797). See
Oct. 1788 c. 67, § 86; 12 Hening 753. The General Assembly
remedied this omission a year later by applying the same
limitation to the General Court. Oct. 1792, c. 14, §§ 5156; 13 Hening 446-47. See also Dunbar v. Long, 4 Hen. & M.
212 (1809).
13. Skipwith v. Clinch, 3 Call 86 (1801); see Oct. 1787 c.
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2) a statute relating to several subjects may be read
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construction which tends to absurdities is not to be
admitted; 4) a statute is to be so construed, that no
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insignificant; 5) no statute is to be so construed as to be
inconvenient; and that consequences may be resorted to
where the meaning of a statute is doubtful; 6) all statutes
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Id. at 201-11. See also Bernard v. Scott's admr.. 3 Rand.
522 (1825) .
22. Henry St. George Tucker, Commentaries, vol. 1, bk. 1,
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(1809).
also the examples cited in Henry St. George Tucker,
Commentaries, 2: 154, 156.
25.

R.C.

26.

See further discussion, infra.

27.

Robert's widow v. Stanton. 2 Munf. 129
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28. Newman v. Chapman, 2 Rand. 93, 100 (1823). It should
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CHAPTER VI
A REPUBLICAN COMMONWEALTH
IN A FEDERAL REPUBLIC

While Virginians were in the midst of defining the
nature of their republican revolution, they were confronted
with a complicating factor:

the creation of a wholly new

governmental entity of undetermined scope and powers, which
was expected to co-exist and interact with the longestablished state institutions.

The Commonwealth of

Virginia, and in particular its Court of Appeals, was thus
forced to confront novel problems concerning the organiza
tion of powers in the years after 1787 that raised new
questions concerning the proper application of republican
principles.1
It was universally admitted that the new federal
Constitution had established a unique frame of government,
structuring governmental power in a way no one had ever
before attempted.

The idea of two governments sharing the

sovereign powers of governance posed immense problems of
both a theoretical and a practical nature.

The theoretical

difficulties with the conception of a shared sovereignty
were dispelled by the triumph of the notion of popular
sovereignty, where "the people are avowedly the fountain of
217
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all power," who then delegated aspects of that sovereignty
to the state and federal governments, respectively.2

The

practical aspects of the new order remained to be worked
out in the first decades of the new system's existence.
The all-important practical issue in the implementa
tion of the new federal system was the proper allocation of
power between the state and federal jurisdictions.

Few

questioned that each had a legitimate sphere of authority?
the problem lay in defining the extent of those spheres.
It was a matter of immense importance, because at stake (or
so many believed) was nothing less than the future of
republican liberty itself.3
To a great degree, this battle was waged in the
courts.

It was there that the proper form— and forum— of

republicanism was hashed out, in a series of critical court
decisions on matters arising under the new scheme.

In

Virginia, the Court of Appeals made a signal contribution
to the ongoing debate over the nature of federalism.

Faced

with a new federal government of unknown powers, the
Virginia court became a citadel of restrictive construction
of federal powers, in the belief that republican rights and
liberties were best protected at the state level.
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In a series of adjudications in the early nineteenth
century, the Virginia Court of Appeals articulated a vision
of the proper balance between federal and state jurisdic
tions that was to serve as one of the key bases for an
alternative (albeit minority) view of the federal relation
which was to be of surpassing importance.
One of the most difficult aspects of the new system to
conceptualize was the new theory of two governments
operating concurrently in the same time and space.

It was

the Court of Appeals, in two early-nineteenth-century
decisions, which best explained how this complexity might
work in practice.

The issue in the 1811 case of Murray v.

M'Cartv was whether, under the Constitution, the Virginia
legislature retained the power to declare when an
individual lost his Virginia citizenship under the
Commonwealth’s "expatriation” law.

The Court acknowledged

that "the situation of America, in this particular, is new,
and may produce new and delicate questions."

Nevertheless,

Justice William Cabell was able to perceive an important
subtlety.

"We have sovereignties moving within sovereign

ties," he said, and, as a result, "allegiance to a
particular state is one thing, and that to the United
States is another; that a renunciation of the former
allegiance does not draw after it a renunciation of the
latter . . .."4

A few years later (in 1815) Cabell

completed his thought within the context of the case of
Hunter v. Martin, where the Court defended the right of
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state courts to refuse to comply with directives from the
federal courts.

In Hunter. Cabell stressed the necessity

of balancing the two spheres.

"The free exercise, by the

states, of the powers reserved to them, is as much
sanctioned and guarded by the constitution of the United
States, as is the free exercise, by the federal government,
of the powers delegated to that government.

If either be

impaired," continued Cabell, "the system is deranged.

The

two governments, therefore, possessing, each, its portion
of the divided sovereignty, although embracing the same
territory, and operating on the same persons and frequently
on the same subjects, are nevertheless separate from, and
independent of each other."3
One important lesson to be drawn from Cabell's
perceptions is that, however much the Virginia Court was
willing to defend the Commonwealth’s interests in the
federal system, it did accept the fact that it was a
federal structure, and there was a place for the national
government.

This is consonant with the more sophisticated

interpretations of republican thought.

While most

Virginians were undoubtedly proponents of the maintenance
of state integrity, to portray them as solely advocates of
local rights is, in Lance Banning's words, "a traditional
interpretation which creates more problems than it
solves."6

The Court of Appeals, for one, was willing to

acknowledge this sphere of federal sovereignty.

Accord

ingly, the Court of Appeals had no trouble in acknowledging
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that the United States Constitution applied to Virginia.
The Virginia Court, for instance, noted in 1828 that the
General Assembly was supreme, "except so far as they are
limited by the Constitutions of Virginia and the United
States."7

An example of the unquestioned acceptance of the

provisions of the federal Constitution was the disposition
of the Virginia Court of Admiralty.

Article three of the

Constitution had vested exclusive admiralty jurisdiction in
the federal courts.

The Commonwealth unhesitatingly

thereupon abolished the state-level court, a move that was
acknowledged and approved by the Court of Appeals.8
Likewise the Court had no objection to enforcing federal
statutes which clearly came within the ambit of the
Constitution.

In the 1809 case of Brown v. Crippin and

Wise, Brown was a citizen of Pennsylvania who sought to
have the case removed from the Virginia state courts to the
federal circuit court under the diversity of citizenship
clause of the Constitution and the federal statute
implementing that provision.
firm.

The Court of Appeals was

"The removal of the cause in such a case," said

Judge Tucker, "is a matter of right which ought not to be
refused to any defendant, who makes out his case; and
complies with the terms of the law."9
Granting that there was no serious questioning of the
right of the national government to operate within its
proper sphere, what becomes most instructive are the
perceived limits of that sphere which the Virginia Court
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attempted to apply.

The case of Williams v. Price provides

a fascinating example of the Court of Appeals evading the
application of a federal statute.

What makes this case so

illuminating is that it dealt with precisely the same
statutory provision as the case of Brown v. Crippin and
Wise just discussed, and was decided only eight years later
in 1817.10

It will be recalled that in the Brown case the

Court rigorously upheld the right of a Pennsylvania
defendant under the Constitution and the federal Judiciary
Act of 1789,11 to have his case removed from the Virginia
state court into the federal court.

In Williams, James

Price of Virginia brought a contract action against Joseph
Williams of Virginia and Cumberland Williams of Baltimore.
During the suit the Maryland defendant filed a motion to
remove the cause into the federal Circuit Court.

The

motion was overruled and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
This departure from a clear recent precedent was justified
in terms of the interests of Virginia citizens.

As Judge

Spencer Roane explained, the statute "does not embrace
cases, like the present, in which [Virginia] citizen
defendants have, also, essential interests in the cause,
which may be affected by a removal into the Federal
Court."12

The Court specifically distinguished the Brown

case where there were no Virginia defendants.

Moreover,

the Court of Appeals specifically left open the issue of
the constitutionality of the federal act.

Roane explained

that the issue was not raised in the Brown case, and that
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here in Williams the matter could properly be resolved
through mere statutory construction.13
If the Virginia Court of Appeals did not automatically
bow to federal statute, neither did it unquestioningly
apply federal treaty provisions, especially to transactions
occurring prior to the treaty.

Indeed, the Treaty of Paris

of 1783 which ended the Revolution received a somewhat
ambiguous treatment by the court.

The provision of the

treaty which occasioned the most litigation was that which
ensured to British citizens the right to pursue their
claims against American citizens.

In only one instance did

the Court of Appeals uphold th£ federal treaty in such
litigation, and it clearly did so with distate.

During the

Revolution, Virginia had enacted a statute allowing debtors
of British creditors to pay the amount owed into the state
loan office and receive in return a certificate in
discharge of the debt.

In 1796 the United States Supreme

Court had ruled this law invalid under the treaty of peace.
In the 1806 case of Commonwealth v. Walker, Virginia
Attorney General Philip Norborne Nicholas had argued that
the decision of the federal court was invalid.

"I will not

question the motives of the Federal Court," said Nicholas,
"but [I] have no hesitation in saying their decision was
wrong.

Virginia, being a sovereign state had a right to

pass the law in question, and a mere treaty, after the
passage of the law, could not annul it.”

In justifying his

position Nicholas acknowledged that "treaties are declared
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by the Federal Constitution to be the supreme law of the
land."

Nevertheless, concluded Nicholas, "they cannot have

a retrospective operation, so as to a n n u l the acts of
sovereign states . . .."14

Judge Roane, for the Court,

disliked the result, but was forced to disagree.

The way

Roane saw it, in the 1777 statute the Commonwealth of
Virginia had made a covenant with its citizens to treat
these debts as discharged.
changed.

" . . .

But since then things had

The sovereignty of Virginia, as then

existing," said Roane, "has passed into other hands; first,
into those of the government of the confederation, and,
lastly, into the hands of the present government of the
United States."

Moreover, added Roane, "all the citizens

of this Commonwealth were parties, and assenting to that
change . . .."

Thus the issue now lay in the hands of the

federal government, and Walker must seek redress, if at
all, in the national forum.13
The Walker case, however, stands in stark contrast to
other cases decided by the same Court before, during, and
after the term of the Walker decision.

In the case of Read

v. Read in 1804, a British citizen sought to claim Virginia
lands by inheritance in 1786.

The Court of Appeals held

that under the common law, and under Virginia statutes of
1779 and 1784, the plaintiffs were aliens and could not
inherit.16

In 1806, in the very same term as the Walker

decision, Robert Bristow, Jr., a British citizen, sought to
recover lands in Virginia that had escheated to the
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Commonwealth in 1779, after all the formalities of an
inquest of office.

The court held that neither the Treaty

of Paris of 1783 nor the Jay Treaty of 1794 applied, and
refused Bristow's claim..

Said St. George Tucker:

"The

confiscation was final, and the property absolutely vested
in the Commonwealth long before the treaty of peace, . . .
or the constitution of the United States, or the treaty of
1794, came into operation.”17

And in 1810, one rationale

for denying the claims of Englishman Denny Martin Fairfax
to lands in Virginia was that the title to the property in
question had been determined by the Virginia legislature
prior to the treaty of 1783.18
Given the spirit of independence demonstrated by the
Court of Appeals in the face of federal statute and treaty,
it should come as no surprise that the Court displayed even
more passion when the federal courts sought to intrude upon
the Virginia judiciary's perceived sphere of influence.
For federal statutes and treaties, if they be constitu
tional, were undeniably the law of the land.

Not so clear

was the effect of the pronouncements of the federal
judiciary.

It was in addressing this issue that the

Virginia Court of Appeals best articulated the Virginia
credo of state autonomy within the federal system.
There was never a time when the Virginia Court of
Appeals did not feel free to ignore a federal adjudication
if it felt called upon to do so.

In the 1797 case of

M'Call v. Turner, President Judge Edmund Pendleton frankly
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acknowledged that Chief Justice Jay had instructed a jury
that interest on British debts should be assessed for the
period of the Revolutionary War.

Pendleton, however,

disagreed, and commented rather blithely that "I have no
doubt, but he gave that opinion with the like sincerity, as
I have delivered mine to the contrary; and mankind, if they
think it worth while, will judge between us."19

In 1804,

St. George Tucker, in dissent, presented his view of the
applicability of federal decisions.

In Dunlop v. Harris,

an action on a promissory note, Tucker stated "The case of
Mandeviile v. Jameson, in the supreme court of the United
States, is, I confess, expressly against the opinion which
I have delivered on this general question . .

Tucker,

while disagreeing, had no thought of undercutting the
Supreme Court as an institution.

He owned that "I owe too

much respect to the opinions of those [members of the
Supreme Court] who decided that question, to controvert
their decisions any where, but in this place."

Neverthe

less, Judge Tucker had no qualms about his right and duty
to ignore the Supreme Court in this Virginia adjudication.
"Here [in the Court of Appeals]," he said, "I must decide
according to my own conviction, founded upon obligatory
precedents, or such as I conceive to be obligatory on me."
And in this case, at any rate, the federal decision did not
have that import.

"Had the question between the parties in

that suit had any relation to the constitution or laws of
the United States," Tucker went on, "I should have regarded
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the decision as obligatory upon me as precedent."
action, however, such was not the case.

In this

The judge

concluded that the Virginia dispute "having no relation to
either [the Constitution or federal law], or any other
[subject] in which the judgment of this court may be liable
to revision by the supreme court of the United States, I do
not regard it as a precedent."20
maintained the same stance.

In 1827 the Court

M *Clung v. Hughes involved the

jurisdiction of a court of equity to hear cases involving
conflicting claims to land.

The Supreme Court had had an

opportunity to apply the Virginia statute in an earlier
case, and had come down against the train of Virginia
decisions on the issue.

In M'Clung, Judge William Green

was "struck with the observation, that the Court of Appeals
in Virginia, and the Supreme Court of the United States,
seem to have come to opposite conclusions . . .."

But

this circumstance presented no real difficulty for Green
and the Court.

"I cannot assent," Green said simply,

"to the principles on which [the federal case] was
decided . . .."21
Much more galling was the prospect of the federal
judiciary actually intervening in the affairs of the
Virginia courts.

In the 1809 case of Brown v. Crippin and

Wise, one of the issues was whether the defendant, in
seeking removal of the case from the lower state court to
the federal court, should have petitioned for a mandamus
(an order from a superior court commanding obedience) from
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the federal court or the state superior court.

Counsel for

the defendant argued that "It never was contemplated that a
Federal Court should issue process, commanding a State
Court to do any act.”22

Judge Tucker agreed.

" . . .

Of

this I have no doubt," asserted Tucker, "that neither the
Constitution of the United States, nor any act of Congress,
does, or can (so long as the [Tenth Amendment] remains in
force) deprive the superior Courts of this .Commonwealth of
that control over the proceedings of the inferior Courts,
which the laws of this country [i.e., Virginia] give to
them."23

An even more dramatic instance of resistance to

the federal judiciary appeared in connection with the
Virginia law of 1802 confiscating glebe (church-owned)
lands.

In the case of Turpin v. Locket in 1804, this

statute had been upheld by the Virginia Court of Appeals as
constitutional.24

On appeal to the Supreme Court of the

United States, this determination had been reversed.23
But the Supreme Court did not have the last word, for in
1840 the Virginia statute came up for consideration again,
and the Virginia Court of Appeals, totally ignoring the
Supreme Court decision, again upheld the constitutionality
of the local enactment.26
All this served as mere background to one of the most
important statements on federalism in .-the Commonwealth's
history:

the case of Hunter v. Martin.27

In that

decision, the Virginia Court of Appeals articulated at some
length a theory of anti-centrism which was both an
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outgrowth of the state's political and intellectual
heritage and a bold statement in its own right.

The

decision was all the more remarkable in that it appeared at
a time (1815) when the reins of the national government had
been safely in the hands of fellow Virginians for a
considerable number of years, and therefore the general
attitude toward the federal government and its policies was
more benevolent than either before or later.

Hunter v.

Martin thus deserves no little attention.
Hunter v. Martin had its origination in the earlier
litigation of Hunter v. Fairfax;s devisee.28

The Fairfax

case had been one of great complexity concerning the right
of the heir of Lord Fairfax to assert his title to lands
once held of Lord Fairfax in Virginia's Northern Neck.
Fortunately, the complexities of the earlier case need not
detain us here.29

The important point for our purposes is

that the Virginia Court of Appeals held for Virginia
citizen Hunter, a determination which was carried to the
United States Supreme Court by a writ of error, and
re-vfers'ed.

In reversing the Virginia Court's decision, the

Supreme Court issued a mandate to the Virginia tribunal to
enter judgment for the appellant, Philip Martin.30

It was

this federal mandate that spurred the Virginia court's ire
in Hunter v. Martin.
Thus, despite the complexities of the underlying
litigation, the issue in Hunter v. Martin was as simple as
it was important:

"whether the Supreme Court was to be the
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ultimate arbiter of the Constitution, or whether the state
courts were to have equal jurisdiction in constitutional
matters."31

The importance of the matter did not go

unrecognized at the time.

Judge William Fleming

acknowledged that "This cause has been justly regarded as
one of the first importance, as it involves in it a great
national and constitutional question of extreme delicacy.”
Accordingly, noted Fleming, the cause "has therefore been
elaborately argued with great ability, by some of the most
distinguished characters of this bar; and has also received
from the court, the greatest attention and the most mature
deliberation."3 2
In addressing the issue itself, the members of the
Court found themselves on common ground.

Indeed, given

the enormity of the matter at issue, Judge Fleming
concluded that "It is fortunate and satisfactory to find,
that the opinion of the court is unanimous on the important
occasion . . .. "33

The substantive holding of the Virginia

court was probably best expressed by Spencer Roane, who
contended that neither Article III of the Constitution nor
the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the Supreme Court jurisdic
tion in this case.

Article III granted appellate jurisdic

tion to the federal courts, but, according to Roane, since
the entire Article dealt exclusively with the federal
courts and not the state courts, the Article did not extend
to a case such as this (and thus the Judiciary Act, which
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merely implemented the Constitutional structure, was
similarly flawed).34
The fact that the case arguably arose under the Treaty
of Paris of 1783 did not deter the Court.

The "supremacy

clause” of the Constitution of course made federal treaties
"the supreme law of the land."

And the twenty-fifth

section of the Judiciary Act provided that "a final
judgment in any suit in the highest court . . .

of a state

. . . where there is drawn in question the validity of a
treaty, or statute of . . . the United States, and the
decision is against their validity, may be re-examined and
reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court . . . ."33

While

none of the Virginia justices questioned the legitimacy of
the Supremacy Clause, they vehemently denied the assumption
inherent in the Judiciary Act that this meant that federal
courts necessarily had the final say in determining the
validity of federal statutes and treaties.

Nowhere could

the Virginia Court find in the Constitution the granting to
the federal judiciary of exclusive appellate jurisdiction
in such matters.

The state courts had equal authority in

cases properly before the state courts, and in such cases
the decision of the highest state court was final.36
In modern days, with the logic of Hunter v. Martin
safely buried, it is easy to minimize the originality and
analytical sense of the Virginia Court's argument.

But the

Virginia justices did more than just articulate an
alternative approach to judicial review; in the process
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they constructed a reasoned theory of state power within
the federal structure.
The Court in Hunter began by adding much-needed
sophistication to the conception of intersecting sovereign
ties first delineated by the Court in Murray v. M 'Carty in
1811.37

It will be recalled that in this aspect Judge

William Cabell was the prime spokesman.

In Hunter, Cabell

acknowledged that in the federal system there were "two
governments . . . possessing, each, its portion of the
divided sovereignty, . . . embracing the same territory,
and operating on the same persons and frequently on the
same subjects."

Despite the obvious opportunity for

confusion, Cabell maintained that in reality this need not
be the case.

All that was required, thought Cabell, was

the proper respect for the state's portion of the divided
sovereignty.

"The two governments," he asserted, "are

. . . separate from, and independent of each other."38
Moreover, said the judge, "The constitution of the United
States contemplates the independence of both governments,"
and, importantly, "regards the residuary sovereignty of the
states, as not less inviolable, than the delegated
sovereignty of the United States."

Here Cabell was getting

to the essence of his argument, which would serve as the
foundation for elaboration by other justices.

"To give the

general government or any of its departments, a direct and
controlling operation upon the state departments, as such,"
concluded Cabell, "would be to change at once, the whole
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character of our system.

The independence of the state

authorities would be extinguished, and a superiority,
unknown to the constitution, would be created, which would,
sooner or later terminate in an entire consolidation of the
states into one complete national sovereignty.”39
Beyond asserting that there was an inviolable sphere
of state sovereignty, the Court went on to articulate a
rationale for that affirmation.

Again it was William

Cabell who made the most significant contribution.

"The

Courts of the United States,” he said, "derive their power
from, and owe responsibility to the people, of the United
States; whereas the State Courts derive their power from,
and owe responsibility to their respective states.

They

emanate from different sources, and have no common or
connecting head.”40

If this be true, then the Court's

conclusion was irresistible.

Cabell again;

"The Courts of

the United States, therefore, belonging to one sovereignty,
cannot be appellate Courts in relation to the State Courts,
which belong to a different sovereignty— and, of course,
their commands and instructions impose no obligation.”41
Not only did the states have their own sphere with its
own philosophical justification, but they were bound to
defend their jurisdiction against any transgression.

For

this the Court found its authority in the Virginia
Resolutions of 1799.

Those resolutions had been a

legislative protest against the federally-enacted Alien and
Sedition Acts.

Drafted by James Madison and enacted by the
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General Assembly, the resolutions had stated that when the
federal government overstepped the bounds of its delegated
authority, the states were compelled to oppose that
usurpation.4 2
Citing the Resolutions, Judge Francis Brooke noted
that "The state authorities . . . [are] the guardians of
the people’s and their own rights,” which includes "the
right to resist infractions of the Federal government, or
any department thereof . . .. "43
stronger terms yet.

Spencer Roane put it in

He, too, quoted from the Virginia

Resolutions in asserting "that in case of a deliberate,
palpable, and dangerous exercise of powers [by the federal
government]

. . . the state . . . [legislatures] have the

right and are in duty bound, to arrest the progress of the
evil."44

Here Roane departed from the Resolutions and made

an even more radical assertion.

In addition to the

required legislative opposition to federal encroachment,
Roane added that "the Courts of the States are also
authorized to check the evil when it occurs, in the
exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction."45
The Court left no loose ends untied.

Lest their

successors entertain doubts as to how to proceed in similar
cases that might arise, the Court spelled out the
appropriate approach to take when such a case came up in
the exercise of their "ordinary jurisdiction."

" . ..

In

a controversy respecting the constitutionality of a state
law," wrote Roane, "it must be shown to be unconstitu
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tional,

[while] a law of the General Government must be

proved to be constitutional; which can only be by shewing,
that the power to pass it has been granted.'*46

In setting

up this standard, the Court was requiring different burdens
of proof (in effect the state laws were presumed constitu
tional, while federal law was presumed unconstitutional).
The underlying issue in Hunter,

(in the opinion of

the Virginia court at any rate) was the question of which
of the two jurisdictions was the most dangerous to liberty.
In response to counsel’s warning that the decision would
lead to anarchy, Judge Roane responded by summing up the
"Virginia theory" of federalism.

" . . .

There is a

Charybdis to be avoided," proclaimed Roane, "as well as a
Scylla; that a centripetal, as well as a centrifugal
principle, exists in the government; and that no calamity
would be more to be deplored by the American people, than a
vortex in the general government, which should ingulph and
sweep away every vestige of the state constitutions."47
The anti-centrist stance of the Virginia Court of
Appeals in 1815 was "conservative" in the true sense of the
term.48

While the Court acknowledged and accepted the

federal government as part of the new constitutional
order, the Court's view of the federal relationship between
the two jurisdictions was distinctly backward-looking.

It

evoked the Articles of Confederation, which clearly rested
upon the authority of the states, as well as the Virginia
Resolutions.

If, as the Court of Appeals assumed, the
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locus of power rested in the states, then "it was only
logical . . . that the states should also possess the power
to declare a federal law unconstitutional."49

Thus we have

the spectacle, in 1815, of the high Virginia Court
expressly adopting both the language and rationale of the
Virginia Resolutions.

And, although the federal Supreme

Court refused to accept the Virginia argument,30 the
Virginia court never retracted the radical tract which was
Hunter v. Martin.
The Virginia's court's interpretation of federalism
was to have important implications.

In supporting the

power of the state, the Court of Appeals was also—
implicitly— articulating a theory about the nature of the
social order in the new federal republic.
the state was all-important.

In this theory

By jealously repelling

federal intrusions, be they by statute, treaty, or
adjudication, the Virginia Court of Appeals was attempting
to secure "the continued survival of [the] states as
independent centers of social policy," as well as the chief
defenders of liberty and property.31

It was the belief in

this fundamental objective, undiluted by the passage of
decades, that would color Virginia perceptions of develop
ments in the ultimate constitutional crisis at mid
century .32
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CHAPTER VII
EPILOGUE:

THE OLD ORDER AND THE NEW

Between 1776 and 1830 Virginia gradually worked out
the details of its "Revolutionary settlement."

That

settlement included the implementation of a new constitu
tional order, the accommodation of British traditions to
Virginia's practical and ideological requirements, and the
practical application of republican principles.

At the

same time, the Commonwealth was obliged to come to terms
with a new federal government of unknown powers, with
potentially critical implications for concepts of liberty
and republicanism.
In all of these achievements the Virginia Court of
Appeals played a vital role.

In the process of adjudicat

ing the issues presented before it— ranging from matters of
high constitutional law to affairs of seeming insig
nificance— the court placed its own unmistakable imprint on
each of the major areas of concern.

For example, the court

established the constitution as the framework around which
the new order would be fashioned through the elevation-of
the constitution and declaration of rights to the status of
a higher, organic law.

Moreover, the Virginia high court

helped to implement that order through its perceptiveness
241
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in delineating and responding to threats to the balance of
the new system.

The accommodation of British legal

traditions to the demands of a new society oriented toward
republican principles was chiefly the work of the Court of
Appeals as well.

The court adopted common-law principles

and precedents in a judicious and pragmatic manner—
respecting the traditions of the common law, with their
stable rules of property, yet willing to pragmatically
alter the law ->n the interests of necessity or sound
reason.

The substance of the new republican principles

adopted by Virginians was articulated by the General
Assembly, but the Court of Appeals played a key role in
interpreting and applying the legislative initiatives.
While supporting legislative intent whenever possible, the
court continued to display a respect for stability in the
law.

Finally, through its localist response to the

challenges of a new federal system, the Court of Appeals
placed Virginia at the forefront of a restrictive theory of
federal power that was to prove a viable alternative view
of the proper nature of the federal relation.
Two developments of particular interest emerge from
the contributions of the Court of Appeals to Virginia’s
Revolutionary settlement.

One was the unique role the

court carved out for itself as an articulator and inter
preter of policy in a republican polity.

That role

abounded in subtlety and complexity, but represented a
consistent approach to the proper role of the judiciary.
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First and foremost, the court upheld the doctrine of
popular sovereignty which served as the polar star of the
new order.

In mundane matters this meant a deference to

legislative initiative, in the recognition that the
legislature was the "most popular" branch, and the best
articulator of the wishes of the people.

In constitutional

matters, however, the legislature had to bow to the
constitution as the supreme expression of popular will.

In

such instances, the Court of Appeals adopted a contrary
approach and struck down legislative initiatives.

In

matters not directly dictated by constitution or statute,
the court displayed a sophisticated approach to the
articulation of policy.

When— as was usually the case— the

matter under adjudication came within the ambit of the
traditional rules of the common law, the court in most
cases deferred to precedent.

However, the court was not

slavish in its devotion to the traditional rules of law.
It did not hesitate to depart from longstanding practice
when the realities of Virginia's situation did not comport
with the old rules, or when the traditional law no longer
appeared to make sense.

The result was a traditional yet

pragmatic approach to law which substantially shaped the
new Commonwealth's legal system.
The second significant aspect of the Virginia court's
contribution to the Revolutionary settlement was more
substantive, and therefore more important.

The Virginia

Court of Appeals did much more than just implement

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

244
constitutional language; much more than merely apply
legislative directives.

The court also applied a substan

tive coloration to the nature of Virginia law, which
became an integral part of the Revolutionary settlement
itself.

While the high court consistently supported

republican principles and policies, it did so in a manner
that can only be described as conservative.

That is, the

Court of Appeals routinely applied both common law and
statute in such a way as to maintain existing rights of
property and stability in the rules of law.

This conserva

tive "gloss,” applied to even the most radical responses to
the issues posed by the Revolution, became the distinguish
ing feature of Virginia's Revolutionary settlement.
The implications of this Revolutionary settlement are
worthy of brief comment.

The commitment to stability and

property evinced by the Court of Appeals in its adjudica
tions must be viewed in conjunction with another phenomenon
emerging from the judicial decisions of the period.

It has

been a recurring theme of this analysis that throughout the
half-century under study the substantive decisions of the
Virginia Court of Appeals remained essentially consistent,
and did not reflect a sense of evolution or change.

The

enduring stability of Virginia law and its commitment to
conservative principles meshes nicely with the oligarchic
institutional structure mandated by the constitution of
1776.

That document, it will be recalled, adopted the

republican doctrine of popular sovereignty, but applied it
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in a conservative manner through its approach toward
representation and apportionment.

In effect, the constitu

tion of 1776 granted control of the institutions of
government to an eastern, conservative, slave-holding
elite.

This, of course, included the power to appoint the

members of the Court of Appeals.

It should come as no

surprise, then, that Virginia's Revolutionary settlement
favored the same values which were held dear by that ruling
bloc.
The adoption of this oligarchic system in 1776
generated no outpouring of resistance.

This was because at

the time of the Revolution the interests of the landholding
elite were seen as essentially consistent wl'ch those of the
rest of society, and because there was an "unchallenged
social habit" of deference to the leadership that made up
the elite.1
Importantly, this tradition of deference to the
eastern elite did not long survive the Revolution, and the
"old order," which remained ensconced in power as a result
of the 1776 constitution, came under increasing challenge.
The threat to the political sway of the eastern, conserva
tive bloc reached its apex in the constitutional convention
of 1829-1830.

The resolution of that dispute— in the form

of the constitution of 1830— forms a perfect capstone to
our study of the nature of Virginia's Revolutionary
settlement.

At the terminus of the period under study, the

Virginia elite succeeded in beating back the challenge of
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the forces of Virginia's new order, and thereby enshrined
its peculiar perception of law and politics in the
institutional structure of Virginia for another generation.
It was not until the eve of the Civil War that Virginia
finally succumbed to the demographic, economic, social, and
political forces engendered by the developments of the
nineteenth century, and adapted its constitution to the new
reality.

By that time, Virginia and the rest of the South

were embroiled in a sectional controversy, and the belated
move toward accommodation with the new order in Virginia
was swallowed up in the swirl of events.

The proceedings of the constitutional convention of
1829-1830 are worthy of no little attention.

The debates

of that convention evidenced the co-existence of two
strains of republican thought, based upon identical
underlying principles, but yielding widely divergent
applications of those fundamental concepts.

On the one

hand, the ruling conservative elite espoused the doctrines
of equality and popular sovereignty, but used those terms
as they had been defined at the time of the Revolution:
"equality” meant equality for only a few, and "popular
sovereignty" presumed a suffrage limited to those with a
"stake in society"— that is, those who owned land.
Moreover, the elite maintained that the government of the
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Commonwealth was properly in their hands.

By 1829 even the

conservatives could not justify this assertion based on a
conception of a homogeneous society of which they were the
natural leaders; instead, they based their claim to power
on the pragmatic assumption that only by holding the reins
of power could they protect their peculiar form of
property— that is, their interest in slaves.
The reformers, on the other hand, began from precisely
the same republican premises:
equality.

popular sovereignty and

In their argument, however, these terms had an

expansive new definition which embraced all adult white
males, regardless of wealth, or type of property owned, or
place of residence.

Moreover, the reformers argued, the

institutions of Virginia's government should be restruc
tured to reflect the new demographic reality of the
westward shift of population in the state.
In the end, the debates represented a classic
confrontation between a minority, representing and
articulating the principles of the "old order" in Virginia,
and a majority, which represented a new reality in Virginia
and a concomitant new variation of republicanism which
comported with that new reality.
The tension between the diverging interpretations of
republicanism had its source in the evolution of Virginia
society after 1776.

Changes in both the nature and

distribution of the Commonwealth's population after 1776
doomed the halcyon days of unchallenged rule by the eastern
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elite.

Two basic demographic trends fueled the new

dissatisfaction.

The first was western population growth.

While the adult white population of th^ Valley of Virginia
and the transmontane region increased rapidly, the number
of counties (and hence the number of delegates and
senators) did not keep up.2

The result was the increasing

demand for legislative apportionment based on population.
Indeed, it was "natural that in the Valley and across the
Alleghenies, the new men of local substance should want a
redistribution of members that would give them weight in
the Assembly proportionate to their numbers."3

The second

demographic trend was the changing nature of Virginia's
population.

Virginia cities saw the growth of a non-

freeholding class of merchants and artisans, while the
entire Commonwealth experienced a rise in the number of
tenants who lived on the land without actually owning it.4
Under the existing suffrage laws these men were denied the
right to vote, and they began to demand reform of the
franchise.

In sum, "the old, unreformed system of

representation was working a grievous injustice upon a
widespread and capably led minority [indeed, quite possibly
a majority] who were no longer content to be subordinate to
a government in which they had no voice."3
Perhaps more important was the fact that by the
nineteenth century Virginia society had developed to the
extent that any claim to its homogeneity— the implicit
basis of the eighteenth-century deferential society— was
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ludicrous.

Indeed, diversity was the norm rather than the

exception.

Even the reality of the eastern portion of

Virginia— the Tidewater and Piedmont sections which served
as the locus of power of the conservative elite— did not
comport with traditional views of a homogeneous society.
True, much of the agricultural land in this section was
controlled by slaveholding planters, but this region was
also the home to several emerging urban centers.

In these

rising cities lived industrialists, artisans, mechanics,
tradesmen, and merchants.

Many of these men owned no

slaves, and their wealth was in the form of personal
property rather than in landed estates.

Moreover, the

interests of many of these urban residents opposed those of
the rural elite, favoring such pro-business policies as
internal improvements and protective tariffs.

As Alison

Goodyear Freehling has noted, "Far from being monolithic
and harmonious, white Tidewater and Piedmont Virginia was
in 1830 a complex, discordant society characterized by
sometimes similar, sometimes dissimilar interests between
urban and rural elite, and by more deep-rooted class rifts
between democratic white artisans and aristocratic white
planters."6
Similarly, the Valley of Virginia was also charac
terized by diversity.
mixture.

In the Valley lived a curious

There were a large number of settlers of German

and Scotch-Irish descent, who tended to be non-slaveowning
small farmers of little wealth, but with strongly held
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egalitarian beliefs.

On the other hand, the Valley had

also become home to a significant population of slavehold
ing planters, with attitudes and interests closely akin to
their eastern brethren.

The Valley of Virginia, then,

represented a kind of amalgam of small, independent
farmers and slaveholding planters.7
It was the transmontaine west, however (much of it now
in West Virginia), which most clearly proved that Virginia
was no longer a homogeneous society based upon agriculture
and slaves, and deferential to the Tidewater gentry.

This

area was peopled by Germans and Scotch-Irish, many of whom
migrated to the area from the North.

They exemplified the

independent, egalitarian, small farmer.

In addition, the

major urban center in the area, Wheeling, relied upon
neither slaves for its labor supply nor plantation
agriculture for its raw materials.
to be in the North and West.

Even its markets tended

There was little about

transmontaine society to link it to the conservative
eastern bloc.

As Freehling observed, this portion of

Virginia society was one "whose lifestyle and values were
more akin to nonslaveholding northern and western states
than to the slaveholding Tidewater and Piedmont."8
It was Freehling who best summarized the varied nature
of Virginia in 1830.

"Virginia at the close of the first

three decades of the nineteenth century was a complex,
heterogeneous society, a region of extremes in both lands
and peoples.

Her vast territory . . . encompassed . , .
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rural plantations and urban factories, aristocratic
slaveholders and democratic nonslaveholders. . . . Perhaps
more than any other state, Virginia mirrored polarities
within the nation as a whole."9

It was this underlying

reality that served as the basis for the developments of
1829-1830, a reality that made the results of the conven
tion all the more remarkable.
Demands for a constitutional convention to reform the
1776 document had been voiced almost from its adoption, but
it did not become a matter of public urgency until the
nineteenth century.

In the first decades of the new

century, protest against the outdated constitution reached
a crescendo.

The conservative-dominated legislature

succeeded in rebuffing these calls for reform for a
considerable period, but in 1828 the General Assembly
finally succumbed to popular demand, and agreed to a
referendum on the convention question.

Despite the

undemocratic nature of the referendum {only those eligible
to vote under existing law could participate), the measure
passed, and the stage was set for the formal consideration
of possible amendments to the constitution of 1776.10
Both the terms of the debate and the substantive
results of the 1829-1830 Virginia constitutional convention
are highly important for our understanding of the nature of
the republican ideal as it was applied in Virginia; for the
policy outcome of that convention and the theories
underlying it set Virginia apart from the generally-
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accepted pattern of nineteenth-century political and
intellectual development.
The convention debates centered around the two key
issues of the suffrage and legislative apportionment.

On

the suffrage issue, reformers argued that such notions as
"popular sovereignty” and "equality” demanded that all
adult white males should vote.

To continue to link the

right to vote with the ownership of real property was
nothing less than "aristocracy."

The conservatives replied

that their version of the suffrage was equally as repub
lican as the reformers.

Since the inception of the

republic, they argued, the right to vote had been tied to
the ownership of property.

Importantly, the conservatives

could buttress their argument by pointing to the actual
provisions of the 1776 declaration of rights and constitu
tion.
On the matter of legislative apportionment, the
reformers advocated a "white basis”; that is, legislative
seats should be allocated on the basis of the entire white
population of Virginia.

Again they cited the rhetoric of

popular sovereignty and equality to support their cause.
The conservatives countered with an apportionment plan
founded on a "mixed basis,” where legislative representa
tion would reflect not only the white population, but also
the slave population.

This of course would favor the large

slaveowners of eastern Virginia.

The conservatives

supported this plan by again appealing to the sanctity of
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property.

They asserted that, unless their dominant

position in the legislature were maintained, their
ownership of property in slaves would be trampled by a nonslaveholding majority which would inevitably tax their
peculiar species of property out of existence.11
After considerable debate and much political maneuver
ing, the issues of legislative apportionment and freehold
suffrage finally came to a vote.

The result reflected a

certain amount of compromise by both sides, but the
ultimate effect of the determinations of the 1829-1830
constitutional convention was a clear victory for the
conservative interests, and solidified their hold on the
institutions of state government for another three decades.
In the apportionment battle, legislative districts
were indeed permitted to be based upon the white population
alone.

But the new districts were to be based on 1820

population figures, with no provision for future reappor
tionment.

This had the effect of assuring a permanent

conservative majority in both houses of the legislature.12
The suffrage issue also reflected a compromise which
nevertheless inured to the benefit of conservatives.

The

final formula for qualifying for the franchise was quite
complex.

It did extend the vote to certain carefully-

delineated nonfreeholders (who were tax-paying heads of
families), but even with the expanded franchise, still
fully 30 percent of all adult white males in Virginia were
denied the right to participate in the government of the
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Commonwealth.13

In addition, the convention expressly

rejected the reform demand for the popular election of
Virginia's executive and judiciary.

As always, this

privilege remained with the conservative-dominated General
Assembly.14
The reason for the conservative victory in 1830 was
not far to seek:

in structuring the elections of delegates

to the convention, the conservative state legislature in
effect "stacked the deck" against any meaningful reform.
The convention elections were held under existing suffrage
requirements, which of course disqualified all nonfree
holders from voting.

Moreover, the delegates were

apportioned according to existing senate districts, which
in turn reflected the 1810 census.

The end result was to

place the convention safely in the hands of conservatives.
As Alison G. Freehling has noted, "the struggle to
democratize Virginia's government seemed doomed to defeat
even before the convention began."15
It took another thirty years for the forces of
democracy in Virginia to muster enough enthusiasm and
support to once again assault the citadel of Virginia's
conservative constitutional structure.

By 1850, however,

the demographics of the Commonwealth had overwhelmed the
eastern conservatives, and in 1850-1851 another constitu
tional convention framed a document that reflected more
democratic mores.

While the senate retained its tradi

tional flavor, reapportionment in the house was placed upon
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a democratic basis, and universal white manhood suffrage
became the rule.

At this time also came the popular

election of the governor and judiciary.16

The debates in the 1829-1830 constitutional convention
and its eventual outcome provide an opportunity to observe
a matter of immense importance to our understanding of
republicanism in Virginia:

the shifting nature of

republican thought in response to changes in the surround
ing society.

Virginia, in what has become a recognizable

pattern, responded in a uniquely conservative manner to the
key issues posed by the constitutional debate.
Perhaps the most obvious issue raised by the debates
was one that was also the most fundamental:

Just what was

the meaning of this term "popular sovereignty" which
slipped so glibly from everyone's tongue: or, to put it
another way, just what was meant by "democracy"?

To begin,

it is clear that the notion of popular sovereignty held by
the framers of the 1776 constitution was not the same
notion that was advocated by the reformers in the 1829-1830
convention.

It is relatively certain that those men who

framed Virginia's original constitution intended sover
eignty to be exercised by just those people to whom they
had granted the suffrage; that is, by those with the
necessary "stake" in society, which of course meant a
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landed interest.

This position appeared rather limiting

and self-serving in retrospect, but at the time it raised
no great outcry.

Moreover, it is no doubt equally true

that the framers felt no overpowering sense of hypocrisy.
For one thing, this theory comported with accepted belief.
For another, it properly reflected an agrarian society with
a built-in deference to the landed gentry.

Perhaps most

important, however, was the fact that placing power in the
people had a different import than it was to have in the
nineteenth century.

As Joyce Appleby has perceived,

"Democratic values were invoked not to enlarge the people's
power in government but rather to justify the abandonment
of the authority traditionally exercised over them."17

In

other words, the broad democratic rhetoric found in
documents such as the Virginia declaration of rights was
intended not so much to justify democracy as it was to
justify an unprecedented republican revolution.
All this began to change as the eighteenth century
gave way to the nineteenth.

In those decades changes in

the social, economic, and political sphere came to undercut
virtually all of the rationalizations for the eighteenthcentury approach.

In the new century many non-landed

individuals were quite qualified to exercise the franchise.
Moreoever, even if one continued to adhere to the "stake in
society" theory of the suffrage, new, non-landed forms of
wealth made the older requirement of real property
ownership archaic.

'In addition to the social and economic
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changes, there was a new political theory in the air;
indeed, one that had been implemented by most other states
by 1830.

There was now a belief that all (adult white

male) people should have a say in government.
With all this seeming inevitability behind the
reformers' position, it is startling to find a constitu
tional convention at the end of the third decade of the
nineteenth century bucking the democratic tide so success
fully.

The reason Virginia conservatives were able to

suceed may be explained by nothing more than their skills
at political infighting.

The important thing, however, is

not how they succeeded, but what it meant for Virginia
society and Virginia republicanism.

One striking result of

the restrictive suffrage requirements that emitted from the
Virginia convention was the apparent adherence to something
akin to the eighteenth-century view of popular sovereignty.
On a more practical level, placing the institutions of
government in the hands of conservative, eastern slave
holders portended policy choices in the future which would
be consonant with their interests.18

All in all, it seems

that, while many of the other states of the union were
progressing toward a more democratic order, the leadership
of Virginia consciously chose an eighteenth-century version
of popular sovereignty and republicanism.

The Commonwealth

continued to march in place (or, if anything, took a
backward step) in the face of a changing political and
social world.
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The Virginia constitution of 1830 was consistent in
many ways with the Revolutionary settlement that was worked
out by the Court of Appeals (among others) in the preceding
decades.

It gave voice to republican values, yet applied

them in a manner that was unequivocally conservative.

As

J. R. Pole has noted, "The new social order was held at bay
for more than a generation.1,19
The long-term implications of Virginia’s peculiar
approach to Revolutionary republicanism are beyond the
scope of this study.

Perhaps the most suggestive pos

sibility has been articulated by James M. McPherson, in
his recent, acclaimed treatment of the Civil War.

The

Confederate States of America, McPherson contends,
represented a reassertion of the ideals and traditions of
the American Revolution.

"The South’s concept of repub

licanism had not changed in three quarters of a century,"
he notes, "the North's had.

With complete sincerity, the

South fought to preserve its version of the republic of the
founding fathers— a government of limited powers that
protected the rights of property and whose constituency
comprised an independent gentry and yeomanry of the white
race undisturbed by large cities, heartless factories,
restless free workers, and class conflict.

The accession

to power of the Republican party,” McPherson continues,
"with its ideology of competitive, egalitarian, free-labor
capitalism, was a signal to the South that the northern
majority had turned irrevocably toward this frightening,
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revolutionary future.

Therefore," he concludes, "secession

was a pre-emptive counterrevolution to prevent the Black
Republican revolution from engulfing the South."20
Regardless of whether McPherson’s particular vision is
correct or not, an understanding of Virginia's peculiar
form of republicanism will inevitably lead to a better
appreciation of the complex forces which were at large in
America in the early nineteenth century.
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APPENDIX A
SHORT TITLES
Call

Daniel Call, Reports of Cases Argued and
Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of Virginia
(6 vols.; Richmond, 1801-33).

Cranch

William Cranch, Reports of Cases Argued and
Adjudged in the Supreme Court of the United
States, 1801-1815 (9 vols.; New York and
Washington, 1804-17).

Gilmer

Francis W. Gilmer, Reports of Cases Decided
in the Court of Appeals of Virginia
(Richmond, 1822).

Hening

William Waller Hening, ed. The Statutes at
Large; Being a Collection of All the Laws of
Virginia . . . (13 vols.; 1819-23; Char
lottesville, 1969 reprint).

Hen. & M.

William W. Hening and William Munford, Reports
of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia . . . (4 vols-;
Philadelphia, 1808-11).

Leigh

Benjamin Watkins Leigh, Reports of Cases
Argued and Determined in the Court of
Appeals, and in the General Court of
Virginia (Richmond, 1830-31).

Munf.

William Munford, Reports of Cases Argued and
Determined in the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia (6 vols.; New York, Philadel
phia, Fredericksburg, Richmond, 1812-21).

Rand.

Peyton Randolph, Reports of Cases Argued and
Determined in the Court of Appeals of
Virginia (6 vols.; Richmond, 1823-30).

Va. Cas.

William Brockenbrough, A Collection of Cases
Decided by the General Court of Virginia (2
vols.; Philadelphia and Richmond, 1815-26).

Wash.

Busnrod Washington, Reports of Cases Argued
and Determined in the Court of Appeals of
Virginia (2 vols.; Richmond, 1798-99).

Wheat.

Henry Wehaton, Reports of Cases Argued and
Adjudged in the Supreme Court, 1816-1827 (12
vols.; Philadelphia, 1816-27).
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APPENDIX B
MEMBERS OF VIRGINIA COURT OF APPEALS, 1788-1830

John Blair

1788-1789

Edmund Pendleton

1788-1803

Paul Carrington

1788-1807

Peter Lyons

1788-1809

William Fleming

1788-1824

James Mercer

1789-1793

Henry Tazewell

1793-1794

Spencer Roane

1794-1822

St. George Tucker

1804-1811

James Pleasants

January 1811March 1811

William H. Cabell

1811-1830

Francis T. Brooke

1811-1830

John Coalter

1811-1830

John W. Green

1822-1830

Dabney Carr

1824-1830

•
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